Country | Company | TARIC additional code |
---|---|---|
The Republic of Korea | Bosung Wire Rope Co., Ltd, 568,Yongdeok-ri, Hallim-myeon, Gimae-si, Gyeongsangnam-do, 621-872 | A969 |
Chung Woo Rope Co., Ltd, 1682-4, Songjung-Dong, Gangseo- Gu, Busan | A969 | |
CS Co., Ltd, 31-102, Junam maeul 2-gil, Yangsan, Gyeongsangnam-do | A969 | |
Cosmo Wire Ltd, 4-10, Koyeon-Ri, Woong Chon-Myon Ulju- Kun, Ulsan | A969 | |
Dae Heung Industrial Co., Ltd, 185 Pyunglim – Ri, Daesan- Myun, Haman – Gun, Gyungnam | A969 | |
Daechang Steel Co., Ltd, 1213, Aam-daero, Namdong-gu, Incheon | C057 | |
DSR Wire Corp., 291, Seonpyong-Ri, Seo-Myon, Suncheon-City, Jeonnam | A969 | |
Goodwire MFG. Co. Ltd, 984-23, Maegok-Dong, Yangsan-City, Kyungnam | B955 | |
Kiswire Ltd, 37, Gurak-Ro, 141 Beon-Gil, Suyeong-Gu, Busan, Korea 48212 | A969 | |
Manho Rope & Wire Ltd, Dongho Bldg, 85-2 4 Street Joongang- Dong, Jong-gu, Busan | A926 | |
Line Metal Co. Ltd, 1259 Boncho-ri, Daeji-Myeon, Changnyeong-gun, Gyeongnam | B926 | |
Seil Wire and Cable, 47-4, Soju-Dong, Yangsan-Si, Kyungsangnamdo | A994 | |
Shin Han Rope Co., Ltd, 715-8, Gojan-Dong, Namdong-gu, Incheon | A969 | |
Ssang Yong Cable Mfg. Co., Ltd, 1559-4 Song-Jeong Dong, Gang-Seo Gu, Busan | A969 | |
YOUNGWIRE, 71-1 Sin-Chon Dong, Changwon City, Gyungnam | A969 |
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1666 of 6 June 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the People’s Republic of China as extended to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from Morocco and the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in these countries or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Union producers Pfeifer Drako Drahtseilwerk GmbH, Mühleim an der Ruhr, Germany and two related traders in the Union – Pfeifer Seil und Hebetechnik GmbH and Pfeifer Cables y Equipos de Elevación, Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, Italy and a related trader in the Union – Teufelberger Seil GmbH, WIRECO Poland sp. z o.o., Włocławek, Poland and a related trader in the Union – Olivera SÁ S.A., WIRECO Portugal.
European Federation of Steel Wire Rope Industries (EWRIS), Düsseldorf, Germany.
the product concerned when exported to the Union, the product under review produced and sold on the domestic market of the PRC, and the product under review produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry.
Overall there is substantial government control and intervention in the Chinese steel sector, and that this has resulted in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles. This is also the case for the Chinese SRC industry. The SRC industry has been characterised by a high level of State ownership, and several SRC producers have close ties with the GOC, regional or local governments, directly or via associations. The GOC and the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP"), as explained in the Report, also maintain structures that ensure their continued influence over enterprises, and in particular, State-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). The Chinese State not only actively formulates and oversees the implementation of general economic policies by individual SOEs, it also claims its rights to participate in operational decision making of SOEs. Furthermore, as also shown in the Report, the GOC keeps close links with the Chinese SRC producers via representative associations, such as the China Iron and Steel Association ("CISA") at national level and, e.g. the Nantong Steel Wire Rod Association, at provincial level in Jiangsu. In addition, the GOC exerts influence through personal connections. In this context, the applicant provided evidence that members of the board of directors, board of supervisors and senior management of several companies in the SRC industry are closely connected to the CCP. The applicant concluded that with the presence of large SOEs and a high level of government intervention in the Chinese SRC industry, even privately-owned producers are prevented from operating under market conditions, and that both public and privately owned enterprises in the SRC sector are also subject to policy supervision and guidance. According to the Report, Chinese policies and measures applicable to the SRC sector discriminate in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influence free market forces. The direction of the Chinese economy, including the SRC sector, is to a significant degree determined by an elaborate system of planning which sets out priorities and prescribes the goals on which the central and local governments must focus. Relevant plans exist at all levels of government and cover virtually all economic sectors, including the steel and SRC sector(s). The objectives set by the planning instruments are of binding nature, and the authorities at each administrative level monitor the implementation of the plans by the corresponding lower level of government. Overall, the system of planning in China results in resources being driven to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the government, rather than being allocated in line with market forces. The steel industry overall, including the SRC industry, is an encouraged industry under the Made in China 2025 initiative, and thereby eligible to benefit from considerable State funding. The Guiding Catalogue for Industry restructuring (2019 Version) also lists steel as an encouraged industry. The 13th and 14th Five Year Plans ("FYPs") encourage the steel industry, as an important manufacturing industry in China, to develop in several markets including marine equipment, engineering machinery, housing and transportation. SRC are used by all those industries and will therefore enjoy the benefits of the support measures implemented in the framework of the FYPs. Other governmental plans such as "Catalogue of Priority Industries for Foreign Investment in Central and Western China"; "Steel Industry Adjustment and Upgrading plan for 2016-2020" or provincial policy plans in Jiangsu and Shandong Provinces additionally intervene in and incentivise development of SRC industry, through, e.g. preferential policies towards foreign investments in this sector. Under the framework and the different policy documents at all levels described above, the GOC has been providing various subsidies to Chinese SRC exporting producers, which clearly indicates the strong interest of the State in promoting this sector. The cost of most, if not all, production factors of Chinese SRC production