(a) "claim" means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before, on or after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and includes in particular: (i) a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction; (ii) a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form; (iii) a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction; (iv) a counterclaim; (v) a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of exequatur , of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;
(b) "contract or transaction" means any transaction of whatever form and whatever the applicable law, whether comprising one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different parties; for this purpose, "contract" includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit, whether legally independent or not, as well as any related provision arising under, or in connection with, the transaction; (c) "competent authorities" refers to the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex III; (d) "economic resources" means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but may be used to obtain funds, goods or services; (e) "freezing of economic resources" means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them; (f) "freezing of funds" means preventing any move, transfer, alteration or use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character or destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management; (g) "funds" means financial assets and benefits of every kind, including, but not limited to: (i) cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments; (ii) deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations; (iii) publicly and privately traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts; (iv) interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets; (v) credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments; (vi) letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale; and (vii) documents showing evidence of an interest in funds or financial resources;
(h) "technical assistance" means any technical support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, maintenance or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruction, advice, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills, or consulting services, including verbal forms of assistance; (i) "brokering services" means: (i) the negotiation or arrangement of transactions for the purchase, sale or supply of goods and technology or financial and technical services from a third country to any other third country, or (ii) the selling or buying of goods and technology or financial and technical services that are located in a third country for their transfer to another third country;
(j) "territory of the Union" means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace.
Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 of 13 November 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela
Modified by
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/88of 22 January 2018implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32018R0088, January 22, 2018
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/899of 25 June 2018implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32018R0899, June 25, 2018
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1653of 6 November 2018implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32018R1653, November 7, 2018
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1163of 5 July 2019amending and setting out a single list for the Annexes containing contact details of Member States competent authorities and address for notifications to the European Commission to certain Regulations concerning restrictive measures, 32019R1163, July 8, 2019
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1169of 8 July 2019implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32019R1169, July 9, 2019
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1586of 26 September 2019implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32019R1586, September 27, 2019
- Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1889of 11 November 2019amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32019R1889, November 12, 2019
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1891of 11 November 2019implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in VenezuelaCorrigendum to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1891 of 11 November 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela(Official Journal of the European Union L 291 of 12 November 2019), 32019R189132019R1891R(01), November 12, 2019
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/897of 29 June 2020implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32020R0897, June 29, 2020
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1696of 12 November 2020implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32020R1696, November 13, 2020
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/275of 22 February 2021implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32021R0275, February 22, 2021
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1959of 11 November 2021implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32021R1959, November 12, 2021
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/595of 11 April 2022amending certain Regulations concerning restrictive measures and setting out a single list for the Annexes to those Regulations containing the contact details of Member States’ competent authorities and the address for notifications to the European Commission, 32022R0595, April 12, 2022
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2194of 10 November 2022implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32022R2194, November 11, 2022
- Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2500of 10 November 2023implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32023R2500, November 13, 2023
- Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2694of 27 November 2023amending certain Council Regulations concerning restrictive measures in order to insert provisions on humanitarian exceptions, 32023R2694, November 28, 2023
Corrected by
- Corrigendum to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1891 of 11 November 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, 32019R1891R(01), December 19, 2019
(a) to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services and other services related to the goods and technology listed in the EU Common List of Military Equipment ("the Common Military List") and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods and technology listed in the Common Military List to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Venezuela; (b) to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services and other services, directly or indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in, Venezuela.
(a) to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex I, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Venezuela; (b) to provide technical assistance and brokering and other services related to the equipment referred to in point (a), directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Venezuela; (c) to provide financing or financial assistance, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, related to the equipment referred to in point (a), directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Venezuela.
(a) the provision of financing and financial assistance and technical assistance related to: (i) non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, or for institution-building programmes of the United Nations (UN) and the Union or its Member States or of regional and sub-regional organisations; (ii) material intended for crisis-management operations of the UN and the Union or of regional and sub-regional organisations;
(b) the sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment which might be used for internal repression and associated financing and financial and technical assistance, intended solely for humanitarian or protective use or for institution-building programmes of the UN or the Union, or for crisis-management operations of the UN and the Union or of regional and subregional organisations; (c) the sale, supply, transfer or export of demining equipment and materiel for use in demining operations and associated financing and financial and technical assistance.
