Directive (EU) 2023/959 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading system (Text with EEA relevance)
Directive (EU) 2023/959 of the European Parliament and of the Councilof 10 May 2023amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading system(Text with EEA relevance)THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 192(1) thereof,Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social CommitteeOJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 175.,Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the RegionsOJ C 301, 5.8.2022, p. 116.,Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedurePosition of the European Parliament of 18 April 2023 (not yet published in the Official Journal) and decision of the Council of 25 April 2023.,Whereas:(1)The Paris AgreementOJ L 282, 19.10.2016, p. 4., adopted on 12 December 2015 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (the "Paris Agreement"), entered into force on 4 November 2016. The Parties to the Paris Agreement have agreed to hold the increase in the global average temperature well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels. That commitment has been reinforced with the adoption under the UNFCCC of the Glasgow Climate Pact on 13 November 2021, in which the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, recognises that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at a temperature increase of 1,5 oC, compared with 2 oC, and resolves to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1,5 oC.(2)The urgency of the need to keep the Paris Agreement goal of 1,5 °C alive has become more significant following the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its Sixth Assessment Report that global warming can only be limited to 1,5 °C if strong and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions within this decade are immediately undertaken.(3)Tackling climate- and environmental-related challenges and reaching the objectives of the Paris Agreement are at the core of the communication of the Commission of 11 December 2019 on "The European Green Deal" (the "European Green Deal").(4)The European Green Deal combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the Union by 2050, and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the Union into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where economic growth is decoupled from resource use. It also aims to protect, conserve and enhance the Union’s natural capital, and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. This transition affects workers from various sectors differently. At the same time, that transition has gender equality aspects as well as a particular impact on some disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, such as older people, persons with disabilities, persons with a minority racial or ethnic background and low and lower-middle income individuals and households. It also imposes greater challenges on certain regions, in particular structurally disadvantaged and peripheral regions, as well as on islands. It must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive, leaving no one behind.(5)On 17 December 2020, the Union submitted its nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC, following its approval by the Council. Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the CouncilDirective 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32)., as amended by, inter alia, Directive (EU) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilDirective (EU) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 (OJ L 76, 19.3.2018, p. 3)., is one of the instruments cited, subject to revision in light of the enhanced 2030 target, in the general description of the target in the Annex to that submission. The Council stated in its conclusions of 24 October 2022 that it stands ready, as soon as possible after the conclusions of the negotiations on the essential elements of the "Fit for 55" package, to update, as appropriate, the NDC of the Union and its Member States, in line with paragraph 29 of the Glasgow Climate Pact to reflect how the final outcome of the essential elements of the "Fit for 55" package implements the Union headline target as agreed by the European Council in December 2020. As the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), established by Directive 2003/87/EC, is a cornerstone of the Union’s climate policy and constitutes its key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective way, the amendments to Directive 2003/87/EC, including with regard to the scope thereof, adopted through this Directive are part of the essential elements of the "Fit for 55" package.(6)The necessity and the value of delivering on the European Green Deal have only grown in light of the very severe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health, the living and working conditions and the well-being of the Union’s citizens. Those effects have shown that our society and our economy need to improve their resilience in relation to external shocks and act early to prevent or mitigate the effects of external shocks in a manner that is just and results in no one being left behind, including those at risk of energy poverty. European citizens continue to express strong views that this applies in particular to climate change.(7)The Union committed to reducing the Union’s economy-wide net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % compared to 1990 levels by 2030 in the updated NDC submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat on 17 December 2020.(8)Through the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 ("European Climate Law") (OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1)., the Union has enshrined in legislation the objective of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and the aim of achieving negative emissions thereafter. That Regulation also establishes a binding Union domestic reduction target for net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55 % compared to 1990 levels by 2030, and provides that the Commission is to endeavour to align all future draft measures or legislative proposals, including budgetary proposals, with the objectives of that Regulation and, in any case of non-alignment, provide the reasons for such non-alignment as part of the impact assessment accompanying those proposals.(9)All sectors of the economy need to contribute to achieving the emission reductions established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1119. Therefore, the ambition of the EU ETS should be adjusted so as to be in line with the economy-wide net greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2030, the objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and the aim of achieving negative emissions thereafter, as laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/1119.(10)The EU ETS should incentivise production from installations that partly reduce or fully eliminate greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, the description of some categories of activities in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC should be amended to ensure that installations performing an activity listed in that Annex and meeting the capacity threshold related to the same activity, but not emitting any greenhouse gases, are included within the scope of the EU ETS, and thereby ensure there is equal treatment of installations in the sectors concerned. In addition, free allocation for the production of a product should take into account, as guiding principles, the circular use-potential of materials and the fact that the benchmark should be independent of the feedstock or the type of production process, where the production processes have the same purpose. It is therefore necessary to modify the definition of the products and of the processes and emissions covered for some benchmarks, to ensure a level playing field for installations using new technologies that partly reduce or fully eliminate greenhouse gas emissions, and installations using existing technologies. Notwithstanding those guiding principles, the revised benchmarks for 2026 to 2030 should continue to distinguish between primary and secondary production of steel and aluminium. It is also necessary to decouple the update of the benchmark values for refineries and for hydrogen to reflect the increasing importance of production of hydrogen, including green hydrogen, outside the refineries sector.(11)Following the modification of the definitions of the products and of the processes and emissions covered for some benchmarks, it is necessary to ensure that producers do not receive double compensation for the same emissions with both free allocation and indirect costs compensation, and thus to adjust accordingly the financial measures to compensate indirect costs passed on in electricity prices.(12)Council Directive 96/61/ECCouncil Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (OJ L 257, 10.10.1996, p. 26). was repealed by Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the CouncilDirective 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17).. The references to Directive 96/61/EC in Article 2 of Directive 2003/87/EC and in its Annex IV should be updated accordingly. Given the need for urgent economy-wide emission reductions, Member States should be able to act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that are within the scope of the EU ETS also through policies other than emission limits adopted pursuant to Directive 2010/75/EU.(13)In its communication of 12 May 2021 entitled "Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All - EU Action Plan: Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil", the Commission calls for the steering of the Union towards zero pollution by 2050, by reducing air, freshwater, sea and soil pollution to levels which are no longer expected to be harmful for health and natural ecosystems. Measures under Directive 2010/75/EU, as the main instrument regulating air, water and soil pollutant emissions, will often also enable greenhouse gas emissions to be reduced. In line with Article 8 of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States should ensure coordination between the permit requirements of Directive 2003/87/EC and those of Directive 2010/75/EU.(14)Recognising that new innovative technologies will often allow emissions of both greenhouse gases and pollutants to be reduced, it is important to ensure synergies between measures delivering reductions of emissions of both greenhouse gases and pollutants, in particular Directive 2010/75/EU, and review their effectiveness in this regard.(15)The definition of electricity generators was used to determine the maximum amount of free allocation to industry in the period from 2013 to 2020, but led to different treatment of cogeneration power plants compared to industrial installations. In order to incentivise the use of high efficiency cogeneration and to level the playing field for all installations receiving free allocation for heat production and district heating, all references to electricity generators in Directive 2003/87/EC should be deleted. In addition, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/331Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/331 of 19 December 2018 determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 59, 27.2.2019, p. 8). specifies the details relating to the eligibility of all industrial processes for free allocation. Therefore, the provisions on carbon capture and storage in Article 10a(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC have become obsolete and should be deleted.(16)Greenhouse gases that are not directly released into the atmosphere should be considered emissions under the EU ETS and allowances should be surrendered for those emissions unless they are stored in a storage site in accordance with Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the CouncilDirective 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 (OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 114)., or they are permanently chemically bound in a product so that they do not enter the atmosphere under normal use and do not enter the atmosphere under any normal activity taking place after the end of the life of the product. The Commission should be empowered to adopt delegated acts specifying the conditions according to which greenhouse gases are to be considered as permanently chemically bound in a product so that they do not enter the atmosphere under normal use and do not enter the atmosphere under any normal activity after the end of the life of the product, including obtaining a carbon removal certificate, where appropriate, in view of regulatory developments with regard to the certification of carbon removals. Normal activity after the end of the life of the product should be understood broadly, covering all the activities taking place after the end of the life of the product, including reuse, remanufacturing, recycling and disposal, such as incineration and landfill.(17)International maritime transport activity, consisting of voyages between ports under the jurisdiction of two different Member States or between a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State and a port outside the jurisdiction of any Member State, has been the only means of transportation not included in the Union’s past commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions from fuel sold in the Union for voyages that depart in one Member State and arrive in a different Member State or a third country have grown by around 36 % since 1990. Those emissions represent close to 90 % of all Union navigation emissions, as emissions from fuel sold in the Union for voyages departing from and arriving in the same Member State have been reduced by 26 % since 1990. In a business-as-usual scenario, emissions from international maritime transport activities are projected to grow by around 14 % between 2015 and 2030 and by 34 % between 2015 and 2050. If the climate change impact of maritime transport activities grows as projected, it would significantly undermine reductions made by other sectors to combat climate change and therefore to achieve the economy-wide net greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2030, the Union’s climate-neutrality objective by 2050 at the latest, and the aim of achieving negative emissions thereafter, as laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, and the objectives of the Paris Agreement.