are distorted, including raw materials, electricity, land and labour costs. The main raw material input for SRC production is steel and the Commission found in several recent investigations relating to steel products from China that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation exist. These repeated and consistent findings are indicative of a systemic issue with prices of all types of steel products.See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191, recitals 187 ff; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 of 16 April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloyed steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 132, 19.4.2021, p. 145 ), recitals 100 ff; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 of15 December 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain utility scale steel wind towers originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 450, 16.12.2021, p. 59 ), recital 52 ff; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 of7 April 2020 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (OJ L 110, 8.4.2020, p. 3 ), recitals 103 ff.With regard to energy prices, according to the Report, the GOC intervenes significantly and systematically in the Chinese power market. The National Development and Reform Commission regulates the Chinese domestic prices of electricity. Under several State policies, large key users of electricity are allowed to purchase a certain quantity of electricity directly from power generators (direct purchasing agreements, with or without a contract) at prices that are lower than those offered by the grid providers. As provided in the Report, all land in the PRC is owned by the State (collectively-owned rural land and State-owned urban land) and its allocation remains solely dependent on the State. There are legal provisions to allocate land use rights in a transparent manner and at market prices, for instance by introducing bidding procedures. However, these provisions are regularly not respected, with certain buyers obtaining their land for free or below market rates. Moreover, authorities often pursue specific political goals including the implementation of the economic plans when allocating land. That has the effect that SRC producers, too, are subject to the top-down distortions arising from the discriminatory application of property laws. Wage costs in the steel sector, including also SRC, are equally distorted as previously confirmed by the Commission in the Report. The mobility of the Chinese workforce is restricted by the household registration system, which limits access to the full range of social security and other benefits to local residents of a given administrative area. This typically results in workers who are not in possession of the local residence registration finding themselves in a vulnerable employment position and receiving lower income than the holders of the residence registration. Those elements lead to the distortion of wage costs in the PRC. The SRC sector is affected by the distortions of wage costs both directly (when making the product under review or the main raw material for its production) as well as indirectly (when having access to capital or inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in the PRC). Access to finance and capital, as referred in the Report, is granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise do not act independently of the State. Access is therefore subject to various distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) sixth indent of the basic Regulation. The Chinese financial system is characterised by the strong position of State-owned banks, which, when granting access to finance, take into consideration criteria other than the economic viability of a project. Similarly to non-financial SOEs, the banks remain connected to the State not only through ownership but also via personal relations (the top executives of large State-owned financial institutions are ultimately appointed by the CCP). Furthermore, bond and credit ratings are often distorted for a variety of reasons including the fact that the risk assessment is influenced by the firm’s strategic importance to the GOC and the strength of any implicit guarantee by the government. Borrowing costs have been kept artificially low to stimulate investment growth. This is illustrated by the recent growth in corporate leverage in the State sector despite a sharp fall in profitability, which suggests that the mechanisms at work in the banking system do not follow normal commercial responses. Due to their status, the SRC industry appears to have easy access to financial lending by Chinese State-owned banks.
A level of economic development similar to the PRC. For this purpose, the Commission used countries with a gross national income per capita similar to PRC on the basis of the database of the World Bank ,World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income. Production of the product under review in that country ,If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered. Availability of relevant public data in the representative country; Where there is more than one possible representative country, preference should be given, where appropriate, to the country with an adequate level of social and environmental protection.
Factor of Production | Commodity Code in Türkiye | Undistorted value (CNY) | Unit of measurement | Source of information | |
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Steel wire | 72171090 | KG | Global Trade Atlas | ||
Synthetics | 5402630010 and 5402630020 | KG | GTA | ||
Plastics | 39021000 0011 | KG | GTA | ||
Strands | 73121065 | KG | GTA | ||
All other raw materials and consumables (i.e. lubricants, zinc), packaging, utilities. | n.a. | Fixed amount | |||
Labour cost per man-hour | N/A | Man-hour | Turkish statistical institute | ||
Electricity | N/A | kWh |
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Manufacturing overheads, which accounted in total for [13-18] % of the direct costs of manufacturing, SG&A and other costs, which accounted for 11,07 % of the Costs of Goods Sold ("COGS") of Celik Halat, and
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the weighted average sales prices of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level, with the corresponding weighted average prices of the imports from Comext, with appropriate adjustments for post-importation costs.
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