(a) to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or brokering services related to the equipment, technology and software identified in Annex II, or related to the installation, provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of the equipment and technology identified in Annex II or to the provision, installation, operation or updating of any software identified in Annex II, to any person, entity or body in Venezuela or for use in Venezuela; (b) to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the equipment, technology and software identified in Annex II to any person, entity or body in Venezuela or for use in Venezuela; (c) to provide any telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services of any kind to, or for the direct or indirect benefit of, Venezuela's government, public bodies, corporations and agencies or any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction.
(a) natural or legal persons, entities and bodies responsible for serious human rights violations or abuses or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Venezuela; (b) natural or legal persons, entities and bodies whose actions, policies or activities otherwise undermine democracy or the rule of law in Venezuela.
(a) necessary to satisfy the basic needs of natural and legal persons listed in Annex IV or V, and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums and public utility charges; (b) intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees or reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services; (c) intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources; (d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the relevant competent authority has notified the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted to the competent authorities of the other Member States and to the Commission at least two weeks prior to authorisation; or (e) to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic or consular mission or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic or consular mission or international organisation.
(a) the United Nations (UN), including its programmes, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialised agencies and related organisations; (b) international organisations; (c) humanitarian organisations having observer status with the UN General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organisations; (d) bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the UN Humanitarian Response Plans, UN Refugee Response Plans, other UN appeals or humanitarian clusters coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; (e) organisations and agencies to which the Union has granted the Humanitarian Partnership Certificate or which are certified or recognised by a Member State in accordance with national procedures; (f) Member States’ specialised agencies; or (g) the employees, grantees, subsidiaries or implementing partners of the entities referred to in points (a) to (f) while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities.
(a) the funds or economic resources are subject to an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 8 was included in Annex IV or V, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to, on or after that date; (b) the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims; (c) the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex IV or V; and (d) recognising the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.
(a) the funds or economic resources are to be used for a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex IV or V; (b) the payment is not in breach of Article 8(2)
(a) interest or other earnings on those accounts; (b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose before the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 8 was included in Annex IV or V; or (c) payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in a Member State or enforceable in the Member State concerned.
(a) supply immediately any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as information on accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 8, to the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident or located, and shall transmit such information, directly or through the Member State, to the Commission; and (b) cooperate with the competent authority in any verification of the information referred to in point (a).
(a) designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annexes IV and V; (b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).
(a) funds frozen under Article 8 and authorisations granted under Articles 9 to 11; (b) violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.
(a) as regards the Council, preparing and making amendments to Annexes IV and V; (b) as regards the High Representative, preparing amendments to Annexes IV and V; (c) as regards the Commission: (i) adding the contents of Annexes IV and V to the electronic consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to Union financial restrictive measures and in the interactive sanctions map, both publicly available; (ii) processing information on the impact of measures taken under this Regulation, such as the value of frozen funds and information on authorisations granted by the competent authorities.
(a) within the territory of the Union, including its airspace; (b) on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State; (c) to any person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State; (d) to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State; (e) to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.
1. Firearms, ammunition and related accessories therefor, as follows: 1.1. Firearms not controlled by ML 1 and ML 2 of the Common Military List; 1.2. Ammunition specially designed for the firearms listed in item 1.1 and specially designed components therefor; 1.3. Weapon-sights not controlled by the Common Military List.
2. Bombs and grenades not controlled by the Common Military List. 3. Vehicles as follows: 3.1. Vehicles equipped with a water cannon, specially designed or modified for the purpose of riot control; 3.2. Vehicles specially designed or modified to be electrified to repel borders; 3.3. Vehicles specially designed or modified to remove barricades, including construction equipment with ballistic protection; 3.4. Vehicles specially designed for the transport or transfer of prisoners and/or detainees; 3.5. Vehicles specially designed to deploy mobile barriers; 3.6. Components for the vehicles specified in items 3.1 to 3.5 specially designed for the purposes of riot control.