(18)In 2013, the Commission adopted a strategy for progressively integrating maritime transport emissions into the Union’s policy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. As a first step in this approach, the Union established a system to monitor, report and verify emissions from maritime transport in Regulation (EU) 2015/757 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) 2015/757 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 55)., to be followed by the laying down of reduction targets for maritime transport and the application of a market-based measure. In line with the commitment of the co-legislators expressed in Directive (EU) 2018/410, action by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or the Union should start from 2023, including preparatory work on adoption and implementation of a measure ensuring that the sector duly contributes to the efforts needed to achieve the objectives agreed under the Paris Agreement, and due consideration being given by all stakeholders.(19)Pursuant to Directive (EU) 2018/410, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the progress achieved in the IMO towards an ambitious emission reduction objective, and on accompanying measures to ensure that maritime transport duly contributes to the efforts needed to achieve the objectives agreed under the Paris Agreement. Efforts to limit global maritime emissions through the IMO are under way and should be encouraged, including the rapid implementation of the Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, adopted in 2018, which also refers to possible market-based measures to incentivise greenhouse gas emission reductions from international shipping. However, while recently there has been progress in the IMO, this has so far not been sufficient to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Given the international character of shipping, it is important that the Member States and the Union within their respective competences work with third countries to step up diplomatic efforts to strengthen global measures and make progress on the development of a global market-based measure at IMO level.(20)Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from maritime transport account for around 3 to 4 % of Union emissions. In the European Green Deal, the Commission stated its intention to take additional measures to address greenhouse gas emissions from maritime transport through a basket of measures to enable the Union to reach its emission reduction targets. In this context, Directive 2003/87/EC should be amended to include maritime transport in the EU ETS in order to ensure that that sector contributes its fair share to the increased climate objectives of the Union as well as to the objectives of the Paris Agreement, which in Article 4(4) states that developed countries should continue to take the lead by undertaking economy-wide emission reduction targets, while developing countries are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets. While emissions from international aviation outside Europe were to be capped from January 2021 by global market-based action, an action that caps or puts a price on maritime transport emissions is not yet in place. It is therefore appropriate that the EU ETS cover a share of the emissions from voyages between a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State and a port under the jurisdiction of a third country, with the third country being able to decide on appropriate action in respect of the other share of emissions.The extension of the EU ETS to maritime transport should thus include half of the emissions from ships performing voyages arriving at a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State from a port outside the jurisdiction of a Member State, half of the emissions from ships performing voyages departing from a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State and arriving at a port outside the jurisdiction of a Member State, all of the emissions from ships performing voyages arriving at a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State from a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State, and all of the emissions within a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State. This approach has been noted as a practical way to solve the issue of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities, which has been a longstanding challenge in the UNFCCC context. The coverage of a share of the emissions from both incoming and outgoing voyages between the Union and third countries ensures the effectiveness of the EU ETS, in particular by increasing the environmental impact of the measure compared to a geographical scope limited to voyages within the Union, while limiting the risk of evasive port calls and the risk of delocalisation of transhipment activities outside the Union. To ensure a smooth inclusion of the sector in the EU ETS, the surrendering of allowances by shipping companies should be gradually increased with respect to verified emissions reported for the years 2024 and 2025.To protect the environmental integrity of the system, where fewer allowances are surrendered compared to verified emissions for maritime transport during those years, once the difference between verified emissions and allowances surrendered has been established each year, an amount of allowances corresponding to that difference should be cancelled. From 2026, shipping companies should surrender the number of allowances corresponding to all of their verified emissions. While the climate impact of maritime transport is mainly due to its CO2 emissions, non-CO2 emissions represent a significant share of emissions from ships. According to the Fourth IMO Greenhouse Gas Study 2020, methane emissions increased significantly over the period from 2012 to 2018. Methane and nitrous oxide emissions will likely grow over time, in particular with the development of vessels powered by liquefied natural gases or other energy sources. The inclusion of methane and nitrous oxide emissions would be beneficial for environmental integrity and for incentivising good practices. Those emissions should first be included in Regulation (EU) 2015/757 from 2024, and they should be included in the EU ETS from 2026.(21)The extension of the scope of Directive 2003/87/EC to maritime transport will lead to changes in the cost of such transport. All parts of the Union will be affected by that extension of scope as the goods transported to and from ports within the Union by maritime transport have their origin or destination in the different Member States, including in landlocked Member States. The allocation of allowances to be auctioned by the Member States should therefore, in principle, not change as a consequence of the inclusion of maritime transport activities, and should include all Member States. However, Member States will be affected to different extents. In particular, Member States with a high reliance on shipping will be most exposed to the effect of the extension. Member States with a large maritime sector compared to their relative size will be more affected by the extension of the EU ETS to maritime transport. It is therefore appropriate to provide additional time-limited assistance to those Member States in the form of additional allowances to support decarbonisation of maritime activities and for the administrative costs incurred. The assistance should be gradually introduced in parallel with the introduction of surrender obligations and thus with the increased effect on those Member States. Within the context of the review of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission should consider the relevance of that additional assistance in light, in particular, of the development in the number of shipping companies under the responsibility of different Member States.(22)The EU ETS should contribute significantly to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from maritime activities and to increasing efficiency in relation to such activities. The use of EU ETS revenues pursuant to Article 10(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC should include, inter alia, the promotion of climate-friendly transport and public transport in all sectors.(23)Renewing fleets of ice-class ships and developing innovative technology that reduces the emissions of such ships will take time and require financial support. Currently, the design of ice-class ships, which enables them to sail in ice conditions, leads to such ships consuming more fuel and emitting more than ships of similar size designed for sailing only in open water. Therefore, a flag-neutral method should be implemented under this Directive allowing for a reduction, until 31 December 2030, of allowances to be surrendered by shipping companies on the basis of their ships’ ice class.(24)Islands with no road or rail link with the mainland are more dependent on maritime transport than the other regions and depend on maritime links for their connectivity. In order to assist islands with a small population to remain connected following the inclusion of maritime transport activities within the scope of Directive 2003/87/EC, it is appropriate to provide for the possibility for a Member State to request a temporary derogation from the surrender obligations under that Directive for certain maritime transport activities with islands with a population of fewer than 200000 permanent residents.(25)It should be possible for Member States to request that a transnational public service contract or a transnational public service obligation between two Member States be temporarily exempted from certain obligations under Directive 2003/87/EC. That possibility should be limited to connections between a Member State without a land border with another Member State and the geographically closest Member State, such as the maritime connection between Cyprus and Greece, which has been absent for over two decades. That temporary derogation would contribute to addressing the compelling need to provide a service of general interest and ensure connectivity as well as economic, social and territorial cohesion.(26)Taking into account the special characteristics and permanent constraints of the outermost regions of the Union as recognised in Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and given their heavy dependence on maritime transport, special consideration should be given to preserving the accessibility of such regions and efficient connectivity by means of maritime transport. Therefore, a temporary derogation from certain obligations pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC should be provided for emissions from maritime transport activities between a port located in an outermost region of a Member State and a port located in the same Member State, including ports located in the same outermost region and in another outermost region of the same Member State.(27)The provisions of Directive 2003/87/EC as regards maritime transport activities should be kept under review in light of future international developments and efforts undertaken to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement, including the second global stocktake in 2028, and subsequent global stocktakes every five years thereafter, intended to inform successive NDCs. Those provisions should also be reviewed in the event of the adoption by the IMO of a global market-based measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from maritime transport. To this end, the Commission should present a report to the European Parliament and to the Council within 18 months of the adoption of such a measure and before it becomes operational. The Commission should in that report examine that global market-based measure as regards its ambition in light of the objectives of the Paris Agreement, its overall environmental integrity, including in comparison with the provisions of Directive 2003/87/EC covering maritime transport, and any issue related to the coherence of the EU ETS and that measure. In particular, the Commission should in its report take into account the level of participation in that global market-based measure, its enforceability, transparency, penalties for non-compliance, the processes for public input, the monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions, registries and accountability. Where appropriate, the report should be accompanied by a legislative proposal to amend Directive 2003/87/EC in a manner that is consistent with the Union 2030 climate target and the climate-neutrality objective set out in Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, and with the aim of preserving the environmental integrity and effectiveness of Union climate action, in order to ensure coherence between the implementation of the global market-based measure and the EU ETS, while avoiding any significant double burden, and thereby recalling the Union’s competence to regulate its share of emissions from international shipping voyages, in line with the obligations of the Paris Agreement.