Note 1 This item does not control vehicles specially designed for the purposes of firefighting. Note 2 For the purposes of item 3.5, the term "vehicles" includes trailers. 4. Explosive substances and related equipment as follows: 4.1. Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosions by electrical or non-electrical means, including firing sets, detonators, igniters, boosters and detonating cord, and specially designed components therefor; except those specially designed for a specific commercial use consisting of the actuation or operation by explosive means of other equipment or devices the function of which is not the creation of explosions (e.g. car air-bag inflaters, electric-surge arresters of fire sprinkler actuators); 4.2. Linear cutting explosive charges not controlled by the Common Military List; 4.3. Other explosives not controlled by the Common Military List and related substances as follows: (a) amatol; (b) nitrocellulose (containing more than 12,5 % nitrogen); (c) nitroglycol; (d) pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN); (e) picryl chloride; (f) 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT).
5. Protective equipment not controlled by ML 13 of the Common Military List as follows: 5.1. Body armour providing ballistic and/or stabbing protection; 5.2. Helmets providing ballistic and/or fragmentation protection, anti-riot helmets, antiriot shields and ballistic shields.
Note: This item does not control: equipment specially designed for sports activities; equipment specially designed for safety of work requirements.
6. Simulators, other than those controlled by ML 14 of the Common Military List, for training in the use of firearms, and specially designed software therefor. 7. Night vision, thermal imaging equipment and image intensifier tubes, other than those controlled by the Common Military List. 8. Razor barbed wire. 9. Military knives, combat knives and bayonets with blade lengths in excess of 10 cm. 10. Production equipment specially designed for the items specified in this list. 11. Specific technology for the development, production or use of the items specified in this list.
(a) equipment, technology or software which are specified in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, p. 1 ).(b) software which is designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier and which is generally available to the public by being sold from stock at retail selling points, without restriction, by means of: (i) over the counter transactions; (ii) mail order transactions; (iii) electronic transactions; or (iv) telephone order transactions; or
(c) software which is in the public domain.
A. List of equipment Deep Packet Inspection equipment Network Interception equipment including Interception Management Equipment (IMS) and Data Retention Link Intelligence equipment Radio Frequency monitoring equipment Network and Satellite jamming equipment Remote Infection equipment Speaker recognition/processing equipment IMSI "IMSI" stands for International Mobile Subscriber Identity. It is a unique identification code for each mobile telephony device, integrated in the SIM card, which allows for identification of such SIM via GSM and UMTS networks. "MSISDN" stands for Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number. It is a number uniquely identifying a subscription in a GSM or a UMTS mobile network. Simply put, it is the telephone number to the SIM card in a mobile phone and therefore it identifies a mobile subscriber as well as IMSI, but to route calls through him. "IMEI" stands for International Mobile Equipment Identity. It is a number, usually unique to identify GSM, WCDMA and IDEN mobile phones as well as some satellite phones. It is usually found printed inside the battery compartment of the phone. interception (wiretapping) can be specified by its IMEI number as well as IMSI and MSISDN. "TMSI" stands for Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity. It is the identity that is most commonly sent between the mobile and the network. Tactical SMS "SMS" stands for Short Message System. "GSM" stands for Global System for Mobile Communications. "GPS" stands for Global Positioning System. "GPRS" stands for General Package Radio Service. "UMTS" stands for Universal Mobile Telecommunication System. "CDMA" stands for Code Division Multiple Access. "PSTN" stands for Public Switch Telephone Networks. DHCP "DHCP" stands for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. "SMTP" stands for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. "GTP" stands for GPRS Tunnelling Protocol. Pattern Recognition and Pattern Profiling equipment Remote Forensics equipment Semantic Processing Engine equipment WEP and WPA code breaking equipment Interception equipment for VoIP proprietary and standard protocol
B. Not used C. Not used D. "Software" for the "development", "production" or "use" of the equipment specified in A above. E. "Technology" for the "development", "production" or "use" of the equipment specified in A above.
| Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Néstor Luis REVEROL TORRES | Minister for Electrical Energy since October 2020, Vice-President of Public Works and Services and Executive Secretary of the Electrical General Staff since April 2019. Minister for Interior, Justice and Peace from 2016 until October 2020. General in Chief of the Bolivarian National Guard since August 2020. Responsible for serious human rights violations, including the torture of (political) prisoners, and the repression of the democratic opposition in Venezuela, including the prohibition and repression of political demonstrations, committed by security forces under his command. | ||
| 2. | Gustavo Enrique GONZÁLEZ LÓPEZ | Reappointed as General Director of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) on | ||
| 3. | Tibisay LUCENA RAMÍREZ | Minister of University Education since October 2021. President of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral or CNE) from April 2006 until June 2020. Her actions and policies have undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, including by failing to ensure that the CNE remains an impartial and independent institution in accordance with the Venezuelan Constitution, thereby facilitating the establishment of the Constituent Assembly and the re-election of Nicolás Maduro in May 2018 through presidential elections that were neither free nor fair. | ||
| 4. | Antonio José BENAVIDES TORRES | Member of the non-democratically elected National Assembly. Chief of the Capital District (Distrito Capital) Government until January 2018. General Commander of the Bolivarian National Guard until | ||
| 5. | Maikel José MORENO PÉREZ | Judge of the Criminal Appeal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Venezuela (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)). Former President and Vice President of the Supreme Court. In those roles, he has supported and facilitated the Government’s actions and policies which have undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, and is responsible for actions and statements that have usurped the authority of the National Assembly, including the appointment of the National Electoral Council (CNE) in June 2020 and the suspension and replacement of the leadership of three opposition parties in June and July 2020. | ||
| 6. | Tarek William SAAB HALABI | Venezuelan Attorney General appointed by the Constituent Assembly. In this role, and in previous roles as Ombudsman and President of the Republican Moral Council, he has undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela by publicly supporting actions against opponents of the government of Venezuela and the withdrawal of competences from the National Assembly. | ||
| 7. | Diosdado CABELLO RONDÓN | Member of the non-democratically elected National Assembly, former President of the Constituent Assembly and First Vice-President of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Involved in undermining democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, including by using the media to publicly attack and threaten political opposition, other media and civil society and giving orders to detain individuals, including to the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). | ||
| 8. | Tareck Zaidan EL-AISSAMI MADDAH | Former Vice President of Economy and former Minister of the Popular Power of Petroleum as well as National Industry and Production. As the former Vice President of Venezuela with oversight of the direction of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN), Tareck El-Aissami is responsible for the serious human rights violations carried out by the organisation, including arbitrary detentions, politically motivated investigations, inhuman and degrading treatment, and torture. He is also responsible for supporting and implementing policies and activities which undermine democracy and the rule of law, including the prohibition of public demonstrations, and heading President Maduro’s "anti-coup command" which has targeted civil society and the democratic opposition. | ||
| 9. | Sergio José RIVERO MARCANO | Inspector General of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), General Commander of the Bolivarian National Guard until | ||
| 10. | Jesús Rafael SUÁREZ CHOURIO | President of the Defence and Security Committee of the non-democratically elected National Assembly since January 2021. Former Chief of the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (between July 2019 and September 2020). Former Commander in Chief of the Venezuelan Bolivarian National Army (until July 2019). Former General Commander of the Venezuelan Bolivarian National Army and former Commander of Venezuela’s Comprehensive Defence Region of the Central Zone (REDI Central). Responsible for serious human rights violations by forces under his command during his tenure as General Commander of the Venezuelan Bolivarian National Army, including the use of excessive force and the mistreatment of detainees. He has targeted the democratic opposition and supported the use of military courts to try civilian protestors. | ||
| 11. | Iván HERNÁNDEZ DALA | Major-General in FANB. Director-General of Military Counter-Intelligence (DGCIM) since January 2014 and Head of the Presidential Guard since September 2015. As Head of the DGCIM, Iván Hernández Dala is responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition and for serious human rights violations committed by members of the DGCIM under his command, including torture, the use of excessive force and the ill-treatment of detainees. | ||
| 12. | Delcy Eloina RODRÍGUEZ GÓMEZ | Vice-President of Venezuela, Minister of the Economy, Finances and Trade. Former President of the illegitimate Constituent Assembly and former member of the Presidential Commission for the illegitimate National Constituent Assembly. Her actions in the Presidential Commission and then as President of the illegitimate Constituent Assembly have undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, including usurping the powers of the National Assembly and using them to target the opposition and to prevent them from taking part in the political process. | ||
| 13. | Elías José JAUA MILANO | Former Minister of Popular Power for Education. Former President of the Presidential Commission for the illegitimate National Constituent Assembly. Responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela through his role in leading the establishment of the illegitimate Constituent Assembly. | ||
| 14. | Sandra OBLITAS RUZZA | Minister of University Education. Former Rector of the Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela. Former Vice President of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and former President of the Commission of the Electoral and Civilian Register. Responsible for CNE activities which have undermined democracy in Venezuela, including by facilitating the establishment of the illegitimate Constituent Assembly and the manipulation of the electoral process. | ||
| 15. | Freddy Alirio BERNAL ROSALES | Governor of Táchira State since winning the elections in November 2021. Former Head of the National Control Centre of the Committee for Local Supply and Production (CLAP) and former Protector of Táchira State. Also a Commissioner General of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). As Head of the CLAP and Protector of Táchira State he was able to call upon Special Forces (FAES) and to influence appointments of judges and prosecutors. Responsible for undermining democracy through manipulation of CLAP programme distributions amongst voters. Additionally, as Commissioner General of SEBIN he is responsible for SEBIN’s activities which include serious human rights violations such as arbitrary detention. | ||
| 16. | Katherine Nayarith HARRINGTON PADRÓN | President of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Metropolitan Area of Caracas. Former Deputy Prosecutor General (also translated as Deputy Attorney General) from July 2017 until October 2018. Appointed Deputy Prosecutor General by the Supreme Court rather than by the National Assembly, in violation of the Constitution. Responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, including by initiating politically-motivated prosecutions and failing to investigate allegations of human rights violations by the Maduro regime. | ||
| 17. | Socorro Elizabeth HERNÁNDEZ | Member (Rector) of the National Electoral Council (CNE) until | ||
| 18. | Xavier Antonio MORENO REYES | Gender: male | Secretary-General of the National Electoral Council (CNE) from 2009 until June 2020. In that role, Moreno Reyes facilitated, legitimised and gave credibility to CNE decisions, since the Secretary-General of the CNE has a role in agenda-setting and formalising decisions. Moreno Reyes remained Secretary-General of CNE while democracy was severely undermined and the independent role of the CNE within the electoral process was compromised. He is therefore responsible for undermining democracy in Venezuela, including facilitating the establishment of the illegitimate Constituent Assembly and the manipulation of the electoral process. | |
| 19. | Néstor Neptali BLANCO HURTADO | Commander in military counterintelligence zone No 32 in the Los Llanos region. As Major in the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB), he has operated alongside officials in the Directorate-General of Military Counter-Intelligence (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar (DGCIM)) since at least December 2017. Responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture, the use of excessive force and the mistreatment of detainees in DGCIM facilities. | ||
| 20. | Rafael Ramón BLANCO MARRERO | Division General of the Venezuelan Bolivarian National Army since | ||
| 21. | Carlos Alberto CALDERÓN CHIRINOS | Official with the elite command of the Venezuelan National Police (PNB/FAES). Former senior office holder (referred to as General Commissioner, Director of El Helicoide and Director of Strategic Investigations) in the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). Officials of the Directorate for Strategic Investigations under his supervision have committed illegal detentions, acts of torture and other ill-treatment, and sexual and gender-based violence. Responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture, the use of excessive force and the mistreatment of detainees in SEBIN facilities. In particular, he has participated in and is responsible for acts of torture and the cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees at El Helicoide, a SEBIN prison. | ||
| 22. | Alexis Enrique ESCALONA MARRERO | Chief in Charge of the National Office Against Organized Crime and Terrorist Financing (ONDOFT) from January 2018 until May 2019. Retired Major General, former Vice Minister for prevention and public safety at the Ministry of the Interior (appointed in 2017 by President Maduro) and former National Commander of the National Anti-Extortion and Kidnapping Command (Comando Nacional Antiextorsión y Secuestro (CONAS)) (between 2014 and 2017). Responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture, the use of excessive force and the mistreatment of detainees by members of CONAS under his command. Also responsible for the repression of civil society by members of CONAS under his command. | ||