(28)With the increased costs of shipping which the extension of Directive 2003/87/EC to maritime transport activities entails, there is, in the absence of a global market-based measure, a risk of evasion. Evasive port calls to ports outside of the Union and relocation of transhipment activities to ports outside of the Union will not only diminish the environmental benefits of internalising the cost of emissions from maritime transport activities but can also lead to additional emissions due to the extra distance travelled to evade the requirements of Directive 2003/87/EC. It is therefore appropriate to exclude from the definition of "port of call" certain stops at non-Union ports. That exclusion should be targeted at ports in the Union’s vicinity where the risk of evasion is greatest. A limit of 300 nautical miles from a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State constitutes a proportionate response to evasive behaviour, balancing the additional burden and the risk of evasion. Moreover, the exclusion from the definition of "port of call" should only apply to stops by container ships at certain non-Union ports, where the transhipment of containers accounts for most container traffic. For such shipments, the risk of evasion, in the absence of mitigating measures, also consists in port hubs being shifted to ports outside the Union, aggravating the effects of the evasion. To ensure the proportionality of the measure and that it results in equal treatment, account should be taken of measures in third countries that have an effect equivalent to Directive 2003/87/EC.(29)The Commission should review the functioning of Directive 2003/87/EC in relation to maritime transport activities in the light of experience in applying that Directive, including detecting evasive behaviour in order to prevent such behaviour at an early stage, and should then propose measures to ensure the effectiveness of that Directive. Such measures could include increased surrender requirements for voyages where the evasion risk is higher, such as to and from a port that is located in the Union’s vicinity, in a third country that has not adopted measures similar to Directive 2003/87/EC.(30)Emissions from ships below 5000 gross tonnage represent less than 15 % of emissions from ships, taking into account the scope of application of this Directive, but are emitted by a large number of ships. For reasons of administrative practicability, it is too early to include ships below 5000 gross tonnage in the EU ETS from the start of the inclusion of maritime transport, but their inclusion in the future would improve the effectiveness of the EU ETS and potentially reduce evasive behaviour with the use of ships below the 5000 gross tonnage threshold. Therefore, no later than 31 December 2026, the Commission should present a report to the European Parliament and to the Council in which it should examine the feasibility and economic, environmental and social impacts of the inclusion in Directive 2003/87/EC of emissions from ships below 5000 gross tonnage, including offshore ships.(31)The person or organisation responsible for the compliance with the EU ETS should be the shipping company, defined as the shipowner or any other organisation or person, such as the manager or the bareboat charterer, that has assumed the responsibility for the operation of the ship from the shipowner and that, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all the duties and responsibilities imposed by the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention. This definition is based on the definition of "company" in Article 3, point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2015/757, and in line with the global data collection system established in 2016 by the IMO.(32)The emissions from a ship depend, inter alia, on the vessel energy efficiency measures taken by the shipowner, and on the fuel, the cargo carried and the route and the speed of the ship, which can be under the control of a different entity from the shipowner. The responsibilities for purchasing fuel or taking operational decisions that affect the greenhouse gas emissions of the ship can be assumed by an entity other than the shipping company under a contractual arrangement. At the time the contract is negotiated, the latter aspects, in particular, would not be known and thus the ultimate emissions from the ship covered by Directive 2003/87/EC would be uncertain. However, unless the carbon costs were passed on to the entity operating the ship, the incentives to implement operational measures for fuel efficiency would be limited. In line with the "polluter pays" principle and to encourage the adoption of efficiency measures and the uptake of cleaner fuels, the shipping company should therefore be entitled, under national law, to claim reimbursement for the costs arising from the surrender of allowances from the entity that is directly responsible for the decisions affecting the greenhouse gas emissions of the ship.While such a mechanism of reimbursement could be subject to a contractual arrangement, Member States should, to reduce administrative costs, not be obliged to ensure or check the existence of such contracts, but should instead provide for, in national law, a statutory entitlement for the shipping company to be reimbursed and the corresponding access to justice to enforce that entitlement. For the same reasons, that entitlement, including any possible conflict relating to the reimbursement between the shipping company and the entity operating the ship, should not affect the obligations of the shipping company vis-à-vis the administering authority in respect of a shipping company or the enforcement measures that might be necessary against such a company to ensure there is full compliance by that company with Directive 2003/87/EC. At the same time, as the purpose served by the provision concerning the entitlement to reimbursement is closely connected with the Union, in particular in relation to the compliance with obligations under this Directive by a shipping company vis-à-vis a given Member State, it is important that that entitlement be observed throughout the Union, in all contractual relations that allow an entity other than the shipowner to determine the cargo carried or the route and the speed of the ship, in a manner that safeguards undistorted competition in the internal market, which can include provisions preventing parties to such contractual agreements from circumventing the entitlement to reimbursement by including a choice of law clause.(33)In order to reduce the administrative burden on shipping companies, one Member State should be responsible for each shipping company. The Commission should publish an initial list of shipping companies that performed a maritime transport activity falling within the scope of the EU ETS, which specifies the administering authority in respect of a shipping company. The list should be updated regularly and at least every two years to reattribute shipping companies to another such administering authority as relevant. For shipping companies registered in a Member State, the administering authority in respect of a shipping company should be that Member State. For shipping companies registered in a third country, the administering authority in respect of a shipping company should be the Member State in which the shipping company had the greatest estimated number of port calls from voyages falling within the scope of Directive 2003/87/EC in the preceding four monitoring years. For shipping companies which are registered in a third country and which did not perform any voyage falling within the scope of Directive 2003/87/EC in the preceding four monitoring years, the administering authority in respect of a shipping company should be the Member State where a ship of the shipping company started or ended its first voyage falling within the scope of that Directive. The Commission should publish and update, as relevant, on a biennial basis a list of shipping companies falling within the scope of Directive 2003/87/EC, specifying the administering authority in respect of a shipping company. In order to ensure equal treatment of shipping companies, Member States should follow harmonised rules for the administration of shipping companies for which they have responsibility, in accordance with detailed rules to be established by the Commission.(34)Member States should ensure that the shipping companies that they administer comply with the requirements of Directive 2003/87/EC. In the event that a shipping company fails to comply with those requirements and any enforcement measures taken by the administering authority in respect of a shipping company have failed to ensure compliance, Member States should act in solidarity. As a last resort measure, Member States, except for the Member State whose flag the ship is flying, should be able to refuse entry to the ships under the responsibility of the shipping company concerned, and the Member State whose flag the ship is flying should be able to detain that ship.(35)Shipping companies should monitor and report their aggregated emissions data from maritime transport activities at company level in accordance with the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2015/757. The reports on aggregated emissions data at company level should be verified in accordance with the rules laid down in that Regulation. When performing verification at company level, the verifier should not verify the emissions reports at ship level or the reports at ship level to be submitted where there is a change of company, as those reports at ship level will have been already verified.(36)Based on experience from similar tasks related to environmental protection, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) or another relevant organisation should, as appropriate and in accordance with its mandate, assist the Commission and the administering authorities in respect of a shipping company in relation to the implementation of Directive 2003/87/EC. Owing to its experience with the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2015/757 and its IT tools, EMSA should assist the administering authorities in respect of a shipping company, in particular as regards the monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions generated by maritime transport activities under the scope of Directive 2003/87/EC, by facilitating the exchange of information or developing guidelines and criteria. The Commission, assisted by EMSA, should endeavour to develop appropriate monitoring tools, as well as guidance to facilitate and coordinate verification and enforcement activities related to the application of Directive 2003/87/EC to maritime transport. As far as practicable, such tools should be made available to the Member States and the verifiers in order to better ensure robust enforcement of the national measures transposing Directive 2003/87/EC.(37)In parallel to the adoption of this Directive, Regulation (EU) 2015/757 is being amended to provide for monitoring, reporting and verification rules that are necessary for an extension of the EU ETS to maritime transport activities and to provide for the monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions of additional greenhouse gases and emissions from additional ship types.(38)Regulation (EU) 2017/2392 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) 2017/2392 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2017 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to continue current limitations of scope for aviation activities and to prepare to implement a global market-based measure from 2021 (OJ L 350, 29.12.2017, p. 7). amended Article 12(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC to allow all operators to use all allowances that are issued. The requirement for greenhouse gas emissions permits to contain an obligation to surrender allowances, pursuant to Article 6(2), point (e), of that Directive, should be aligned accordingly.(39)Achieving the Union’s emission reduction target for 2030 will require a reduction in the emissions of the sectors covered by the EU ETS of 62 % compared to 2005. The Union-wide quantity of allowances of the EU ETS needs to be reduced to create the necessary long-term carbon price signal and impetus for that degree of decarbonisation. The total quantity of allowances should be reduced in 2024 and 2026 to bring it more in line with actual emissions. Moreover, the linear reduction factor should be increased in 2024 and in 2028, also taking into account the inclusion of emissions from maritime transport. The steeper cap trajectory resulting from those changes will lead to significantly greater levels of cumulative emission reductions up to 2030 than would have occurred pursuant to Directive (EU) 2018/410. The figures relating to the inclusion of maritime transport should be derived from the emissions from maritime transport activities that are addressed in Article 3ga of Directive 2003/87/EC and reported in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2015/757 for 2018 and 2019 in the Union and the States of the European Economic Area and the European Free Trade Association, adjusted, from 2021 until 2024, by the linear reduction factor for the year 2024. The linear reduction factor should be applied in 2024 to the increase of the Union-wide quantity of allowances in that year.(40)Achieving the increased climate ambition will require substantial public and private resources in the Union as well as in Member States to be dedicated to the climate transition. To complement and reinforce the substantial climate-related spending in the Union budget, all auction revenues that are not attributed to the Union budget in the form of own resources, or the equivalent financial value of such auction revenues, should be used for climate-related purposes, with the exception of the revenues used for the compensation of indirect carbon costs. The list of climate-related purposes in Article 10(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC should be expanded to cover additional purposes with a positive environmental impact. This should include use for financial support to address social aspects in lower- and middle-income households by reducing distortive taxes and targeted reductions of duties and charges for renewable electricity. Member States should report annually on the use of auctioning revenues in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 1)., specifying, where relevant and as appropriate, which revenues are used and the actions that are taken to implement their integrated national energy and climate plans and their territorial just transition plans.(41)Member States’ auctioning revenues will increase as a result of the inclusion of maritime transport in the EU ETS. Therefore, Member States are encouraged to increase the use of EU ETS revenues pursuant to Article 10(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC to contribute to the protection, restoration and better management of marine-based ecosystems, in particular marine protected areas.(42)Significant financial resources are needed to implement the goals of the Paris Agreement in developing countries and the Glasgow Climate Pact urges developed country Parties to urgently and significantly scale up their provision of climate finance. In its conclusions on the Preparations for the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 27), the Council recalls that the Union and its Member States are the largest contributor to international public climate finance and have more than doubled their contribution to climate finance to support developing countries since 2013. In those conclusions, the Council also renews the strong commitment made by the Union and its Member States to continue scaling up their international climate finance towards the developed countries’ goal of mobilising at least USD 100 billion per year as soon as possible and through to 2025 from a wide variety of sources, and expects the goal to be met in 2023.(43)To address the distributional and social effects of the transition in low-income Member States, an additional amount of 2,5 % of the Union-wide quantity of allowances from 2024 to 2030 should be used to fund the energy transition of the Member States with a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita below 75 % of the Union average in the years 2016 to 2018, through the Modernisation Fund referred to in Article 10d of Directive 2003/87/EC.(44)The beneficiary Member States should be able to use the resources allocated to the Modernisation Fund to finance investments involving the adjacent Union border regions when this is relevant to the energy transition of beneficiary Member States.(45)Further incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by using cost-efficient techniques should be provided. To that end, the free allocation of emission allowances to stationary installations from 2026 onwards should be conditional on investments in techniques to increase energy efficiency and reduce emissions, in particular for large energy users. The Commission should ensure that the application of that conditionality does not jeopardise a level playing field, environmental integrity or equal treatment of installations across the Union. The Commission should therefore, without prejudice to the rules applicable under Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the CouncilDirective 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 1)., adopt delegated acts supplementing this Directive to address any issue identified in particular on the above-mentioned principles and provide for administratively simple rules for the application of the conditionality. Those rules should be part of the general rules on free allocation, using the established procedure for national implementing measures, and provide for timelines, for criteria for the recognition of implemented energy efficiency measures, as well as for alternative measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should be further reinforced for installations with high greenhouse gas emission intensities. To that end, from 2026 onwards, the free allocation of emission allowances to the 20 % stationary installations with the highest emission intensities under a given product benchmark should also be conditional on the setting-up and implementation of climate-neutrality plans.(46)The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), established under Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (see page 52 of this Official Journal)., is set to replace the mechanisms established under Directive 2003/87/EC to prevent the risk of carbon leakage. To the extent that sectors and subsectors are covered by that measure, they should not receive free allocation. However, a transitional phasing-out of free allowances is needed to allow producers, importers and traders to adjust to the new regime. The reduction of free allocation should be implemented by applying a factor to free allocation for CBAM sectors, while CBAM is phased in. The CBAM factor should be equal to 100 % for the period between the entry into force of that Regulation and the end of 2025, and subject to the application of provisions referred to in Article 36(2), point (b), of that Regulation, should be equal to 97,5 % in 2026, 95 % in 2027, 90 % in 2028, 77,5 % in 2029, 51,5 % in 2030, 39 % in 2031, 26,5 % in 2032 and 14 % in 2033. From 2034, no CBAM factor should apply.The relevant delegated acts on free allocation should be adjusted accordingly for the sectors and subsectors covered by CBAM. The free allocation no longer provided to the CBAM sectors based on this calculation (CBAM demand) is to be added to the Innovation Fund, so as to support innovation in low-carbon technologies, carbon capture and utilisation (CCU), carbon capture, transport and geological storage (CCS), renewable energy and energy storage, in a way that contributes to mitigating climate change. In this context, special attention should be given to projects in CBAM sectors. To respect the proportion of the free allocation available for non-CBAM sectors, the final amount to be deducted from the free allocation and made available under the Innovation Fund should be calculated based on the proportion that the CBAM demand represents in respect of the free allocation needs of all sectors receiving free allocation.(47)In order to mitigate potential carbon leakage risks related to goods subject to CBAM and produced in the Union for export to third countries which do not apply the EU ETS or a similar carbon pricing mechanism, an assessment should be carried out before the end of the transitional period under Regulation (EU) 2023/956. Where that assessment concludes that there is such a carbon leakage risk, the Commission should, where appropriate, submit a legislative proposal to address that carbon leakage risk in a manner that is compliant with the rules of the World Trade Organization. Moreover, Member States should be allowed to use auction revenues to address any residual risk of carbon leakage in CBAM sectors and in accordance with State aid rules. Where allowances coming from a reduction of free allocation in application of the conditionality rules are not fully used to exempt the installations with the lowest greenhouse gas emission intensity from the cross-sectoral correction, 50 % of those residual allowances should be added to the Innovation Fund. The other 50 % should be auctioned on behalf of Member States and they should use the revenue therefrom to address any residual risk of carbon leakage in CBAM sectors.(48)In order to better reflect technological progress while ensuring emission reduction incentives and properly rewarding innovation, the minimum adjustment of the benchmark values should be increased from 0,2 % to 0,3 % per year, and the maximum adjustment should be increased from 1,6 % to 2,5 % per year. For the period from 2026 to 2030, the benchmark values should thus be adjusted within a range of 6 % to 50 % compared to the value applicable in the period from 2013 to 2020. In order to provide predictability to installations, the Commission should adopt implementing acts determining the revised benchmark values for free allocation as soon as possible before the start of the period from 2026 to 2030.(49)To incentivise new breakthrough technologies in the steel industry and to avoid a significantly disproportionate reduction of the benchmark value and in light of the particular situation of the steel industry such as the high emission intensity and the international and Union market structure, it is necessary to exclude from the calculation of the hot metal benchmark value for the period from 2026 to 2030 installations that were operational during the reference period from 2021 to 2022 and that would otherwise be included in that calculation due to the review of the definition of the product benchmark for hot metal.(50)To reward best performers and innovation, installations whose greenhouse gas emission levels are below the average of the 10 % most efficient installations under a given benchmark should be excluded from the application of the cross-sectoral correction factor. Allowances that are not allocated due to a reduction of free allocation in application of the conditionality rules should be used to cover the deficit in the reduction of free allocation resulting from excluding best performers from the application of the cross-sectoral correction factor.(51)In order to speed up the decarbonisation of the economy while strengthening the industrial competitiveness of the Union, an additional 20 million allowances from the quantity which could otherwise be allocated for free and an additional 5 million allowances from the quantity which could otherwise be auctioned should be made available to the Innovation Fund. When reviewing the timing and sequencing of the auctioning for the Innovation Fund established in Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowances trading within the Union (OJ L 302, 18.11.2010, p. 1). in view of the changes introduced by this Directive, the Commission should consider making available larger amounts of resources in the first years of implementation of the revised Directive 2003/87/EC to boost the decarbonisation of relevant sectors.(52)A comprehensive approach to innovation is essential for achieving the objectives of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119. At Union level, the necessary research and innovation efforts are supported, among other things, through Horizon Europe, which includes significant funding and new instruments for the sectors coming under the EU ETS. Consequently, the Commission should seek synergies with Horizon Europe and, where relevant, with other Union funding programmes.(53)The Innovation Fund should support innovative techniques, processes and technologies, including the scaling-up of such techniques, processes and technologies, with a view to their broad roll-out across the Union. Breakthrough innovation should be prioritised in the selection of projects supported through grants.(54)The scope of the Innovation Fund referred to in Article 10a(8) of Directive 2003/87/EC should be extended to support innovation in low- and zero-carbon technologies and processes that concern the consumption of fuels in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors, including collective forms of transport such as public transport and coach services. In addition, the Innovation Fund should serve to support investments to decarbonise maritime transport, including investments in energy efficiency of ships, ports and short-sea shipping, in electrification of the sector, in sustainable alternative fuels, such as hydrogen and ammonia that are produced from renewables, in zero-emission propulsion technologies such as wind technologies, and in innovations with regard to ice-class ships. Special attention should be given to innovative projects contributing to decarbonising the maritime sector and reducing all of its climate impacts, including black carbon emissions. In that respect, the Commission should provide for dedicated topics in Innovation Fund calls for proposals. Those calls should take biodiversity protection, noise and water pollution issues into account. As far as maritime transport is concerned, projects with clear added value for the Union should be eligible.(55)Pursuant to Article 9 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/1122Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/1122 of 12 March 2019 supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the functioning of the Union Registry (OJ L 177, 2.7.2019, p. 3)., where aircraft operators no longer operate flights covered by the EU ETS, their accounts are set to "excluded" status, and processes may no longer be initiated from those accounts. To preserve the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, allowances which are not issued to aircraft operators, due to them ceasing operations, should be used to cover any shortfall in surrenders by those operators, and any leftover allowances should be used to accelerate action to tackle climate change by being placed in the Innovation Fund.(56)Technical assistance from the Commission focused on Member States from which few or no projects have been submitted so far would contribute to achieving a high number of project applications for funding by the Innovation Fund across all Member States. That assistance should, among other things, support activities aimed at improving the quality of proposals for projects located in the Member States from which few or no projects have been submitted, for example through sharing information, lessons learned and best practice, and at boosting the activities of national contact points. Other measures serving the same aim include measures to raise awareness of funding options and increase the capacity of those Member States to identify and support potential project applicants. Project partnerships across Member States and matchmaking between potential applicants, in particular for large-scale projects, should also be promoted.