| 23. | Rafael Antonio FRANCO QUINTERO | Brigadier General of the Venezuelan Bolivarian National Army (FANB). Agent in the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). Head of Security at Maiquetía International Airport since August 2019. Director of the Special Directorate of Criminal and Criminalistics Investigations (DEIPC) at the Directorate-General of Military Counter-Intelligence (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar (DGCIM)) between November 2016 and November 2018. Responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture, the use of excessive force and the ill-treatment of detainees in DGCIM facilities by members of the DGCIM under his command, notably at the Boleita detention centre. Officials under his authority were also implicated in sexual violence against detainees. Also responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition by members of the DGCIM under his command. Linked to the death of Captain Acosta Arévalo. | ||
| 24. | Alexander Enrique GRANKO ARTEAGA | Head (Director) of the Special Affairs Division (DAE) of the Directorate-General of Military Counter-Intelligence (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar (DGCIM)) since 2017. Head of Office of DGCIM’s Boleita detention centre since | ||
| 25. | Hannover Esteban GUERRERO MIJARES | Second Commander and Chief of Staff of the 35th Military Police Brigade since 2019. Director of the Special Directorate of Criminal and Criminalistics Investigations (DEIPC) at the Directorate-General of Military Counter-Intelligence (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar (DGCIM)) from November 2018 to August 2019. As Director of DEIPC, he supervised the DGCIM facility in Boleita detention centre. During this period, acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as sexual violence, were committed by DGCIM officials at Boleita. Responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture, the use of excessive force and the ill-treatment of detainees committed by himself and by officials under his command, particularly in Boleita. Linked to the death of Captain Acosta Arévalo. | ||
| 26. | Secretary‐General of the National Defence Council since | |||
| 27. | Gladys DEL VALLE REQUENA | Inspector General of the Courts since | ||
| 28. | Tania Valentina DÍAZ GONZÁLEZ | Member of the non-democratically elected National Assembly and former First Vice-President of the non-recognised National Constituent Assembly (ANC). In her leading role in the non-recognised ANC she has undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, including by signing the decree that stripped the president of the National Assembly of Venezuela, Juan Guaidó, of his parliamentary immunity. | ||
| 29. | Elvis Eduardo HIDROBO AMOROSO | President of the National Electoral Commission of Venezuela since | ||
| 30. | Juan José MENDOZA JOVER | Former Second Vice-President of the Venezuelan Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)) and former President of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (February 2017 – April 2022). His actions have undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, including by a number of judicial rulings in the past two years that have limited or undermined the constitutional powers of Venezuela’s democratically-elected legislative body, the National Assembly. | ||
| 31. | Jorge Elieser MÁRQUEZ MONSALVE | Minister of the Office of the Presidency since November 2017 and Director-General of the National Commission of Telecommunications (CONATEL) since | ||
| 32. | Farik Karin MORA SALCEDO | Prosecutor serving at the Venezuelan First Special Court of First Instance with an office within the Directorate‐General of Military Counter‐Intelligence ( | ||
| 33. | Dinorah Yoselin BUSTAMANTE PUERTA | Prosecutor serving at the Venezuelan First Special Court of First Instance, with an office within the Directorate‐General of Military Counter‐Intelligence ( | ||
| 34. | Luis Eduardo PARRA RIVERO | Member of the non-democratically elected National Assembly. As a member of the National Assembly elected in 2015, he staged his election as President of the National Assembly on | ||
| 35. | Franklyn Leonardo DUARTE | Member of the non-democratically elected National Assembly. Former member and illegitimately elected first Vice-President of the National Assembly elected in 2015. As a member of the National Assembly elected in 2015, he staged his election as the first Vice-President of the National Assembly on | ||
| 36. | José Gregorio NORIEGA FIGUEROA | Member of the non-democratically elected National Assembly. Former member and illegitimately elected second Vice-President of the National Assembly elected in 2015. Illegitimately appointed director of the ad-hoc board of the political party Voluntad Popular. As a member of the National Assembly elected in 2015, he staged his election as the second Vice-President of the National Assembly on | ||