(57)In order to improve the role of Member States in the governance of the Innovation Fund and increase transparency, the Commission should report to the Climate Change Committee on the implementation of the Innovation Fund, providing an analysis of the expected impact of awarded projects by sector and by Member State. The Commission should also provide the report to the European Parliament and to the Council and make it public. Subject to the agreement of applicants, following the closure of a call for proposals, the Commission should inform Member States of the applications for funding of projects in their respective territories and should provide them with detailed information of those applications in order to facilitate the Member States’ coordination of the support to projects. In addition, the Commission should inform the Member States about the list of pre-selected projects prior to the award of the support. Member States should ensure that the national transposition provisions do not hamper innovation and are technologically neutral, while the Commission should provide technical assistance, in particular to Member States with low effective participation, in order to improve the effective geographical participation in the Innovation Fund and increase the overall quality of submitted projects. The Commission should also ensure comprehensive monitoring and reporting, including information on progress towards effective, quality-based geographical coverage across the Union and appropriate follow-up.(58)In order to align with the comprehensive nature of the European Green Deal, the selection process for projects supported through grants should give priority to projects addressing multiple environmental impacts. In order to support the replication and the faster market penetration of the technologies or solutions that are supported, projects funded by the Innovation Fund should share knowledge with other relevant projects as well as with Union-based researchers having a legitimate interest.(59)Contracts for difference (CDs), carbon contracts for difference (CCDs) and fixed premium contracts are important elements for the triggering of emission reductions in industry through the scaling-up of new technologies, offering the opportunity to guarantee investors in innovative climate-friendly technologies a price that rewards CO2 emission reductions above those induced by the prevailing carbon price level in the EU ETS. The range of measures that the Innovation Fund can support should be extended to provide support to projects through competitive bidding, leading to the award of CDs, CCDs or fixed premium contracts. Competitive bidding would be an important mechanism for supporting the development of decarbonisation technologies and optimising the use of available resources. It would also offer certainty to investors in those technologies. With a view to minimising any contingent liability for the Union budget, risk mitigation should be ensured in the design of CDs and CCDs and appropriate coverage by a budgetary commitment should be provided with full coverage at least for the first two rounds of CDs and CCDs with appropriations resulting from the proceeds of auctioning of allowances allocated pursuant to Article 10a(8) of Directive 2003/87/EC.No such risks exist for fixed premium contracts because the legal commitment will be covered by a matching budgetary commitment. In addition, the Commission should conduct, after concluding the first two rounds of CDs and CCDs, and each time it is necessary thereafter, a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the financial risks arising from their implementation. The Commission should be empowered to adopt a delegated act to provide, based on the results of that assessment, for an appropriate provisioning rate rather than full coverage for subsequent rounds of CDs or CCDs. Such an approach should take into account any elements that could reduce the financial risks for the Union budget, in addition to the allowances available in the Innovation Fund, such as possible sharing of liability with Member States, on a voluntary basis, or a possible re-insurance mechanism from the private sector. It is therefore necessary to provide for derogations from parts of Title X of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).. The provisioning rate for the first two rounds of CDs and CCDs should be 100 %.However, by way of derogation from Article 210(1), Article 211(1) and (2) and Article 218(1) of that Regulation, a minimum provisioning rate of 50 % as well as a maximum share of revenue from the Innovation Fund to be used for provisioning of 30 % should be set in this Directive for subsequent rounds of CDs and CCDs and the Commission should be able to specify the provisioning rate necessary on the basis of the experience from the first two calls for proposals and the amount of revenue to be used for provisioning. The total financial liability borne by the Union budget should thus not exceed 60 % of the proceeds from auctioning for the Innovation Fund. Moreover, as provisioning will come, in general, from the Innovation Fund, derogations should be made from the rules in Articles 212, 213 and 214 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 relating to the common provisioning fund established by Article 212 of that Regulation. The novel nature of CDs and CCDs might also necessitate derogations from Article 209(2), points (d) and (h), of that Regulation, given that they do not rely on leverage/multipliers or depend entirely on an ex ante assessment, from Article 219(3), due to the link to Article 209(2), point (d), and from Article 219(6) thereof, as implementing partners will not have credit or equity exposures under a guarantee. The use of any derogation from Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 should be limited to what is necessary. The Commission should be empowered to amend the maximum share of revenue from the Innovation Fund to be used for provisioning by no more than 20 percentage points above what is provided for in this Directive.(60)The Innovation Fund is subject to the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget established by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1)..(61)Where an installation’s activity is temporarily suspended, free allocation is adjusted to the activity levels which are mandatorily reported annually. In addition, competent authorities can suspend the issuance of emission allowances to installations that have suspended operations as long as there is no evidence that they will resume operations. Therefore, operators should no longer be required to demonstrate to the competent authority that their installation will resume production within a specified and reasonable time in the event of a temporary suspension of the activities.(62)Corrections of free allocation granted to stationary installations pursuant to Article 11(2) of Directive 2003/87/EC can require granting additional free allowances or transferring back surplus allowances. The allowances set aside for new entrants under Article 10a(7) of Directive 2003/87/EC should be used for those purposes.(63)Since 2013, electricity producers have been obliged to purchase all the allowances they need to generate electricity. Nevertheless, in accordance with Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC, some Member States have the option of providing transitional free allocation for the modernisation of the energy sector for the period from 2021 to 2030. Three Member States have chosen to use that option. Given the need for rapid decarbonisation, especially in the energy sector, the Member States concerned should only be able to provide this transitional free allocation for investments carried out until 31 December 2024. They should be able to add any remaining allowances for the period from 2021 to 2030 that are not used for such investments, in the proportion they determine, to the total quantity of allowances that the Member State concerned receives for auctioning, or use them to support investments within the framework of the Modernisation Fund. With the exception of the deadline for notification thereof, allowances transferred to the Modernisation Fund should be subject to the same rules concerning investments that are applicable to the allowances already transferred pursuant to Article 10d(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC. To ensure predictability and transparency with regard to the amount of allowances available either for auctioning or for the transitional free allocation, and with regard to the assets managed by the Modernisation Fund, Member States should inform the Commission of the amounts of remaining allowances to be used for each purpose, respectively, by 15 May 2024.(64)The scope of the Modernisation Fund should be aligned with the most recent climate objectives of the Union by requiring that investments are consistent with the objectives of the European Green Deal and Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, and eliminating the support to any investments related to energy generation based on fossil fuels, except as regards the support for such investments with revenue from allowances voluntarily transferred to the Modernisation Fund in accordance with Article 10d(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC. In addition, limited support for such investments should continue to be possible with revenue from the allocations referred to in Article 10(1), third subparagraph, of that Directive under certain conditions, in particular where the activity qualifies as environmentally sustainable under Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13). and as regards the allowances auctioned until 2027. For the latter category of allowances, the downstream uses of non-solid fossil fuels should, in addition, not be supported with revenue from allowances auctioned after 2028. Furthermore, the percentage of the Modernisation Fund that needs to be devoted to priority investments should be increased to 80 % for the Modernisation Fund allowances transferred in accordance with Article 10d(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC and referred to in Article 10(1), third subparagraph, of that Directive, and to 90 % for the additional amount of 2,5 % from the Union-wide quantity of allowances.Energy efficiency including in industry, transport, buildings, agriculture and waste; heating and cooling from renewable sources; as well as support for households to address energy poverty, including in rural and remote areas, should be included within the scope of the priority investments. In order to increase transparency and better assess the impact of the Modernisation Fund, the Investment Committee should report annually to the Climate Change Committee on experience with the evaluation of investments, in particular in terms of emission reductions and abatement costs.(65)Directive (EU) 2018/410 introduced provisions relating to the cancellation by Member States of allowances from their auction volume in respect of closures of electricity-generation capacity in their territory. In view of the increased climate ambition of the Union and the resulting accelerated decarbonisation of the electricity sector, such cancellation has become increasingly relevant. Therefore, the Commission should assess whether the use by Member States of cancellation can be facilitated by amending the relevant delegated acts adopted pursuant to Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC.(66)Adjustments to free allocation introduced in Directive (EU) 2018/410 and put into effect by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1842Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1842 of 31 October 2019 laying down rules for the application of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards further arrangements for the adjustments to free allocation of emission allowances due to activity level changes (OJ L 282, 4.11.2019, p. 20). improved the efficiency and incentives provided by free allocation, but increased the administrative burden and rendered the historical date of issuance of free allocation of 28 February inoperative. In order to better take into account the adjustments to free allocation, it is appropriate to make adjustments to the compliance cycle. The deadline for competent authorities to grant free allocation should therefore be postponed from 28 February to 30 June and the deadline for operators to surrender allowances should be postponed from 30 April to 30 September.(67)Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2066Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2066 of 19 December 2018 on the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and amending Commission Regulation (EU) No 601/2012 (OJ L 334, 31.12.2018, p. 1). lays down rules on the monitoring of emissions from biomass, which are consistent with the rules on the use of biomass laid down in the Union legislation on renewable energy. As the legislation becomes more elaborate on the sustainability criteria for biomass with the latest rules established in Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilDirective (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82)., the conferral of implementing powers in Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC should be explicitly extended to the adoption of the necessary adjustments for the application in the EU ETS of sustainability criteria for biomass, including biofuels, bioliquids and biomass fuels. In addition, the Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing acts to specify how to account for the storage of emissions from mixes of zero-rated biomass and biomass that is not from zero-rated sources.(68)Renewable liquid and gaseous fuels of non-biological origin and recycled carbon fuels can be important for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in sectors that are hard to decarbonise. Where recycled carbon fuels and renewable liquid and gaseous fuels of non-biological origin are produced from captured CO2 under an activity covered by this Directive, the emissions should be accounted for under that activity. To ensure that renewable fuels of non-biological origin and recycled carbon fuels contribute to greenhouse gas emission reductions, and to avoid double counting for fuels that do so, it is appropriate to explicitly extend the empowerment in Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC to the adoption by the Commission of implementing acts laying down the necessary adjustments for how to account for the eventual release of CO2, in a way that ensures that all emissions are accounted for, including where such fuels are produced from captured CO2 outside the Union, while avoiding double counting and ensuring appropriate incentives are in place for capturing emissions, taking also into account the treatment of those fuels under Directive (EU) 2018/2001.(69)As CO2 is also expected to be transported by means other than pipelines, such as by ship and by truck, the current coverage in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC for transport of greenhouse gases for the purpose of storage should be extended to all means of transport for reasons of equal treatment and irrespective of whether the means of transport are covered by the EU ETS. Where the emissions from the transport are also covered by another activity under Directive 2003/87/EC, the emissions should be accounted for under that other activity to prevent double counting.(70)The exclusion from the EU ETS of installations exclusively using biomass has led to situations where installations combusting a high share of biomass have obtained windfall profits by receiving free allowances greatly exceeding actual emissions. Therefore, a threshold value for zero-rated biomass combustion should be introduced, above which installations are excluded from the EU ETS. The introduction of a threshold would provide more certainty as to which installations are under the EU ETS scope and would enable free allowances to be more evenly distributed to sectors more at risk of carbon leakage in particular. The threshold should be set at a level of 95 % to balance the advantages and disadvantages for installations of remaining under the scope of the EU ETS. Therefore, installations that have retained the physical capacity to burn fossil fuels should not be incentivised to revert to the use of such fuels. A threshold of 95 % would ensure that if an installation uses fossil fuels with the purpose of remaining within the scope of the EU ETS to benefit from free allocation allowances, the carbon costs related to the use of those fossil fuels would be sufficiently important to act as a disincentive.That threshold would also ensure that installations using a sizeable quantity of fossil fuels will remain within the monitoring obligations of the EU ETS, thus avoiding potential circumvention of existing monitoring, reporting and verification obligations. At the same time, installations which combust a lower share of zero-rated biomass should continue to be encouraged, through a flexible mechanism, to reduce fossil fuel combustion further while remaining under the scope of the EU ETS until their use of sustainable biomass is so substantial that their inclusion under the EU ETS is no longer justified. In addition, experience has shown that the exclusion of installations exclusively using biomass, effectively being a 100 % threshold except for the combustion of fossil fuels during start-up and shutdown phases, requires a reassessment and more precise definition. The 95 % threshold allows for the combustion of fossil fuels during start-up and shutdown phases.(71)In order to incentivise the uptake of low- and zero-carbon technologies, Member States should provide operators with the options of remaining within the scope of the EU ETS until the end of the current and next five-year period referred to in Article 11(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC if the installation changes its production process to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and no longer meets the threshold of 20 MW of total rated thermal input.(72)The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) published its final report on emission allowances and associated derivatives on 28 March 2022. The report is a comprehensive analysis of the integrity of the European carbon market and has provided expertise and recommendations in relation to upholding the proper functioning of the carbon market. In order to continuously monitor market integrity and transparency, the reporting by ESMA should be conducted on a regular basis. ESMA is already assessing market developments and, where necessary, provides recommendations, in the area of its competence, in its report on trends, risks and vulnerabilities in accordance with Article 32(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84).. Analysis of the European carbon market, which includes the auctions of emission allowances, on-venue and over-the-counter trading in emission allowances and derivatives thereof, should be part of that annual reporting. This obligation would lead to streamlining of the reporting done by ESMA and allow for cross-market comparisons, in particular due to strong linkages between the EU ETS and commodity derivative markets.Such regular analysis by ESMA should in particular monitor any market volatility and price evolution, the operation of the auctions and trading operations on the markets, liquidity and the volumes traded, and the categories and trading behaviour of market participants, including speculative activity significantly impacting on prices. Its assessments should, where relevant, include recommendations to improve market integrity and transparency as well as reporting obligations, and to enhance the prevention and detection of market abuse and help in maintaining orderly markets for emission allowances and derivatives thereof. The Commission should take due account of the assessments and recommendations in the context of the annual carbon market report and, where necessary, in the reports to ensure the better functioning of the carbon market.(73)In order to further incentivise investments required for the decarbonisation of district heating and to address social aspects related to high energy prices and the high greenhouse gas emission intensity of district heating installations, in Member States with a very high share of emissions from district heating in comparison with the size of the economy, operators should be able to apply for additional transitional free allocation for district heating installations and the additional value of the free allocation should be invested to significantly reduce emissions before 2030. To ensure those reductions take place, the additional transitional free allocation should be conditional on investments made and on emission reductions achieved as laid down in climate-neutrality plans to be drawn up by operators for their relevant installations.(74)Unexpected or sudden excessive price increases in the carbon market can negatively affect market predictability, which is essential for the planning of decarbonisation investments. Therefore, the measure which applies in the event of excessive price fluctuations in the market for emissions allowance trading covered under Chapters II and III of Directive 2003/87/EC should be strengthened in a careful manner to improve its reactivity to unwarranted price fluctuations. If the triggering condition based on the increase in the average allowance price is met, this rule-based safeguard measure should apply automatically, thereby resulting in a release of a predetermined number of allowances from the market stability reserve established by Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilDecision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 264, 9.10.2015, p. 1).. The triggering condition should be closely monitored by the Commission and published on a monthly basis in order to improve transparency. To ensure the orderly auctioning of the allowances released from the market stability reserve pursuant to this safeguard measure and to improve market predictability, this measure should not apply again until at least twelve months after the end of the previous release of allowances in the market under the measure.(75)The communication of the Commission of 17 September 2020 entitled "Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition - Investing in a climate-neutral future for the benefit of our people" underlined the particular challenge of reducing the emissions in the buildings and road transport sectors. Therefore, the Commission announced that a further expansion of emissions trading could include emissions from buildings and road transport, while indicating that covering all emissions from fuel combustion would present important benefits. Emissions trading should be applied to fuels used for combustion in the buildings and road transport sectors as well as in additional sectors which correspond to industrial activities not covered by Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC such as the heating of industrial facilities ("buildings, road transport and additional sectors"). For those sectors, a separate but parallel emissions trading system should be established to avoid any disturbance of the well-functioning emissions trading system for stationary installations and aviation. The new system is accompanied by complementary policies shaping expectations of market participants and aiming for a carbon price signal for the whole economy while providing measures to avoid undue price impacts. Previous experience has shown that the development of the new system requires setting up an efficient monitoring, reporting and verification system. With a view to ensuring synergies and consistency with the existing Union infrastructure for the EU ETS, it is appropriate to set up an emissions trading system for the buildings, road transport and additional sectors via an amendment to Directive 2003/87/ЕC.(76)In order to establish the necessary implementation framework and to provide a reasonable timeframe for reaching the 2030 target, emissions trading in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors should start in 2025. During the first years, the regulated entities should be required to hold a greenhouse gas emissions permit and to report their emissions for the years 2024 to 2026. The issuance of allowances and compliance obligations for those entities should be applicable as from 2027. This sequencing would allow emissions trading in those sectors to start in an orderly and efficient manner. It would also allow the measures to be in place to ensure a socially fair introduction of emissions trading into the buildings, road transport and additional sectors, so as to mitigate the impact of the carbon price on vulnerable households and transport users.(77)Due to the very large number of small emitters in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors, it is not possible to establish the point of regulation at the level of entities directly emitting greenhouse gases, as is the case for stationary installations and aviation. Therefore, for reasons of technical feasibility and administrative efficiency, it is more appropriate to establish the point of regulation further upstream in the supply chain. The act that triggers the compliance obligation under the new emissions trading system should be the release for consumption of fuels which are used for combustion in the buildings and road transport sectors, including for road transport of greenhouse gases for the purpose of their geological storage, as well as in the additional sectors which correspond to industrial activities not covered by Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC. To avoid double coverage, the release for consumption of fuels which are used in activities under Annex I to that Directive should not be covered.(78)The regulated entities in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors and the point of regulation should be defined in line with the system of excise duty established by Council Directive (EU) 2020/262Council Directive (EU) 2020/262 of 19 December 2019 laying down the general arrangements for excise duty (OJ L 58, 27.2.2020, p. 4)., with the necessary adaptations, as that Directive already lays down a robust control system for all quantities of fuels released for consumption for the purposes of paying excise duties. Final consumers of fuels in those sectors should not be subject to obligations under Directive 2003/87/EC.(79)The regulated entities falling within the scope of the emissions trading system in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors should be subject to similar greenhouse gas emissions permit requirements as the operators of stationary installations. It is necessary to establish rules on permit applications, conditions for permit issuance, content, and review, and any changes related to the regulated entity. In order for the new system to start in an orderly manner, Member States should ensure that regulated entities falling within the scope of the new emissions trading system have a valid permit as of the start of the system in 2025.(80)The total quantity of allowances for the new emissions trading system should follow a linear trajectory to reach the emission reduction target for 2030, taking into account the cost-efficient contribution of the buildings and road transport sectors of 43 % emission reductions by 2030 compared to 2005 and of the additional sectors, a combined cost-efficient contribution of 42 % emission reductions by 2030 compared to 2005. The total quantity of allowances should be established for the first time in 2027, to follow a trajectory starting in 2024 from the value of the 2024 emissions limits, calculated in accordance with Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) 2018/842 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 26). on the basis of the reference emissions for the sectors covered for 2005 and the period from 2016 to 2018 as determined under Article 4(3) of that Regulation. Accordingly, the linear reduction factor should be set at 5,10 %. From 2028, the total quantity of allowances should be set on the basis of the average reported emissions for the years 2024, 2025 and 2026, and should decrease by the same absolute annual reduction rate as set from 2024, which corresponds to a 5,38 % linear reduction factor compared to the comparable 2025 value of the above defined trajectory. If those emissions are significantly higher than that trajectory value and if such divergence is not due to small-scale differences in emission measurement methodologies, the linear reduction factor should be adjusted to reach the required level of emission reduction in 2030.