| 37. | Remigio CEBALLOS ICHASO | Since August 2021, Minister of the Interior and Justice of Venezuela and Vice-President of the Government for Citizen Security. Former Commander of the Operational and Strategic Command of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces of Venezuela (Comando Estratégico Operacional Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales Bolivarianas (CEOFANB)), the highest organ in the Venezuelan Armed Forces (June 2017–July 2021). CEOFANB controls the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and the Bolivarian National Guard. CEOFANB is also responsible for coordinating FANB interventions in demonstrations. In his position as Commander of CEOFANB, he was responsible for serious human rights violations, including the use of excessive force and inhuman and degrading treatment by officials of the FANB and by subordinate forces under his command, including the Bolivarian National Guard. Various sources, including the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, attribute human rights violations to FANB and the Bolivarian National Guard. | ||
| 38. | Omar José PRIETO FERNÁNDEZ | Former Governor of Zulia State (2017 – 2021). In this position he has undermined democracy and the rule of law in Zulia State. He was sworn in by the non-recognised National Constituent Assembly (ANC), after the legitimate winner of the election refused to be sworn in by the ANC. Omar José Prieto Fernández actively promoted the non-democratic elections for the National Assembly, which took place on | ||
| 39. | José Dionisio BRITO RODRÍGUEZ | Member of the non-democratically elected National Assembly and chair of the parliamentary commission that investigates the "actions perpetrated against the Republic" by members of the National Assembly elected in 2015. Furthermore, José Dionisio Brito Rodríguez illegitimately assumed leadership over opposition party | ||
| 40. | José Bernabé GUTIÉRREZ PARRA | Member of the non-democratically elected National Assembly and illegitimate leader of opposition party | ||
| 41. | Luis Fernando DAMIANI BUSTILLOS | Judge of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)). As a member of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, he is responsible for actions, statements and rulings that have usurped the constitutional powers of the National Assembly and undermined the opposition’s electoral rights including the unilateral appointment by the Supreme Court of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)) in June 2020 and the suspension and unilateral replacement of the leadership of three of the main democratic opposition parties in June and July 2020, as well as the extension of the ruling on Acción Democrática for one more year in May 2021. His actions have therefore undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, and he has supported and facilitated the undermining of democracy and the rule of law by the executive branch. | ||
| 42. | Lourdes Benicia SUÁREZ ANDERSON | Judge of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)) since December 2005 and Vice President of the Constitutional Chamber since April 2022. Former President of the Constitutional Chamber and former first Vice-President of the Supreme Court. As a member of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, she is responsible for actions, statements and rulings that have usurped the constitutional powers of the National Assembly and undermined the opposition’s electoral rights including the unilateral appointment by the Supreme Court of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)) in June 2020 and the suspension and unilateral replacement of the leadership of three of the main democratic opposition parties in June and July 2020, as well as the extension of the ruling on Acción Democrática for one more year in May 2021. Her actions have therefore undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, and she has supported and facilitated the undermining of democracy and the rule of law by the executive branch. | ||
| 43. | Calixto Antonio ORTEGA RÍOS | Judge of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)). As a member of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, he is responsible for actions, statements and rulings that have usurped the constitutional powers of the National Assembly and undermined the opposition’s electoral rights including the unilateral appointment by the Supreme Court of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)) in June 2020 and the suspension and unilateral replacement of the leadership of three of the main democratic opposition parties in June and July 2020, as well as the extension of the ruling on Acción Democrática for one more year in May 2021. His actions have therefore undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, and he has supported and facilitated the undermining of democracy and the rule of law by the executive branch. | ||
| 44. | René Alberto DEGRAVES ALMARZA | Gender: male | Substitute judge of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)) since April 2022. Former judge of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. As a member of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, he has been responsible for actions, statements and rulings that have usurped the constitutional powers of the National Assembly and undermined the opposition’s electoral rights including the unilateral appointment by the Supreme Court of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)) in June 2020 and the suspension and unilateral replacement of the leadership of three of the main democratic opposition parties in June and July 2020, as well as the extension of the ruling on Acción Democrática for one more year in May 2021. His actions have therefore undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, and he has supported and facilitated the undermining of democracy and the rule of law by the executive branch. | |
| 45. | Arcadio DELGADO ROSALES | Former judge and Vice-President of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)). As a member of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, he has been responsible for actions, statements and rulings that have usurped the constitutional powers of the National Assembly and undermined the opposition’s electoral rights, including the unilateral appointment by the Supreme Court of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)) in June 2020 and the suspension and unilateral replacement of the leadership of three of the main democratic opposition parties in June and July 2020, as well as the extension of the ruling on Acción Democrática for one more year in May 2021. His actions have therefore undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, and he has supported and facilitated the undermining of democracy and the rule of law by the executive branch. | ||
| 46. | Carmen Auxiliadora ZULETA DE MERCHÁN | Former judge of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)). As a member of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, she has been responsible for actions, statements and rulings that have usurped the constitutional powers of the National Assembly and undermined the opposition’s electoral rights including the unilateral appointment by the Supreme Court of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)) in June 2020 and the suspension and unilateral replacement of the leadership of three of the main democratic opposition parties in June and July 2020, as well as the extension of the ruling on Acción Democrática for one more year in May 2021. Her actions have therefore undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, and she has supported and facilitated the undermining of democracy and the rule of law by the executive branch. | ||
| 47. | Indira Maira ALFONZO IZAGUIRRE | Former President of the Electoral Chamber of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)). Former chairwoman of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)), appointed on | ||
| 48. | Leonardo Enrique MORALES POLEO | Gender: male | Former Vice-President of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)) and President of the Political Participation and Financing Commission (August 2020–May 2021). Leonardo Enrique Morales Poleo was appointed Vice-President of the CNE and President of the Political Participation and Financing Commission on | |
| 49. | Tania D’AMELIO CARDIET | Judge of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)) since April 2022. Former member (rector) of the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)) for the period 2016-2023. Former Member (rector) of the CNE for the period 2010-2016. Tania d’Amelio Cardiet, as rector of the CNE since 2010, contributed directly by her activity in her functions to the undermining of democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, including by preparing the non-democratic 2020 National Assembly elections, participating in the change of | ||
| 50. | José Miguel DOMÍNGUEZ RAMÍREZ | Director of the Special Action Forces ( | ||
| 51. | Carlos Ramón Enrique CARVALLO GUEVARA | President of state enterprise Corporación Ecosocialista Ezequiel Zamora (CORPOEZ) since March 2021. Division General and Deputy Director of the Directorate-General of Military Counter-Intelligence (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar (DGCIM)) since | ||
| 52. | Jesús Emilio VÁSQUEZ QUINTERO | President of the Court Martial and the Military Criminal Judicial Circuit since | ||
| 53. | Carlos Enrique TERÁN HURTADO | Division General of the Venezuelan Bolivarian National Armed Forces since 2022. Director of the Special Directorate of Criminal and Criminalistics Investigations (DEIPC) at the Directorate-General of Military Counter-Intelligence (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar (DGCIM)) from August 2019 to February 2021. In previous functions, Brigadier General Terán Hurtado served as head of the police in Falcón state and head of DGCIM in Táchira state. Responsible for the serious human rights violations, including cruel and inhuman treatment of detainees, committed by DGCIM officials under his command. In the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brigadier General Terán Hurtado is specifically pointed out as one of the responsible actors, and is linked to the Captain de la Sotta case. | ||
| 54. | Manuel Eduardo PÉREZ URDANETA | Former Deputy Minister of the Interior and Justice. Within the Venezuelan Ministry of the Interior and Justice, Brigadier General Manuel Eduardo Pérez Urdaneta ranked as one of five Deputy Ministers. His portfolio encompassed Preventive Security and Public Safety (Viceministro de prevención y Seguridad Ciudadana). Before that, Brigadier General Pérez served as Director of the Bolivarian National Police. In that role he was responsible for serious human rights violations, including the use of severe physical force against peaceful protesters, committed by officials of the Bolivarian National Police under his authority. | ||
| 55. | Douglas Arnoldo RICO GONZÁLEZ | Director of the Bureau for Scientific, Criminal, and Forensic Investigations (Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas (CICPC)) since |
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