(81)The auctioning of allowances is the simplest and the most economically efficient method for allocating emission allowances, and also avoids windfall profits. Both the buildings and road transport sectors are under relatively little or non-existent competitive pressure from outside the Union and are not exposed to a risk of carbon leakage. Therefore, allowances for buildings and road transport should only be allocated via auctioning, without there being any free allocation.(82)In order to ensure a smooth start to the new emissions trading system and taking into account the need of the regulated entities to hedge or buy ahead allowances to mitigate their price and liquidity risk, a higher amount of allowances should be auctioned early on. In 2027, the auction volumes should therefore be 30 % higher than the total quantity of allowances for 2027. This amount would be sufficient to provide liquidity, both if emissions decrease in line with the reductions needed, and in the event that emission reductions only materialise progressively. The detailed rules for that front-loading of auction volumes should be established in a delegated act related to auctioning, adopted pursuant to Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC.(83)The distribution rules on auction shares are highly relevant for any auction revenues that would accrue to the Member States, especially in view of the need to strengthen the ability of the Member States to address the social impacts of a carbon price signal in the buildings and road transport sectors. Notwithstanding the fact that those buildings, road transport and additional sectors have very different characteristics, it is appropriate to set a common distribution rule similar to the one applicable to stationary installations. The majority of the allowances should be distributed among all Member States on the basis of the average distribution of the emissions in road transportation, commercial and institutional buildings and residential buildings, during the period from 2016 to 2018.(84)The introduction of the carbon price in the buildings and road transport sectors should be accompanied by effective social compensation, especially in view of the existing levels of energy poverty. About 34 million Europeans, nearly 6,9 % of the Union population, have said that they cannot afford to heat their home sufficiently in a 2021 Union-wide survey. To achieve effective social and distributional compensation, Member States should be required to spend the auction revenues from emissions trading for the buildings, road transport and additional sectors on the climate and energy-related purposes already specified for the existing emissions trading system, giving priority to activities that can contribute to addressing social aspects of the emissions trading in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors, or for measures added specifically to address related concerns for those sectors, including related policy measures under Directive 2012/27/EU.A new Social Climate Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a Social Climate Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (see page 1 of this Official Journal). will provide dedicated funding to Member States to support the most affected vulnerable groups, especially households in energy or transport poverty. The Social Climate Fund will promote fairness and solidarity between and within Member States while mitigating the risk of energy and transport poverty during the transition. It will build on and complement existing solidarity mechanisms, in synergy with other Union spending programmes and funds. 50 million allowances from the EU ETS pursuant to Article 10a(8b) of Directive 2003/87/EC and 150 million allowances from emissions trading in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors, and revenue generated from the auctioning of allowances concerning the buildings, road transport and additional sectors, up to a maximum of EUR 65000000000, should be used for the financing of the Social Climate Fund in the form of external assigned revenue on a temporary and exceptional basis, pending the discussions and deliberations on the Commission’s proposal of 22 December 2021 for a Council Decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union concerning the establishment of a new own resource based on the EU ETS in accordance with Article 311, third paragraph, TFEU.It is necessary to provide that, where a decision is adopted in accordance with Article 311, third paragraph, TFEU establishing that new own resource, the same revenue should cease to be externally assigned when such a decision enters into force. With regard to the Social Climate Fund, the Commission is, in the event of the adoption of such a decision, to present, as appropriate, the necessary proposals in accordance with Article 27(4) of Regulation (EU) 2023/955. This is without prejudice to the outcome of the post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations.(85)Reporting on the use of auctioning revenues should be aligned with the current reporting established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1999.(86)Regulated entities covered by the new emissions trading system should surrender allowances for their verified emissions corresponding to the quantities of fuels they have released for consumption. They should surrender allowances for the first time for their verified emissions in 2027. In order to minimise the administrative burden, a number of rules applicable to the existing emissions trading system for stationary installations and aviation should be made applicable to the new emissions trading system for the buildings, road transport and additional sectors, with the necessary adaptations. This includes, in particular, rules on transfer, surrender and cancellation of allowances, as well as the rules on the validity of allowances, penalties, competent authorities and reporting obligations of Member States.(87)Certain Member States already have national carbon taxes that apply to the buildings, road transport and additional sectors covered by Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC. Therefore, a temporary derogation should be introduced until the end of 2030. To ensure the objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC are achieved and that the new emissions trading system is coherent, the option of applying that derogation should only be available where the national tax rate is higher than the average auctioning price for the relevant year, and should only apply to the surrender obligation of the regulated entities paying such a tax. To ensure stability and transparency of the system, the national tax, including the relevant tax rates, should be notified to the Commission by the end of the transposition period of this Directive. The derogation should not affect the external assigned revenue for the Social Climate Fund or, if established in accordance with Article 311, third paragraph, TFEU, an own resource based on the auctioning revenues from emissions trading in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors.(88)For emissions trading in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors to be effective, it should be possible to monitor emissions with high certainty and at reasonable cost. Emissions should be attributed to regulated entities on the basis of fuel quantities released for consumption and combined with an emission factor. Regulated entities should be able to reliably and accurately identify and differentiate the sectors in which the fuels are released for consumption, as well as the final users of the fuels, in order to avoid undesirable effects, such as a double burden. In the small number of cases where double counting between emissions in the existing EU ETS and the new emissions trading system for the buildings, road transport and additional sectors cannot be avoided, or where costs arise due to the surrender of allowances for emissions from activities not covered by Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States should use such revenue to compensate for the unavoidable double counting or other such costs outside the buildings, road transport and additional sectors in accordance with Union law. Implementing powers should therefore be conferred on the Commission to ensure uniform conditions for avoiding double counting and allowances being surrendered for emissions not covered by the emissions trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors, and for providing financial compensation. To further mitigate any issues of double counting, the deadlines for monitoring and surrendering in the new emissions trading system should be one month after the deadlines in the existing system for stationary installations and aviation. To have sufficient data to establish the total quantity of allowances for the period from 2028 to 2030, the regulated entities holding a permit at the start of the system in 2025 should report their associated historical emissions for 2024.(89)Transparency as regards carbon costs and the extent to which they are passed on to consumers is of key importance for enabling swift and cost-efficient emission reductions in all sectors of the economy. This is of particular importance in an emissions trading system which is based on upstream obligations. The new emissions trading system is meant to incentivise regulated entities to reduce the carbon content of the fuels, and such entities should not make undue profits by passing on more carbon costs to consumers than they incur. While full auctioning of emissions allowances under the emissions trading system for the buildings, road transport and additional sectors already limits the occurrence of such undue profits, the Commission should monitor the extent to which regulated entities pass on carbon costs, so that windfall profits are avoided. In relation to Chapter IVa, the Commission should report annually, where possible by type of fuel, on the average level of the carbon costs which have been passed on to consumers in the Union.(90)It is appropriate to introduce measures to address the potential risk of excessive price increases, which, if particularly high at the start of the new emissions trading system, may undermine the readiness of households and individuals to invest in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. Those measures should complement the safeguards provided by the market stability reserve and that became operational in 2019. While the market will continue to determine the carbon price, safeguard measures will be triggered by a rules-based automatic mechanism, whereby allowances will be released from the market stability reserve only if one or more concrete triggering conditions based on the increase in the average allowance price are met. This additional mechanism should also be highly reactive, in order to address excessive volatility due to factors other than changed market fundamentals. The measures should be adapted to different levels of excessive price increase, which will result in different degrees of intervention. The triggering conditions should be closely monitored by the Commission and the measures should be adopted by the Commission as a matter of urgency when those conditions are met. This should be without prejudice to any accompanying measures that Member States might adopt to address adverse social impacts.(91)In order to increase certainty for citizens that the carbon price in the initial years of the new emissions trading system does not go above EUR 45, it is appropriate to include an additional price stability mechanism to release allowances from the market stability reserve in the event the carbon price exceeds that level. In principle, the measure should apply once during a period of 12 months. However, it should also be able to apply again during the same period of 12 months where the Commission, assisted by the Climate Change Committee, considers that the evolution of the price justifies another release of allowances. In view of the aim of this mechanism to ensure stability in the initial years of the new emissions trading system, the Commission should assess its functioning and whether it should be continued after 2029.(92)As an additional safeguard mechanism ahead of the start of emissions trading in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors, it should be possible to delay the application of the cap and the surrendering obligations where gas or oil wholesale prices are exceptionally high compared to historical trends. The mechanism should be automatic, meaning that the application of the cap and the surrendering obligations is to be delayed by one year if concrete energy price triggers are met. The reference prices should be determined on the basis of benchmark contracts in the gas and oil wholesale markets which are immediately available and the most relevant for final consumers. Separate trigger conditions for gas and oil prices should be envisaged, as their price developments follow different historical trends. In order to ensure market certainty, the Commission should provide clarity on the application of the delay sufficiently in advance, through a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.(93)The application of emissions trading in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors should be monitored by the Commission, including the degree of price convergence with the existing EU ETS, and, if necessary, a review should be proposed to the European Parliament and to the Council to improve the effectiveness, administration and practical application of emissions trading for those sectors on the basis of acquired knowledge as well as increased price convergence. The Commission should be required to submit the first report on those matters by 1 January 2028.(94)In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of Article 3ga(2), Article 3gf(2) and (4), Article 10b(4), Article 12(3-d) and (3-c), Article 14(1), Article 30f(3) and (5) and Article 30h(7) of Directive 2003/87/EC, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. To ensure synergies with the existing regulatory framework, the conferral of implementing powers in Articles 14 and 15 of that Directive should be extended to cover the buildings, road transport and additional sectors. Those implementing powers, except the implementing powers in relation to Article 3gf(2) and Article 12(3-d) and (3-c) of Directive 2003/87/EC, should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13)..(95)In order to achieve the objectives laid down in this Directive and other Union legislation, particularly those in Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, the Union and its Member States should make use of the latest scientific evidence while implementing policies. Therefore, when the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change provides scientific advice and issues reports regarding the EU ETS, the Commission should take such advice and reports into account, in particular, as regards the need for additional Union policies and measures to ensure compliance with the objectives and targets of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, and additional Union policies and measures in view of the ambition and environmental integrity of global market-based measures for aviation and maritime transport.(96)To acknowledge the contribution of EU ETS revenues to the climate transition, an EU ETS label should be introduced. Among other measures to ensure the visibility of funding from the EU ETS, Member States and the Commission should ensure that projects and activities supported through the Modernisation Fund and the Innovation Fund are clearly indicated as coming from EU ETS revenues by displaying an appropriate label.(97)With a view to achieving the climate-neutrality objective set out in Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, a Union-wide climate target for 2040 should be set, based on a legislative proposal to amend that Regulation. The EU ETS should be reviewed to align it with the Union 2040 climate target. As a result, by July 2026 the Commission should report on several aspects of the EU ETS to the European Parliament and to the Council, accompanying the report, where appropriate, by a legislative proposal and impact assessment. In line with Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, priority should be given to direct emission reductions, which will have to be complemented by increased carbon removals in order to achieve climate neutrality. Therefore, among other aspects, by July 2026 the Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on how emissions removed from the atmosphere and safely and permanently stored, for example through direct air capture, could potentially be covered by emissions trading, without offsetting necessary emission reductions. Until all stages of the life of a product in which captured carbon is used are subject to carbon pricing, in particular at the stage of waste incineration, reliance on accounting for emissions at the point of their release from products into the atmosphere would result in emissions being undercounted.In order to regulate the capture of carbon in a way that reduces net emissions and ensures that all emissions are accounted for and that double counting is avoided, while generating economic incentives, the Commission should assess, by July 2026, whether all greenhouse gas emissions covered by Directive 2003/87/EC are effectively accounted for, and whether double counting is effectively avoided. In particular, it should assess the accounting for the greenhouse gas emissions which are considered to have been captured and utilised in a product in a way other than that referred to in Article 12(3b), and take into account the downstream stages, including disposal and waste incineration. Finally, the Commission should also report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the feasibility of lowering the 20 MW total rated thermal input thresholds for the activities in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC, taking into account the environmental benefits and administrative burden.(98)By July 2026, the Commission should also assess and report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the feasibility of including municipal waste incineration installations in the EU ETS, including with a view to their inclusion from 2028, and provide an assessment of the potential need for an option for a Member State to opt out until the end of 2030, taking into account the importance of all sectors contributing to emission reductions. Inclusion of municipal waste incineration installations in the EU ETS would contribute to the circular economy by encouraging recycling, reuse and repair of products, while also contributing to economy-wide decarbonisation. The inclusion of municipal waste incineration installations would reinforce incentives for sustainable management of waste in line with the waste hierarchy and would create a level playing field between the regions that have included municipal waste incineration under the scope of the EU ETS.To avoid diversion of waste from municipal waste incineration installations towards landfills in the Union, which create methane emissions, and to avoid exports of waste to third countries, with a potentially negative impact on the environment, in its report the Commission should take into account the potential diversion of waste towards disposal by landfilling in the Union and waste exports to third countries. The Commission should also take into account the effects on the internal market, potential distortions of competition, environmental integrity, alignment with the objectives of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the CouncilDirective 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3). and robustness and accuracy with respect to the monitoring and calculation of emissions. Considering the methane emissions from landfilling and to avoid creating an uneven playing field, the Commission should also assess the possibility of including other waste management processes, such as landfilling, fermentation, composting and mechanical-biological treatment, in the EU ETS, when assessing the feasibility of including municipal waste incineration installations.(99)In order to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a legislative act, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning, the rules on the application of conditionality, the rules on the operation of the Innovation Fund, the rules on the operation of the competitive bidding mechanism in relation to CDs and CCDs, the requirements for considering that greenhouse gases have become permanently chemically bound in a product and the extension of the activity referred to in Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC to other sectors. Moreover, to ensure synergies with the existing regulatory framework, the delegation in Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC concerning the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning should be extended to cover the buildings, road transport and additional sectors. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-MakingOJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1.. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.(100)The provisions relating to the existing EU ETS and its extension to maritime transport should apply from 2024 in line with the need for urgent climate action and for all sectors to contribute to emission reductions in a cost-effective manner. Consequently, Member States should transpose the provisions relating to those sectors by 31 December 2023. However, the deadline for transposing the provisions relating to the emissions trading system for the buildings, road transport and additional sectors should be 30 June 2024, as the rules on monitoring, reporting, verification and permitting for those sectors apply from 1 January 2025, and require sufficient time for orderly implementation. As an exception, to guarantee transparency and robust reporting, Member States should transpose the obligation to report on historical emissions for those sectors by 31 December 2023, as that obligation relates to the emissions in the year 2024. In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documentsOJ C 369, 17.12.2011, p. 14., Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the components of a directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments. With regard to this Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified.(101)A well-functioning, reformed EU ETS comprising an instrument to stabilise the market is a key means for the Union to achieve the economy-wide net greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2030, the Union’s climate-neutrality objective by 2050 at the latest, and the aim of achieving negative emissions thereafter as laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, as well as the objectives of the Paris Agreement. The market stability reserve seeks to address the imbalance between supply and demand of allowances in the market. Article 3 of Decision (EU) 2015/1814 provides that the reserve is to be reviewed three years after it becomes operational, paying particular attention to the percentage figure for the determination of the number of allowances to be placed in the market stability reserve, the threshold for the total number of allowances in circulation (TNAC) that determines the intake of allowances, and the number of allowances to be released from the reserve. The current threshold determining the placing of allowances in the market stability reserve was established in 2018, with the last review of the EU ETS, while the linear reduction factor is being increased with this Directive. Therefore, as part of the regular review of the functioning of the market stability reserve, the Commission should also assess the need for a potential adjustment of that threshold, in line with the linear factor referred to in Article 9 of Directive 2003/87/EC.(102)Considering the need to deliver a stronger investment signal to reduce emissions in a cost-efficient manner and with a view to strengthening the EU ETS, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 should be amended so as to increase the percentage rate for determining the number of allowances to be placed each year in the market stability reserve. In addition, for lower levels of the TNAC, the intake should be equal to the difference between the TNAC and the threshold that determines the intake of allowances. This would prevent the considerable uncertainty in the auction volumes that results when the TNAC is close to the threshold, and at the same time ensure that the surplus reaches the volume bandwidth within which the carbon market is deemed to operate in a balanced manner.(103)Furthermore, in order to ensure that the level of allowances that remains in the market stability reserve after the invalidation is predictable, the invalidation of allowances in the reserve should no longer depend on the auction volumes of the previous year. The number of allowances in the reserve should, therefore, be fixed at a level of 400 million allowances, which corresponds to the lower threshold for the value of the TNAC.(104)The analysis of the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this Directive has also shown that net demand from aviation should be included in the TNAC. In addition, since aviation allowances can be used in the same way as general allowances, including aviation in the reserve would make it a more accurate, and thus a better, tool to ensure the stability of the market. The calculation of the TNAC should include aviation emissions and allowances issued in respect of aviation as of the year following the entry into force of this Directive.(105)To clarify the calculation of the TNAC, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 should specify that only allowances issued and not put in the market stability reserve are included in the supply of allowances. Moreover, the formula should no longer subtract the number of allowances in the market stability reserve from the supply of allowances. This change would have no material impact on the result of the calculation of the TNAC, including on the past calculations of the TNAC or on the reserve.(106)In order to mitigate the risk of supply and demand imbalances associated with the start of emissions trading for the buildings, road transport and additional sectors, as well as to render it more resistant to market shocks, the rule-based mechanism of the market stability reserve should be applied to those sectors. For that reserve to be operational from the start of the system, it should be established with an initial endowment of 600 million allowances for emissions trading in the buildings, road transport and additional sectors. The initial lower and upper thresholds, which trigger the release or intake of allowances from the reserve, should be subject to a general review clause. Other elements such as the publication of the TNAC or the quantity of allowances released or placed in the reserve should follow the rules of the reserve for other sectors.(107)Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient way in a manner commensurate with the economy-wide net greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2030 through an extended and amended Union wide market-based mechanism, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.(108)Directive 2003/87/EC and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 should therefore be amended accordingly,HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: