(a) access to the activity of credit institutions and investment firms (collectively referred to as "institutions"); (b) supervisory powers and tools for the prudential supervision of institutions by competent authorities; (c) the prudential supervision of institutions by competent authorities in a manner that is consistent with the rules set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (d) publication requirements for competent authorities in the field of prudential regulation and supervision of institutions.
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC Text with EEA relevance
Modified by
- Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Councilof 4 February 2014on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010(Text with EEA relevance), 32014L0017, February 28, 2014
- Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Councilof 15 May 2014establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council(Text with EEA relevance), 32014L0059, June 12, 2014
Corrected by
- Corrigendum to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 32013L0036R(01), August 2, 2013
- Corrigendum to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 32013L0036R(02), January 25, 2017
(1) access to the activity of investment firms in so far as it is regulated by Directive 2004/39/EC; (2) central banks; (3) post office giro institutions; (4) in Belgium, the 'Institut de Réescompte et de Garantie/Herdiscontering- en Waarborginstituut'; (5) in Denmark, the 'Eksport Kredit Fonden', the 'Eksport Kredit Fonden A/S', the 'Danmarks Skibskredit A/S' and the 'KommuneKredit'; (6) in Germany, the 'Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau', undertakings which are recognised under the 'Wohnungsgemeinnützigkeitsgesetz' as bodies of State housing policy and are not mainly engaged in banking transactions, and undertakings recognised under that law as non-profit housing undertakings; (7) in Estonia, the 'hoiu-laenuühistud', as cooperative undertakings that are recognised under the 'hoiu-laenuühistu seadus'; (8) in Ireland, credit unions and the friendly societies; (9) in Greece, the 'Ταμείο Παρακαταθηκών και Δανείων' (Tamio Parakatathikon kai Danion); (10) in Spain, the 'Instituto de Crédito Oficial'; (11) in France, the 'Caisse des dépôts et consignations'; (12) in Italy, the 'Cassa depositi e prestiti'; (13) in Latvia, the 'krājaizdevu sabiedrības', undertakings that are recognised under the 'krājaizdevu sabiedrību likums' as cooperative undertakings rendering financial services solely to their members; (14) in Lithuania, the 'kredito unijos' other than the 'Centrinė kredito unija'; (15) in Hungary, the 'MFB Magyar Fejlesztési Bank Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság' and the 'Magyar Export-Import Bank Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság'; (16) in the Netherlands, the 'Nederlandse Investeringsbank voor Ontwikkelingslanden NV', the 'NV Noordelijke Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij', the 'NV Industriebank Limburgs Instituut voor Ontwikkeling en Financiering' and the 'Overijsselse Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij NV'; (17) in Austria, undertakings recognised as housing associations in the public interest and the 'Österreichische Kontrollbank AG'; (18) in Poland, the 'Spółdzielcze Kasy Oszczędnościowo — Kredytowe' and the 'Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego'; (19) in Portugal, the 'Caixas Económicas' existing on 1 January 1986 with the exception of those incorporated as limited companies and of the 'Caixa Económica Montepio Geral';(20) in Slovenia, the 'SID-Slovenska izvozna in razvojna banka, d.d. Ljubljana'; (21) in Finland, the 'Teollisen yhteistyön rahasto Oy/Fonden för industriellt samarbete AB', and the 'Finnvera Oyj/Finnvera Abp'; (22) in Sweden, the 'Svenska Skeppshypotekskassan'; (23) in the United Kingdom, the National Savings Bank, the Commonwealth Development Finance Company Ltd, the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation Ltd, the Scottish Agricultural Securities Corporation Ltd, the Crown Agents for overseas governments and administrations, credit unions and municipal banks.
(1) 'credit institution' means credit institution as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (2) 'investment firm' means investment firm as defined in point (2) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (3) 'institution' means institution as defined in point (3) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (4) 'local firm' means local firm as defined in point (4) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (5) 'insurance undertaking' means insurance undertaking as defined in point (5) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (6) 'reinsurance undertaking' means reinsurance undertaking as defined in point (6) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (7) 'management body' means an institution's body or bodies, which are appointed in accordance with national law, which are empowered to set the institution's strategy, objectives and overall direction, and which oversee and monitor management decision-making, and include the persons who effectively direct the business of the institution; (8) 'management body in its supervisory function' means the management body acting in its role of overseeing and monitoring management decision-making; (9) 'senior management' means those natural persons who exercise executive functions within an institution and who are responsible, and accountable to the management body, for the day-to-day management of the institution; (10) 'systemic risk' means a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the financial system and the real economy; (11) 'model risk' means the potential loss an institution may incur, as a consequence of decisions that could be principally based on the output of internal models, due to errors in the development, implementation or use of such models; (12) 'originator' means originator as defined in point (13) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (13) 'sponsor' means sponsor as defined in point (14) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (14) 'parent undertaking' means parent undertaking as defined in point (15) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (15) 'subsidiary' means subsidiary as defined in point (16) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (16) 'branch' means branch as defined in point (17) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (17) 'ancillary services undertaking' means ancillary services undertaking as defined in point (18) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (18) 'asset management company' means asset management company as defined in point (19) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (19) 'financial holding company' means financial holding company as defined in point (20) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (20) 'mixed financial holding company' means mixed financial holding company as defined in point (21) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (21) 'mixed activity holding company' means mixed activity holding company as defined in point (22) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (22) 'financial institution' means financial institution as defined in point (26) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (23) 'financial sector entity' means financial sector entity as defined in point (27) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (24) 'parent institution in a Member State' means parent institution in a Member State as defined in point (28) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (25) 'EU parent institution' means EU parent institution as defined in point (29) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (26) 'parent financial holding company in a Member State' means parent financial holding company in a Member State as defined in point (30) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (27) 'EU parent financial holding company' means EU parent financial holding company as defined in point (31) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (28) 'parent mixed financial holding company in a Member State' means parent mixed financial holding company in a Member State as defined in point (32) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (29) 'EU parent mixed financial holding company' means EU parent mixed financial holding company as defined in point (33) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (30) 'systemically important institution' means an EU parent institution, an EU parent financial holding company, an EU parent mixed financial holding company or an institution the failure or malfunction of which could lead to systemic risk; (31) 'central counterparty' means central counterparty as defined in point (34) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (32) 'participation' means participation as defined in point (35) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (33) 'qualifying holding' means qualifying holding as defined in point (36) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (34) 'control' means control as defined in point (37) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (35) 'close links' means close links as defined in point (38) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (36) 'competent authority' means competent authority as defined in point (40) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (37) 'consolidating supervisor' means consolidating supervisor as defined in point (41) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (38) 'authorisation' means authorisation as defined in point (42) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (39) 'home Member State' means home Member State as defined in point (43) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (40) 'host Member State' means host Member State as defined in point (44) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (41) 'ESCB central banks' means ESCB central banks as defined in point (45) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (42) 'central banks' means central banks as defined in point (46) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (43) 'consolidated situation' means consolidated situation as defined in point (47) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (44) 'consolidated basis' means consolidated basis as defined in point (48) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (45) 'sub-consolidated basis' means sub-consolidated basis as defined in point (49) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (46) 'financial instrument' means financial instrument as defined in point (50) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (47) 'own funds' means own funds as defined in point (118) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (48) 'operational risk' means operational risk as defined in point (52) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (49) 'credit risk mitigation' means credit risk mitigation as defined in point (57) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (50) 'securitisation' means securitisation as defined in point (61) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (51) 'securitisation position' means securitisation position as defined in point (62) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (52) 'securitisation special purpose entity' means securitisation special purpose entity as defined in point (66) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (53) 'discretionary pension benefits' means discretionary pension benefits as defined in point (73) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (54) 'trading book' means trading as defined in point (86) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (55) 'regulated market' means regulated market as defined in point (92) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (56) 'leverage' means leverage as defined in point (93) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (57) 'risk of excessive leverage' means risk of excessive leverage as defined in point (94) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (58) 'external credit assessment institution' means external credit assessment institution as defined in point (98) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (59) 'internal approaches' means the internal ratings based approach referred to in Article 143(1), the internal models approach referred to in Article 221, the own estimates approach referred to in Article 225, the advanced measurement approaches referred to in Article 312(2), the internal models method referred to in Articles 283 and 363, and the internal assessment approach referred to in Article 259(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
(a) the competent authorities, as parties to the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular when ensuring the flow of appropriate and reliable information between them and other parties to the ESFS, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation set out in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union; (b) the competent authorities participate in the activities of EBA and, as appropriate, in the colleges of supervisors; (c) the competent authorities make every effort to comply with those guidelines and recommendations issued by EBA in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and to respond to the warnings and recommendations issued by the ESRB pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010; (d) the competent authorities cooperate closely with the ESRB; (e) national mandates conferred on the competent authorities do not inhibit the performance of their duties as members of EBA, of the ESRB, where appropriate, or under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
(a) the information to be provided to the competent authorities in the application for the authorisation of credit institutions, including the programme of operations provided for in Article 10; (b) the requirements applicable to shareholders and members with qualifying holdings pursuant to Article 14; and (c) obstacles which may prevent effective exercise of the supervisory functions of the competent authority, as referred to in Article 14.
(a) the initial capital is no less than EUR 1 million; (b) the Member States concerned notify the Commission and EBA of their reasons for exercising that option.
(a) a credit institution which is a legal person and which, under its national law, has a registered office, has its head office in the same Member State as its registered office; (b) a credit institution other than that referred to in point (a) has its head office in the Member State which granted it authorisation and in which it actually carries out its business.
(a) a subsidiary of a credit institution authorised in that other Member State; (b) a subsidiary of the parent undertaking of a credit institution authorised in that other Member State; (c) controlled by the same natural or legal persons as those who control a credit institution authorised in that other Member State.
(a) a subsidiary of an insurance undertaking or investment firm authorised in the Union; (b) a subsidiary of the parent undertaking of an insurance undertaking or investment firm authorised in the Union; (c) controlled by the same natural or legal persons as those who control an insurance undertaking or investment firm authorised in the Union.
(a) does not make use of the authorisation within 12 months, expressly renounces the authorisation or has ceased to engage in business for more than six months, unless the Member State concerned has made provision for the authorisation to lapse in such cases; (b) has obtained the authorisation through false statements or any other irregular means; (c) no longer fulfils the conditions under which authorisation was granted; (d) no longer meets the prudential requirements set out in Parts Three, Four or Six of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or imposed under Article 104(1)(a) or Article 105 of this Directive or can no longer be relied on to fulfil its obligations towards its creditors, and, in particular, no longer provides security for the assets entrusted to it by its depositors; (e) falls within one of the other cases where national law provides for withdrawal of authorisation; or (f) commits one of the breaches referred to in Article 67(1).
(a) the reputation of the proposed acquirer; (b) the reputation, knowledge, skills and experience, as set out in Article 91(1), of any member of the management body and any member of senior management who will direct the business of the credit institution as a result of the proposed acquisition; (c) the financial soundness of the proposed acquirer, in particular in relation to the type of business pursued and envisaged in the credit institution in which the acquisition is proposed; (d) whether the credit institution will be able to comply and continue to comply with the prudential requirements based on this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, and where applicable, other Union law, in particular Directives 2002/87/EC and 2009/110/EC, including whether the group of which it will become a part has a structure that makes it possible to exercise effective supervision, effectively exchange information among the competent authorities and determine the allocation of responsibilities among the competent authorities; (e) whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, in connection with the proposed acquisition, money laundering or terrorist financing within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing is being or has been committed or attempted, or that the proposed acquisition could increase the risk thereof.OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15 .
(a) a credit institution, insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking, investment firm, or a management company within the meaning of Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 2009/65/EC ("UCITS management company") authorised in another Member State or in a sector other than that in which the acquisition is proposed; (b) the parent undertaking of a credit institution, insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking, investment firm or UCITS management company authorised in another Member State or in a sector other than that in which the acquisition is proposed; (c) a natural or legal person controlling a credit institution, insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking, investment firm or UCITS management company authorised in another Member State or in a sector other than that in which the acquisition is proposed.
(a) the reception and transmission of investors' orders for financial instruments; (b) the execution of investors' orders for financial instruments; (c) the management of individual portfolios of investments in financial instruments.
(a) such positions arise only as a result of the firm's failure to match investors' orders precisely; (b) the total market value of all such positions is subject to a ceiling of 15 % of the firm's initial capital; (c) the firm meets the requirements set out in Articles 92 to 95 and Part Four of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (d) such positions are incidental and provisional in nature and strictly limited to the time required to carry out the transaction in question.
(a) initial capital of EUR 50000 ;(b) professional indemnity insurance covering the whole territory of the Union or some other comparable guarantee against liability arising from professional negligence, representing at least EUR 1000000 applying to each claim and in aggregate EUR1500000 per annum for all claims;(c) a combination of initial capital and professional indemnity insurance in a form resulting in a level of coverage equivalent to that referred to in points (a) or (b).
(a) initial capital of EUR 25000 ;(b) professional indemnity insurance covering the whole territory of the Union or some other comparable guarantee against liability arising from professional negligence, representing at least EUR 500000 applying to each claim and in aggregate EUR750000 per annum for all claims;(c) a combination of initial capital and professional indemnity insurance in a form resulting in a level of coverage equivalent to that referred to in points (a) or (b).
(a) the parent undertaking or undertakings are authorised as credit institutions in the Member State by the law of which the financial institution is governed; (b) the activities in question are actually carried out within the territory of the same Member State; (c) the parent undertaking or undertakings holds 90 % or more of the voting rights attaching to shares in the capital of the financial institution; (d) the parent undertaking or undertakings satisfies the competent authorities regarding the prudent management of the financial institution and has declared, with the consent of the relevant home Member State competent authorities, that they jointly and severally guarantee the commitments entered into by the financial institution; (e) the financial institution is effectively included, for the activities in question in particular, in the consolidated supervision of the parent undertaking, or of each of the parent undertakings, in accordance with Title VII, Chapter 3 of this Directive and Part One, Title II, Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, in particular for the purposes of the own funds requirements set out in Article 92 of that Regulation, for the control of large exposures provided for in Part Four of that Regulation and for the purposes of the limitation of holdings provided for in Articles 89 and 90 of that Regulation.
(a) the Member State within the territory of which it plans to establish a branch; (b) a programme of operations setting out, inter alia, the types of business envisaged and the structural organisation of the branch; (c) the address in the host Member State from which documents may be obtained; (d) the names of those to be responsible for the management of the branch.
(a) the credit institution does not comply with the national provisions transposing this Directive or with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) there is a material risk that the credit institution will not comply with the national provisions transposing this Directive or with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
(a) institutions the parent undertakings of which have their head offices in a third country; (b) institutions situated in third countries the parent undertakings of which, whether institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies, have their head offices in the Union.
(a) the competent authorities of the Member States are able to obtain the information necessary for the supervision, on the basis of their consolidated financial situations, of institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies situated in the Union which have as subsidiaries institutions or financial institutions situated in a third country, or holding participation therein; (b) the supervisory authorities of third countries are able to obtain the information necessary for the supervision of parent undertakings the head offices of which are situated within their territories and which have as subsidiaries institutions or financial institutions situated in one or more Member States or holding participation therein; and (c) EBA is able to obtain from the competent authorities of the Member States the information received from national authorities of third countries in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
(a) whether the market share of the branch in terms of deposits exceeds 2 % in the host Member State; (b) the likely impact of a suspension or closure of the operations of the institution on systemic liquidity and the payment, clearing and settlement systems in the host Member State; (c) the size and the importance of the branch in terms of number of clients within the context of the banking or financial system of the host Member State.
(a) to check that the conditions governing access to the activity of credit institutions are met and to facilitate monitoring, on a non-consolidated or consolidated basis, of the conduct of such activity, especially with regard to the monitoring of liquidity, solvency, large exposures, and administrative and accounting procedures and internal control mechanisms; (b) to impose penalties; (c) in an appeal against a decision of the competent authority including court proceedings pursuant to Article 72; (d) in court proceedings initiated pursuant to special provisions provided for in Union law adopted in the field of credit institutions.
(a) authorities entrusted with the public duty of supervising other financial sector entities and the authorities responsible for the supervision of financial markets; (b) authorities or bodies charged with responsibility for maintaining the stability of the financial system in Member States through the use of macroprudential rules; (c) reorganisation bodies or authorities aiming at protecting the stability of the financial system; (d) contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred to in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (e) bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of institutions and in other similar procedures; (f) persons responsible for carrying out statutory audits of the accounts of institutions, insurance undertakings and financial institutions.
(a) the bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of institutions and in other similar procedures; (b) contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred to in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (c) persons charged with carrying out statutory audits of the accounts of institutions, insurance undertakings and financial institutions.
(a) that the information is exchanged for the purpose of performing the tasks referred to in paragraph 1; (b) that the information received is subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1); (c) where the information originates in another Member State, that it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement.
(a) that the information is exchanged for the purpose of detecting and investigating breaches of company law; (b) that the information received is subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1); (c) where the information originates in another Member State, that it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement.
(a) ESCB central banks and other bodies with a similar function in their capacity as monetary authorities when the information is relevant for the exercise of their respective statutory tasks, including the conduct of monetary policy and related liquidity provision, oversight of payments, clearing and settlement systems and the safeguarding of stability of the financial system; (b) contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred to in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (c) where appropriate, other public authorities responsible for overseeing payment systems; (d) the ESRB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) ("EIOPA"), established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and ESMA, where that information is relevant for the exercise of their tasks under Regulations (EU) No 1092/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 or (EU) No 1095/2010.OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48 .
(a) that the entities have a precise mandate under national law to investigate or scrutinise the actions of authorities responsible for the supervision of institutions or for laws on such supervision; (b) that the information is strictly necessary for fulfilling the mandate referred to in point (a); (c) the persons with access to the information are subject to professional secrecy requirements under national law at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1); (d) where the information originates in another Member State that it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement.
(a) constitute a material breach of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions which lay down the conditions governing authorisation or which specifically govern pursuit of the activities of institutions; (b) affect the ongoing functioning of the institution; (c) lead to refusal to certify the accounts or to the expression of reservations.
(a) directly; (b) in collaboration with other authorities; (c) under their responsibility by delegation to such authorities; (d) by application to the competent judicial authorities.
(a) the power to require the following natural or legal persons to provide all information that is necessary in order to carry out the tasks of the competent authorities, including information to be provided at recurring intervals and in specified formats for supervisory and related statistical purposes: (i) institutions established in the Member State concerned; (ii) financial holding companies established in the Member State concerned; (iii) mixed financial holding companies established in the Member State concerned; (iv) mixed-activity holding companies established in the Member State concerned; (v) persons belonging to the entities referred to in points (i) to (iv); (vi) third parties to whom the entities referred to in points (i) to (iv) have outsourced operational functions or activities;
(b) the power to conduct all necessary investigations of any person referred to in points (a)(i) to (vi) established or located in the Member State concerned where necessary to carry out the tasks of the competent authorities, including: (i) the right to require the submission of documents; (ii) to examine the books and records of the persons referred to in points(a)(i) to (vi) and take copies or extracts from such books and records; (iii) to obtain written or oral explanations from any person referred to in points (a) (i) to (vi) or their representatives or staff; and (iv) to interview any other person who consents to be interviewed for the purpose of collecting information relating to the subject matter of an investigation;
(c) the power, subject to other conditions set out in Union law, to conduct all necessary inspections at the business premises of the legal persons referred to in points (a)(i) to (vi) and any other undertaking included in consolidated supervision where a competent authority is the consolidating supervisor, subject to the prior notification of the competent authorities concerned. If an inspection requires authorisation by a judicial authority under national law, such authorisation shall be applied for.
(a) carrying out the business of taking deposits or other repayable funds from the public without being a credit institution in breach of Article 9; (b) commencing activities as a credit institution without obtaining authorisation in breach of Article 9; (c) acquiring, directly or indirectly, a qualifying holding in a credit institution or further increasing, directly or indirectly, such a qualifying holding in a credit institution as a result of which the proportion of the voting rights or of the capital held would reach or exceed the thresholds referred to in Article 22(1) or so that the credit institution would become its subsidiary, without notifying in writing the competent authorities of the credit institution in which they are seeking to acquire or increase a qualifying holding, during the assessment period, or against the opposition of the competent authorities, in breach of Article 22(1); (d) disposing, directly or indirectly, of a qualifying holding in a credit institution or reducing a qualifying holding so that the proportion of the voting rights or of the capital held would fall below the thresholds referred to in Article 25 or so that the credit institution would cease to be a subsidiary, without notifying in writing the competent authorities.
(a) a public statement which identifies the natural person, institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company responsible and the nature of the breach; (b) an order requiring the natural or legal person responsible to cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct; (c) in the case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to 10 % of the total annual net turnover including the gross income consisting of interest receivable and similar income, income from shares and other variable or fixed-yield securities, and commissions or fees receivable in accordance with Article 316 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the undertaking in the preceding business year; (d) in the case of a natural person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to EUR 5000000 , or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on17 July 2013 ;(e) administrative pecuniary penalties of up to twice the amount of the benefit derived from the breach where that benefit can be determined; (f) suspension of the voting rights of the shareholder or shareholders held responsible for the breaches referred to in paragraph 1.
(a) an institution has obtained an authorisation through false statements or any other irregular means; (b) an institution, on becoming aware of any acquisitions or disposals of holdings in their capital that cause holdings to exceed or fall below one of the thresholds referred to in Article 22(1) or Article 25, fails to inform the competent authorities of those acquisitions or disposals in breach of the first subparagraph of Article 26(1); (c) an institution listed on a regulated market as referred to in the list to be published by ESMA in accordance with Article 47 of Directive 2004/39/EC does not, at least annually, inform the competent authorities of the names of shareholders and members possessing qualifying holdings and the sizes of such holdings in breach of the second subparagraph of Article 26(1) of this Directive; (d) an institution fails to have in place governance arrangements required by the competent authorities in accordance with the national provisions transposing Article 74; (e) an institution fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information on compliance with the obligation to meet own funds requirements set out in Article 92 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to the competent authorities in breach of Article 99(1) of that Regulation; (f) an institution fails to report or provides incomplete or inaccurate information to the competent authorities in relation to the data referred to in Article 101 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (g) an institution fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information about a large exposure to the competent authorities in breach of Article 394(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (h) an institution fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information on liquidity to the competent authorities in breach of Article 415(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (i) an institution fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information on the leverage ratio to the competent authorities in breach of Article 430(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (j) an institution repeatedly or persistently fails to hold liquid assets in breach of Article 412 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (k) an institution incurs an exposure in excess of the limits set out in Article 395 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (l) an institution is exposed to the credit risk of a securitisation position without satisfying the conditions set out in Article 405 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (m) an institution fails to disclose information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information in breach of Article 431(1), (2) and (3) or Article 451(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (n) an institution makes payments to holders of instruments included in the own funds of the institution in breach of Article 141 of this Directive or in cases where Article 28, 52 or 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 prohibit such payments to holders of instruments included in own funds; (o) an institution is found liable for a serious breach of the national provisions adopted pursuant to Directive 2005/60/EC; (p) an institution allows one or more persons not complying with Article 91 to become or remain a member of the management body.
(a) a public statement which identifies the natural person, institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company responsible and the nature of the breach; (b) an order requiring the natural or legal person responsible to cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct; (c) in the case of an institution, withdrawal of the authorisation of the institution in accordance with Article 18; (d) subject to Article 65(2), a temporary ban against a member of the institution's management body or any other natural person, who is held responsible, from exercising functions in institutions; (e) in the case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to 10 % of the total annual net turnover including the gross income consisting of interest receivable and similar income, income from shares and other variable or fixed-yield securities, and commissions or fees receivable in accordance with Article 316 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the undertaking in the preceding business year; (f) in the case of a natural person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to EUR 5000000 , or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on17 July 2013 ;(g) administrative pecuniary penalties of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined.
(a) where the penalty is imposed on a natural person and, following an obligatory prior assessment, publication of personal data is found to be disproportionate; (b) where publication would jeopardise the stability of financial markets or an ongoing criminal investigation; (c) where publication would cause, insofar as it can be determined, disproportionate damage to the institutions or natural persons involved.
(a) the gravity and the duration of the breach; (b) the degree of responsibility of the natural or legal person responsible for the breach; (c) the financial strength of the natural or legal person responsible for the breach, as indicated, for example, by the total turnover of a legal person or the annual income of a natural person; (d) the importance of profits gained or losses avoided by the natural or legal person responsible for the breach, insofar as they can be determined; (e) the losses for third parties caused by the breach, insofar as they can be determined; (f) the level of cooperation of the natural or legal person responsible for the breach with the competent authority; (g) previous breaches by the natural or legal person responsible for the breach; (h) any potential systemic consequences of the breach.
(a) specific procedures for the receipt of reports on breaches and their follow-up; (b) appropriate protection for employees of institutions who report breaches committed within the institution against retaliation, discrimination or other types of unfair treatment at a minimum; (c) protection of personal data concerning both the person who reports the breaches and the natural person who is allegedly responsible for a breach, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC; (d) clear rules that ensure that confidentiality is guaranteed in all cases in relation to the person who reports the breaches committed within the institution, unless disclosure is required by national law in the context of further investigations or subsequent judicial proceedings.
(a) those approaches that exhibit significant differences in own fund requirements for the same exposure; (b) approaches where there is particularly high or low diversity, and also where there is a significant and systematic under-estimation of own funds requirements.
(a) lead to standardisation or preferred methods; (b) create wrong incentives; or (c) cause herd behaviour.
(a) the procedures for sharing assessments made in accordance with paragraph 3 between the competent authorities and with EBA; (b) the standards for the assessment made by competent authorities referred to in paragraph 3.
(a) the template, the definitions and the IT-solutions to be applied in the Union for the reporting referred to in paragraph 2; (b) the benchmark portfolio or portfolios referred to in paragraph 1.
(a) credit-granting is based on sound and well-defined criteria and that the process for approving, amending, renewing, and re-financing credits is clearly established; (b) institutions have internal methodologies that enable them to assess the credit risk of exposures to individual obligors, securities or securitisation positions and credit risk at the portfolio level. In particular, internal methodologies shall not rely solely or mechanistically on external credit ratings. Where own funds requirements are based on a rating by an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) or based on the fact that an exposure is unrated, this shall not exempt institutions from additionally considering other relevant information for assessing their allocation of internal capital; (c) the ongoing administration and monitoring of the various credit risk-bearing portfolios and exposures of institutions, including for identifying and managing problem credits and for making adequate value adjustments and provisions, is operated through effective systems; (d) diversification of credit portfolios is adequate given an institution's target markets and overall credit strategy.
(a) the management body must have the overall responsibility for the institution and approve and oversee the implementation of the institution's strategic objectives, risk strategy and internal governance; (b) the management body must ensure the integrity of the accounting and financial reporting systems, including financial and operational controls and compliance with the law and relevant standards; (c) the management body must oversee the process of disclosure and communications; (d) the management body must be responsible for providing effective oversight of senior management; (e) the chairman of the management body in its supervisory function of an institution must not exercise simultaneously the functions of a chief executive officer within the same institution, unless justified by the institution and authorised by competent authorities.
(a) identify and recommend, for the approval of the management body or for approval of the general meeting, candidates to fill management body vacancies, evaluate the balance of knowledge, skills, diversity and experience of the management body and prepare a description of the roles and capabilities for a particular appointment, and assess the time commitment expected. Furthermore, the nomination committee shall decide on a target for the representation of the underrepresented gender in the management body and prepare a policy on how to increase the number of the underrepresented gender in the management body in order to meet that target. The target, policy and its implementation shall be made public in accordance with Article 435(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) periodically, and at least annually, assess the structure, size, composition and performance of the management body and make recommendations to the management body with regard to any changes; (c) periodically, and at least annually, assess the knowledge, skills and experience of individual members of the management body and of the management body collectively, and report to the management body accordingly; (d) periodically review the policy of the management body for selection and appointment of senior management and make recommendations to the management body.
(a) name(s), nature of activities and geographical location; (b) turnover; (c) number of employees on a full time equivalent basis; (d) profit or loss before tax; (e) tax on profit or loss; (f) public subsidies received.
(a) one executive directorship with two non-executive directorships; (b) four non-executive directorships.
(a) executive or non-executive directorships held within the same group; (b) executive or non-executive directorships held within: (i) institutions which are members of the same institutional protection scheme provided that the conditions set out in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 are fulfilled; or (ii) undertakings (including non-financial entities) in which the institution holds a qualifying holding.
(a) the notion of sufficient time commitment of a member of the management body to perform his functions, in relation to the individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of activities of the institution; (b) the notion of adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience of the management body as referred to in paragraph 7; (c) the notions of honesty, integrity and independence of mind of a member of the management body as referred to in paragraph 8; (d) the notion of adequate human and financial resources devoted to the induction and training of members of the management body as referred to in paragraph 9; (e) the notion of diversity to be taken into account for the selection of members of the management body as referred to in paragraph 10.
(a) the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the institution; (b) the remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution, and incorporates measures to avoid conflicts of interest; (c) the institution' s management body in its supervisory function adopts and periodically reviews the general principles of the remuneration policy and is responsible for overseeing its implementation; (d) the implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the management body in its supervisory function; (e) staff engaged in control functions are independent from the business units they oversee, have appropriate authority, and are remunerated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control; (f) the remuneration of the senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in Article 95 or, if such a committee has not been established, by the management body in its supervisory function; (g) the remuneration policy, taking into account national criteria on wage setting, makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting: (i) basic fixed remuneration, which should primarily reflect relevant professional experience and organisational responsibility as set out in an employee's job description as part of the terms of employment; and (ii) variable remuneration which should reflect a sustainable and risk adjusted performance as well as performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description as part of the terms of employment.
(a) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenue where it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support; (b) the relevant competent authorities require institutions to restructure remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including, where appropriate, establishing limits to the remuneration of the members of the management body of the institution; (c) no variable remuneration is paid to members of the management body of the institution unless justified.
(a) where remuneration is performance related, the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual and of the business unit concerned and of the overall results of the institution and when assessing individual performance, financial and non-financial criteria are taken into account; (b) the assessment of the performance is set in a multi-year framework in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the underlying business cycle of the credit institution and its business risks; (c) the total variable remuneration does not limit the ability of the institution to strengthen its capital base; (d) guaranteed variable remuneration is not consistent with sound risk management or the pay-for-performance principle and shall not be a part of prospective remuneration plans; (e) guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional, occurs only when hiring new staff and where the institution has a sound and strong capital base and is limited to the first year of employment; (f) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component; (g) institutions shall set the appropriate ratios between the fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration, whereby the following principles shall apply: (i) the variable component shall not exceed 100 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage; (ii) Members States may allow shareholders or owners or members of the institution to approve a higher maximum level of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of remuneration provided the overall level of the variable component shall not exceed 200 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage. Any approval of a higher ratio in accordance with the first subparagraph of this point shall be carried out in accordance with the following procedure: the shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act upon a detailed recommendation by the institution giving the reasons for, and the scope of, an approval sought, including the number of staff affected, their functions and the expected impact on the requirement to maintain a sound capital base; shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act by a majority of at least 66 % provided that at least 50 % of the shares or equivalent ownership rights are represented or, failing that, shall act by a majority of 75 % of the ownership rights represented; the institution shall notify all shareholders or owners or members of the institution, providing a reasonable notice period in advance, that an approval under the first subparagraph of this point will be sought; the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the recommendation to its shareholders or owners or members, including the proposed higher maximum ratio and the reasons therefore and shall be able to demonstrate to the competent authority that the proposed higher ratio does not conflict with the institution's obligations under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, having regard in particular to the institution's own funds obligations; the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the decisions taken by its shareholders or owners or members, including any approved higher maximum ratio pursuant to the first subparagraph of this point, and the competent authorities shall use the information received to benchmark the practices of institutions in that regard. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information and EBA shall publish it on an aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. EBA may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this indent and to ensure the consistency of the information collected; staff who are directly concerned by the higher maximum levels of variable remuneration referred to in this point shall not, where applicable, be allowed to exercise, directly or indirectly, any voting rights they may have as shareholders or owners or members of the institution;
(iii) Member States may allow institutions to apply the discount rate referred to in the second subparagraph of this point to a maximum of 25 % of total variable remuneration provided it is paid in instruments that are deferred for a period of not less than five years. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage. EBA shall prepare and publish, by 31 March 2014 , guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate taking into account all relevant factors including inflation rate and risk, which includes length of deferral. The EBA guidelines on the discount rate shall specifically consider how to incentivise the use of instruments which are deferred for a period of not less than five years;
(h) payments relating to the early termination of a contract reflect performance achieved over time and do not reward failure or misconduct; (i) remuneration packages relating to compensation or buy out from contracts in previous employment must align with the long-term interests of the institution including retention, deferral, performance and clawback arrangements; (j) the measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components includes an adjustment for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost of the capital and the liquidity required; (k) the allocation of the variable remuneration components within the institution shall also take into account all types of current and future risks; (l) a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50 %, of any variable remuneration shall consist of a balance of the following: (i) shares or equivalent ownership interests, subject to the legal structure of the institution concerned or share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments, in the case of a non-listed institution; (ii) where possible, other instruments within the meaning of Article 52 or 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or other instruments which can be fully converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or written down, that in each case adequately reflect the credit quality of the institution as a going concern and are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration.
The instruments referred to in this point shall be subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the institution. Member States or their competent authorities may place restrictions on the types and designs of those instruments or prohibit certain instruments as appropriate. This point shall be applied to both the portion of the variable remuneration component deferred in accordance with point (m) and the portion of the variable remuneration component not deferred; (m) a substantial portion, and in any event at least 40 %, of the variable remuneration component is deferred over a period which is not less than three to five years and is correctly aligned with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question. Remuneration payable under deferral arrangements shall vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. In the case of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the amount shall be deferred. The length of the deferral period shall be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question; (n) the variable remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the institution as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the institution, the business unit and the individual concerned. Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract and labour law, the total variable remuneration shall generally be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the institution occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements. Up to 100 % of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements. Institutions shall set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback. Such criteria shall in particular cover situations where the staff member: (i) participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the institution; (ii) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety;
(o) the pension policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution. If the employee leaves the institution before retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be held by the institution for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in point (l). Where an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in point (l) subject to a five-year retention period; (p) staff members are required to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements; (q) variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the non-compliance with this Directive or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
(a) risks to which the institutions are or might be exposed; (b) risks that an institution poses to the financial system taking into account the identification and measurement of systemic risk under Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, or recommendations of the ESRB, where appropriate; and (c) risks revealed by stress testing taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of an institution's activities.
(a) the results of the stress test carried out in accordance with Article 177 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 by institutions applying an internal ratings based approach; (b) the exposure to and management of concentration risk by institutions, including their compliance with the requirements set out in Part Four of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 81 of this Directive; (c) the robustness, suitability and manner of application of the policies and procedures implemented by institutions for the management of the residual risk associated with the use of recognised credit risk mitigation techniques; (d) the extent to which the own funds held by an institution in respect of assets which it has securitised are adequate having regard to the economic substance of the transaction, including the degree of risk transfer achieved; (e) the exposure to, measurement and management of liquidity risk by institutions, including the development of alternative scenario analyses, the management of risk mitigants (in particular the level, composition and quality of liquidity buffers) and effective contingency plans; (f) the impact of diversification effects and how such effects are factored into the risk measurement system; (g) the results of stress tests carried out by institutions using an internal model to calculate market risk own funds requirements under Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (h) the geographical location of institutions' exposures; (i) the business model of the institution; (j) the assessment of systemic risk, in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 97.
(a) an indication of how competent authorities intend to carry out their tasks and allocate their resources; (b) an identification of which institutions are intended to be subject to enhanced supervision and the measures taken for such supervision as set out in paragraph 3; (c) a plan for inspections at the premises used by an institution, including its branches and subsidiaries established in other Member States in accordance with Articles 52, 119 and 122.
(a) institutions for which the results of the stress tests referred to in points (a) and (g) of Article 98(1) and Article 100, or the outcome of the supervisory review and evaluation process under Article 97, indicate significant risks to their ongoing financial soundness or indicate breaches of national provisions transposing this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) institutions that pose systemic risk to the financial system; (c) any other institution for which the competent authorities deem it to be necessary.
(a) an increase in the number or frequency of on-site inspections of the institution; (b) a permanent presence of the competent authority at the institution; (c) additional or more frequent reporting by the institution; (d) additional or more frequent review of the operational, strategic or business plans of the institution; (e) thematic examinations monitoring specific risks that are likely to materialise.
(a) the institution does not meet the requirements of this Directive or of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) the competent authorities have evidence that the institution is likely to breach the requirements of this Directive or of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 within the following 12 months.
(a) to require institutions to hold own funds in excess of the requirements set out in Chapter 4 of this Title and in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 relating to elements of risks and risks not covered by Article 1 of that Regulation; (b) to require the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies implemented in accordance with Articles 73 and 74; (c) to require institutions to present a plan to restore compliance with supervisory requirements pursuant to this Directive and to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and set a deadline for its implementation, including improvements to that plan regarding scope and deadline; (d) to require institutions to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds requirements; (e) to restrict or limit the business, operations or network of institutions or to request the divestment of activities that pose excessive risks to the soundness of an institution; (f) to require the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities, products and systems of institutions; (g) to require institutions to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of net revenues where it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base; (h) to require institutions to use net profits to strengthen own funds; (i) to restrict or prohibit distributions or interest payments by an institution to shareholders, members or holders of Additional Tier 1 instruments where the prohibition does not constitute an event of default of the institution; (j) to impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements, including reporting on capital and liquidity positions; (k) to impose specific liquidity requirements, including restrictions on maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities; (l) to require additional disclosures.
(a) an institution does not meet the requirement set out in Articles 73 and 74 of this Directive or in Article 393 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) risks or elements of risks are not covered by the own funds requirements set out in Chapter 4 of this Title or in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (c) the sole application of other administrative measures is unlikely to improve the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies sufficiently within an appropriate timeframe; (d) the review referred to in Article 98(4) or Article 101(4) reveals that the non-compliance with the requirements for the application of the respective approach will likely lead to inadequate own funds requirements; (e) the risks are likely to be underestimated despite compliance with the applicable requirements of this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; or (f) an institution reports to the competent authority in accordance with Article 377(5) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 that the stress test results referred to in that Article materially exceed its own funds requirement for the correlation trading portfolio.
(a) the quantitative and qualitative aspects of an institution's assessment process referred to in Article 73; (b) an institution's arrangements, processes and mechanisms referred to in Article 74; (c) the outcome of the review and evaluation carried out in accordance with Article 97 or 101; (d) the assessment of systemic risk.
(a) the particular business model of the institution; (b) the institution's arrangements, processes and mechanisms referred to in Section II and in particular in Article 86; (c) the outcome of the review and evaluation carried out in accordance with Article 97; (d) systemic liquidity risk that threatens the integrity of the financial markets of the Member State concerned.
(a) to publish information referred to in Part Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 more than once per year, and to set deadlines for publication; (b) to use specific media and locations for publications other than the financial statements.
(a) the functioning of their review and evaluation process referred to in Article 97; (b) the methodology used to base decisions referred to in Articles 98, 100, 101, 102, 104 and 105 on the process referred to in point (a).
(a) coordination of the gathering and dissemination of relevant or essential information in going concern and emergency situations; (b) planning and coordination of supervisory activities in going-concern situations, including in relation to the activities referred to in Title VII, Chapter 3, in cooperation with the competent authorities involved; (c) planning and coordination of supervisory activities in cooperation with the competent authorities involved, and if necessary with ESCB central banks, in preparation for and during emergency situations, including adverse developments in institutions or in financial markets using, where possible, existing channels of communication for facilitating crisis management.
(a) on the application of Articles 73 and 97 to determine the adequacy of the consolidated level of own funds held by the group of institutions with respect to its financial situation and risk profile and the required level of own funds for the application of Article 104(1)(a) to each entity within the group of institutions and on a consolidated basis; (b) on measures to address any significant matters and material findings relating to liquidity supervision including relating to the adequacy of the organisation and the treatment of risks as required pursuant to Article 86 and relating to the need for institution-specific liquidity requirements in accordance with Article 105 of this Directive.
(a) for the purpose of paragraph 1(a), within four months after submission by the consolidating supervisor of a report containing the risk assessment of the group of institutions in accordance with Articles 73 and 97 and Article 104(1)(a) to the other relevant competent authorities; (b) for the purposes of paragraph 1(b), within one month after submission by the consolidating supervisor of a report containing the assessment of the liquidity risk profile of the group of institutions in accordance with Articles 86 and 105.
(a) exchanging information between each other and with EBA in accordance with Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010; (b) agreeing on voluntary entrustment of tasks and voluntary delegation of responsibilities where appropriate; (c) determining supervisory examination programmes referred to in Article 99 based on a risk assessment of the group in accordance with Article 97; (d) increasing the efficiency of supervision by removing unnecessary duplication of supervisory requirements, including in relation to the information requests referred to in Article 114 and Article 117(3); (e) consistently applying the prudential requirements under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 across all entities within a group of institutions without prejudice to the options and discretions available in Union law; (f) applying Article 112(1)(c) taking into account the work of other forums that may be established in that area.
(a) identification of the group's legal structure and the governance structure including organisational structure, covering all regulated entities, non-regulated entities, non-regulated subsidiaries and significant branches belonging to the group, the parent undertakings, in accordance with Article 14(3), Article 74(1) and Article 109(2), and of the competent authorities of the regulated entities in the group; (b) procedures for the collection of information from the institutions in a group, and the checking of that information; (c) adverse developments in institutions or in other entities of a group, which could seriously affect the institutions; (d) significant penalties and exceptional measures taken by competent authorities in accordance with this Directive, including the imposition of a specific own fund requirement under Article 104 and the imposition of any limitation on the use of the Advanced Measurement Approach for the calculation of the own funds requirements under Article 312(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
(a) where a competent authority has not communicated essential information; (b) where a request for cooperation, in particular to exchange relevant information, has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time.
(a) changes in the shareholder, organisational or management structure of credit institutions in a group, which require the approval or authorisation of competent authorities; and (b) significant penalties or exceptional measures taken by competent authorities, including the imposition of a specific own funds requirement under Article 104 and the imposition of any limitation on the use of the advances measurement approaches for the calculation of the own funds requirements under Article 312(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
(1) 'capital conservation buffer' means the own funds that an institution is required to maintain in accordance with Article 129; (2) 'institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer' means the own funds that an institution is required to maintain in accordance with Article 130; (3) 'G-SII buffer' means the own funds that are required to be maintained in accordance with Article 131(4); (4) 'O-SII buffer' means the own funds that may be required to be maintained in accordance with Article 131(5); (5) 'systemic risk buffer' means the own funds that an institution is or may be required to maintain in accordance with Article 133; (6) 'combined buffer requirement' means the total Common Equity Tier 1 capital required to meet the requirement for the capital conservation buffer extended by the following, as applicable: (a) an institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer; (b) a G-SII buffer; (c) an O-SII buffer; (d) a systemic risk buffer;
(7) 'countercyclical buffer rate' means the rate that institutions must apply in order to calculate their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer, and that is set in accordance with Article 136, Article 137 or by a relevant third-country authority, as the case may be; (8) 'domestically authorised institution' means an institution that has been authorised in the Member State for which a particular designated authority is responsible for setting the countercyclical buffer rate; (9) 'buffer guide' means a benchmark buffer rate calculated in accordance with Article 135(1).
(a) size of the group; (b) interconnectedness of the group with the financial system; (c) substitutability of the services or of the financial infrastructure provided by the group; (d) complexity of the group; (e) cross-border activity of the group, including cross border activity between Member States and between a Member State and a third country.
(a) size; (b) importance for the economy of the Union or of the relevant Member State; (c) significance of cross-border activities; (d) interconnectedness of the institution or group with the financial system.
(a) the O-SII buffer must not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system of other Member States or of the Union as a whole forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market; (b) the O-SII buffer must be reviewed by the competent authority or the designated authority at least annually.
(a) the justification for why the O-SII buffer is considered likely to be effective and proportionate to mitigate the risk; (b) an assessment of the likely positive or negative impact of the O-SII buffer on the internal market, based on information which is available to the Member State; (c) the O-SII buffer rate that the Member State wishes to set.
(a) 1 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; and (b) the G-SII or O-SII buffer rate applicable to the group at consolidated level.
(a) re- allocate a G-SII from a lower sub-category to a higher sub-category; (b) allocate an entity as referred to in paragraph 1 that has an overall score that is lower than the cut-off score of the lowest sub-category to that sub-category or to a higher sub-category, thereby designating it as a G-SII.
(a) a G-SII buffer and an O-SII buffer; (b) a G-SII buffer, an O-SII buffer and a systemic risk buffer in accordance with Article 133.
(a) the systemic risk buffer must not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system of other Member States or of the Union as a whole forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market; (b) the systemic risk buffer must be reviewed by the competent authority or the designated authority at least every second year.
(a) the systemic or macroprudential risk in the Member State; (b) the reasons why the dimension of the systemic or macroprudential risks threatens the stability of the financial system at national level justifying the systemic risk buffer rate; (c) the justification for why the systemic risk buffer is considered likely to be effective and proportionate to mitigate the risk; (d) an assessment of the likely positive or negative impact of the systemic risk buffer on the internal market, based on information which is available to the Member State; (e) the justification for why none of the existing measures in this Directive or in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, excluding Articles 458 and 459 of that Regulation, alone or in combination, will be sufficient to address the identified macroprudential or systemic risk taking into account the relative effectiveness of those measures; (f) the systemic risk buffer rate that the Member State wishes to require.
(a) the systemic or macroprudential risk in the Member State; (b) the reasons why the dimension of the systemic or macroprudential risks threatens the stability of the financial system at national level justifying the systemic risk buffer rate; (c) the justification for why the systemic risk buffer is considered likely to be effective and proportionate to mitigate the risk; (d) an assessment of the likely positive or negative impact of the systemic risk buffer on the internal market, based on information which is available to the Member State; (e) the justification for why none of the existing measures in this Directive or in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, excluding Articles 458 and 459 of that Regulation, alone or in combination, will be sufficient to address the identified macroprudential or systemic risk taking into account the relative effectiveness of those measures; (f) the systemic risk buffer rate that the Member State wishes to require.
(a) the systemic risk buffer rate; (b) the institutions to which the systemic risk buffer applies; (c) a justification for the systemic risk buffer; (d) the date from which the institutions must apply the setting or resetting of the systemic risk buffer; and (e) the names of the countries where exposures located in those countries are recognised in the systemic risk buffer.
(a) principles to guide designated authorities when exercising their judgment as to the appropriate countercyclical buffer rate, ensure that authorities adopt a sound approach to relevant macro-economic cycles and promote sound and consistent decision-making across Member States; (b) general guidance on: (i) the measurement and calculation of the deviation from long term trends of ratios of credit to gross domestic product (GDP); (ii) the calculation of buffer guides required by Article 136(2);
(c) guidance on variables that indicate the build-up of system-wide risk associated with periods of excessive credit growth in a financial system, in particular the relevant credit-to-GDP ratio and its deviation from the long-term trend, and on other relevant factors, including the treatment of economic developments within individual sectors of the economy, that should inform the decisions of designated authorities on the appropriate countercyclical buffer rate under Article 136; (d) guidance on variables, including qualitative criteria, that indicate that the buffer should be maintained, reduced or fully released.
(a) an indicator of growth of levels of credit within that jurisdiction and, in particular, an indicator reflective of the changes in the ratio of credit granted in that Member State to GDP; (b) any current guidance maintained by the ESRB in accordance with Article 135(1)(b).
(a) the buffer guide calculated in accordance with paragraph 2; (b) any current guidance maintained by the ESRB in accordance with Article 135(1)(a), (c) and (d) and any recommendations issued by the ESRB on the setting of a buffer rate; (c) other variables that the designated authority considers relevant for addressing cyclical systemic risk.
(a) the applicable countercyclical buffer rate; (b) the relevant credit-to-GDP-ratio and its deviation from the long-tem trend; (c) the buffer guide calculated in accordance with paragraph 2; (d) a justification for that buffer rate; (e) where the buffer rate is increased, the date from which the institutions must apply that increased buffer rate for the purposes of calculating their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer; (f) where the date referred to in point (e) is less than 12 months after the date of the announcement under this paragraph, a reference to the exceptional circumstances that justify that shorter deadline for application; (g) where the buffer rate is decreased, the indicative period during which no increase in the buffer rate is expected, together with a justification for that period;
(a) the applicable countercyclical buffer rate; (b) the Member State or third countries to which it applies; (c) where the buffer rate is increased, the date from which the institutions authorised in the Member State of the designated authority must apply that increased buffer rate for the purposes of calculating their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer; (d) where the date referred to in point (c) is less than 12 months after the date of the announcement under this paragraph, a reference to the exceptional circumstances that justify that shorter deadline for application.
(a) a countercyclical buffer rate has not been set and published by the relevant third-country authority for a third country ('relevant third-country authority') to which one or more Union institutions have credit exposures; (b) the ESRB considers that a countercyclical buffer rate which has been set and published by the relevant third-country authority for a third country is not sufficient to protect Union institutions appropriately from the risks of excessive credit growth in that country, or a designated authority notifies the ESRB that it considers that buffer rate to be insufficient for that purpose.
(a) the countercyclical buffer rate and the third country to which it applies; (b) a justification for that buffer rate; (c) where the buffer rate is set above zero for the first time or is increased, the date from which the institutions must apply that increased buffer rate for the purposes of calculating their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer; (d) where the date referred to in point (c) is less than 12 months after the date of the publication of the setting under this paragraph, a reference to the exceptional circumstances that justify that shorter deadline for application.
(a) domestically authorised institutions shall apply that buffer rate in excess of 2,5 % of total risk exposure amount; (b) institutions that are authorised in another Member State shall apply a countercyclical buffer rate of 2,5 % of total risk exposure amount if the designated authority in the Member State in which they have been authorised has not recognised the buffer rate in excess of 2,5 % in accordance with Article 137(1); (c) institutions that are authorised in another Member State shall apply the countercyclical buffer rate set by the designated authority of Member State A if the designated authority in the Member State in which they have been authorised has recognised the buffer rate in accordance with Article 137.
(a) institutions shall apply a countercyclical buffer rate of 2,5 % of total risk exposure amount if the designated authority in the Member State in which they have been authorised has not recognised the buffer rate in excess of 2,5 % in accordance with Article 137(1); (b) institutions shall apply the countercyclical buffer rate set by the relevant third-country authority if the designated authority in the Member State in which they have been authorised has recognised the buffer rate in accordance with Article 137.
(a) the own funds requirements for credit risk under Part Three, Title II of that Regulation; (b) where the exposure is held in the trading book, own funds requirements for specific risk under Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 of that Regulation or incremental default and migration risk under Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 of that Regulation; (c) where the exposure is a securitisation, the own funds requirements under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 5 of that Regulation.
(a) a countercyclical buffer rate for a Member State shall apply from the date specified in the information published in accordance with Article 136(7)(e) or Article 137(2)(c) if the effect of that decision is to increase the buffer rate; (b) subject to point (c), a countercyclical buffer rate for a third country shall apply 12 months after the date on which a change in the buffer rate was announced by the relevant third-country authority, irrespective of whether that authority requires institutions incorporated in that third country to apply the change within a shorter period, if the effect of that decision is to increase the buffer rate; (c) where the designated authority of the home Member State of the institution sets the countercyclical buffer rate for a third country pursuant to Article 139(2) or (3), or recognises the countercyclical buffer rate for a third country pursuant to Article 137, that buffer rate shall apply from the date specified in the information published in accordance with Article 139(5)(c) or Article 137(2)(c), if the effect of that decision is to increase the buffer rate; (d) a countercyclical buffer rate shall apply immediately if the effect of that decision is to reduce the buffer rate.
(a) make a distribution in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital; (b) create an obligation to pay variable remuneration or discretionary pension benefits or pay variable remuneration if the obligation to pay was created at a time when the institution failed to meet the combined buffer requirements; (c) make payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments.
(a) interim profits not included in Common Equity Tier 1 capital pursuant to Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 that have been generated since the most recent decision on the distribution of profits or any of the actions referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of the second subparapgraph of paragraph 2 of this Article; plus (b) year-end profits not included in Common Equity Tier 1 capital pursuant to Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 that have been generated since the most recent decision on the distribution of profits or any of the actions referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of the second subparapgraph of paragraph 2 of this Article; minus (c) amounts which would be payable by tax if the items specified in points (a) and (b) of this paragraph were to be retained.
(a) where the Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained by the institution which is not used to meet the own funds requirement under Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation, is within the first (that is, the lowest) quartile of the combined buffer requirement, the factor shall be 0; (b) where the Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained by the institution which is not used to meet the own funds requirement under Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation, is within the second quartile of the combined buffer requirement, the factor shall be 0,2; (c) where the Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained by the institution which is not used to meet the own funds requirement under Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation, is within the third quartile of the combined buffer requirement, the factor shall be 0,4; (d) where the Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained by the institution which is not used to meet the own funds requirement under Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation, is within the fourth (that is, the highest) quartile of the combined buffer requirement, the factor shall be 0,6;
(a) the amount of capital maintained by the institution, subdivided as follows: (i) Common Equity Tier 1 capital, (ii) Additional Tier 1 capital, (iii) Tier 2 capital;
(b) the amount of its interim and year-end profits; (c) the MDA calculated in accordance with paragraph 4; (d) the amount of distributable profits it intends to allocate between the following: (i) dividend payments, (ii) share buybacks, (iii) payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments, (iv) the payment of variable remuneration or discretionary pension benefits, whether by creation of a new obligation to pay, or payment pursuant to an obligation to pay created at a time when the institution failed to meet its combined buffer requirements.
(a) a payment of cash dividends; (b) a distribution of fully or partly paid bonus shares or other capital instruments referred to in Article 26(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (c) a redemption or purchase by an institution of its own shares or other capital instruments referred to in Article 26(1)(a) of that Regulation; (d) a repayment of amounts paid up in connection with capital instruments referred to in Article 26(1)(a) of that Regulation; (e) a distribution of items referred to in points (b) to (e) of Article 26(1) of that Regulation.
(a) estimates of income and expenditure and a forecast balance sheet; (b) measures to increase the capital ratios of the institution; (c) a plan and timeframe for the increase of own funds with the objective of meeting fully the combined buffer requirement; (d) any other information that the competent authority considers to be necessary to carry out the assessment required by paragraph 3.
(a) require the institution to increase own funds to specified levels within specified periods; (b) exercise its powers under Article 102 to impose more stringent restrictions on distributions than those required by Article 141.
(a) the texts of laws, regulations, administrative rules and general guidance adopted in their Member State in the field of prudential regulation; (b) the manner of exercise of the options and discretions available in Union law; (c) the general criteria and methodologies they use in the review and evaluation referred to in Article 97; (d) without prejudice to the provisions set out in Title VII, Chapter 1, Section II of this Directive and Articles 54 and 58 of Directive 2004/39/EC, aggregate statistical data on key aspects of the implementation of the prudential framework in each Member State, including the number and nature of supervisory measures taken in accordance with Article 102(1)(a) and of administrative penalties imposed in accordance with Article 65.
(a) the general criteria and methodologies adopted to review compliance with Articles 405 to 409 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Title VII, Chapter 1, Section II, a summary description of the outcome of the supervisory review and description of the measures imposed in cases of non-compliance with Articles 405 to 409 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, identified on an annual basis.
(a) the criteria it applies to determine that there is no current or foreseen material practical or legal impediment to the prompt transfer of own funds or repayment of liabilities; (b) the number of parent institutions which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 7(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the number of those which incorporate subsidiaries in a third country; (c) on an aggregate basis for the Member State: (i) the total amount of own funds on the consolidated basis of the parent institution in a Member State, which benefits from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 7(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, which are held in subsidiaries in a third country; (ii) the percentage of total own funds on the consolidated basis of parent institutions in a Member State which benefits from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 7(3) of that Regulation, represented by own funds which are held in subsidiaries in a third country; (iii) the percentage of total own funds required under Article 92 of that Regulation on the consolidated basis of parent institutions in a Member State, which benefits from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 7(3) of that Regulation, represented by own funds which are held in subsidiaries in a third country.
(a) the criteria it applies to determine that there is no current or foreseen material practical or legal impediment to the prompt transfer of own funds or repayment of liabilities; (b) the number of parent institutions which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the number of such parent institutions which incorporate subsidiaries in a third country; (c) on an aggregate basis for the Member State: (i) the total amount of own funds of parent institutions which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 which are held in subsidiaries in a third country; (ii) the percentage of total own funds of parent institutions which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 represented by own funds which are held in subsidiaries in a third country; (iii) the percentage of total own funds required under Article 92 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of parent institutions which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of that Regulation represented by own funds which are held in subsidiaries in a third country.
(a) clarification of the definitions set out in Article 3 and Article 128 to ensure uniform application of this Directive; (b) clarification of the definitions set out in Article 3 and Article 128 in order to take account, in the application of this Directive, of developments on financial markets; (c) alignment of terminology on, and the framing of, definitions set out in Article 3 in accordance with subsequent acts on institutions and related matters; (d) adjustment of the amounts referred to in Article 31(1) to take account of changes in the European Index of Consumer Prices as published by Eurostat, in line with, and at the same time as, the adjustments made under Article 4(7) of Directive 2002/92/EC; (e) expansion of the content of the list referred to in Articles 33 and 34 and set out in Annex I or adaptation of the terminology used in that list to take account of developments on financial markets; (f) identification of the areas in which the competent authorities must exchange information as set out in Article 50; (g) adjustment of the provisions set out in Articles 76 to 88 and Article 98 in order to take account of developments on financial markets (in particular new financial products) or in accounting standards or requirements which take account of Union law, or with regard to the convergence of supervisory practices; (h) deferral of the disclosure obligations in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 89(3) where the Commission report submitted pursuant to the first subparagraph of that paragraph identifies significant negative effects; (i) adjustments of the criteria set out in Article 23(1), in order to take account of future developments and to ensure the uniform application of this Directive.
(a) technical adjustments to the list in Article 2; (b) alteration of the amount of initial capital prescribed in Article 12 and Title IV to take account of developments in the economic and monetary field.
(a) in paragraph 2, point (a) is deleted; (b) paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: "3. In order to ensure consistent application of the calculation methods listed in Annex I, Part II, of this Directive, in conjunction with Article 49(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 228(1) of Directive 2009/138/EC, but without prejudice to Article 6(4) of this Directive, the ESAs shall, through the Joint Committee, develop draft regulatory technical standards with regard to Article 6(2) of this Directive. The ESA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by five months before the date of application referred to in Article 309(1) of Directive 2009/138/EC. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 respectively.".
(a) whether the market share of the branch in terms of deposits exceeds 2 % in the host Member State; (b) the likely impact of a suspension or closure of the operations of the institution on systemic liquidity and the payment, clearing and settlement systems in the host Member State; (c) the size and the importance of the branch in terms of number of clients within the context of the banking or financial system of the host Member State.
(a) the capital conservation buffer shall consist of Common Equity Tier 1 capital equal to 0,625 % of the total of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of the institution calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) the institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer shall be no more than 0,625 % of the total of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of the institution calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
(a) the capital conservation buffer shall consist of Common Equity Tier 1 capital equal to 1,25 % of the total of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of the institution calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) the institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer shall be no more than 1,25 % of the total of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of the institution calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
(a) the capital conservation buffer shall consist of Common Equity Tier 1 capital equal to 1,875 % of the total of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of the institution calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) the institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer shall be no more than 1,875 % of the total of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of the institution calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
(a) their efficiency, implementation and enforcement, including the identification of any lacunae arising from the application of the principle of proportionality to those provisions; (b) the impact of compliance with the principle in Article 94(1)(g) in respect of: (i) competitiveness and financial stability; and (ii) any staff working effectively and physically in subsidiaries established outside the EEA of parent institutions established within the EEA.
(a) 25 % of the G-SII buffer, set in accordance with Article 131(4), in 2016; (b) 50 % of the G-SII buffer, set in accordance with Article 131(4), in 2017; (c) 75 % of the G-SII buffer, set in accordance with Article 131(4), in 2018; and (d) 100 % of the G-SII buffer, set in accordance with Article 131(4), in 2019.
1. Taking deposits and other repayable funds. 2. Lending including, inter alia: consumer credit, credit agreements relating to immovable property, factoring, with or without recourse, financing of commercial transactions (including forfeiting). 3. Financial leasing. 4. Payment services as defined in Article 4(3) of Directive 2007/64/EC. 5. Issuing and administering other means of payment (e.g. travellers' cheques and bankers' drafts) insofar as such activity is not covered by point 4. 6. Guarantees and commitments. 7. Trading for own account or for account of customers in any of the following: (a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of deposit, etc.); (b) foreign exchange; (c) financial futures and options; (d) exchange and interest-rate instruments; (e) transferable securities.
8. Participation in securities issues and the provision of services relating to such issues. 9. Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related questions and advice as well as services relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings. 10. Money broking. 11. Portfolio management and advice. 12. Safekeeping and administration of securities. 13. Credit reference services. 14. Safe custody services. 15. Issuing electronic money.
This Directive | Directive 2006/48/EC | Directive 2006/49/EC |
---|---|---|
Article 1 | Article 1(1) | |
Article 2(1) | ||
Article 2(2) | ||
Article 2(3) | ||
Article 2(4) | Article 1(2) | |
Article 2(5) | Article 2 | |
Article 2(6) | Article 1(3) | |
Article 3 | Article 4 | |
Article 3(1), point (53) | Article 4, point (49) | |
Article 4(1) | ||
Article 4(2) | ||
Article 4(3) | ||
Article 4(4) | ||
Article 4(5) | Article 35(1) | |
Article 4(6) | ||
Article 4(7) | ||
Article 4(8) | ||
Article 5 | Article 128 | |
Article 6 | Article 42b(1) | |
Article 7 | Article 40(3) | |
Article 8(1) | Article 6(1) | |
Article 8(2) | Article 6(2) | |
Article 8(3) | Article 6(3) | |
Article 8(4) | ||
Article 9 | Article 5 | |
Article 10 | Article 7 | |
Article 11 | Article 8 | |
Article 12(1) | Article 9(1), first subparagraph | |
Article 12(2) | Article 9(1), second subparagraph | |
Article 12(3) | Article 9(1), third subparagraph | |
Article 12(4) | Article 9(2) | |
Article 13(1) | Article 11(1) | |
Article 13(2) | Article 11(2) | |
Article 14(1) | Article 12(1) | |
Article 14(2) | Article 12(2) | |
Article 14(3) | Article 12(3) | |
Article 15 | Article 13 | |
Article 16(1) | Article 15(1) | |
Article 16(2) | Article 15(2) | |
Article 16(3) | Article 15(3) | |
Article 17 | Article 16 | |
Article 18 | Article 17(1) | |
Article 19 | Article 18 | |
Article 20(1) | Article 14 | |
Article 20(2) | Article 14 | |
Article 20(3) | ||
Article 20(5) | Article 17(2) | |
Article 21 | Article 3 | |
Article 22(1) | Article 19(1) | |
Article 22(2) | Article 19(2) | |
Article 22(3) | Article 19(3) | |
Article 22(4) | Article 19(4) | |
Article 22(5) | Article 19(5) | |
Article 22(6) | Article 19(6) | |
Article 22(7) | Article 19(7) | |
Article 22(8) | Article 19(8) | |
Article 22(9) | Article 19(9) | |
Article 23(1) | Article 19a(1) | |
Article 23(2) | Article 19a(2) | |
Article 23(3) | Article 19a(3) | |
Article 23(4) | Article 19a(4) | |
Article 23(5) | Article 19a(5) | |
Article 24(1) | Article 19b(1) | |
Article 24(2) | Article 19b(2) | |
Article 25 | Article 20 | |
Article 26(1) | Article 21(1) | |
Article 26(2) | Article 21(2) | |
Article 27 | Article 21(3) | |
Article 28(1) | Article 4 | |
Article 28(2) | Article 9 | |
Article 29(1) | Article 5(1) | |
Article 29(2) | Article 5(2) | |
Article 29(3) | Article 5(3) | |
Article 29(4) | Article 5(2) | |
Article 30 | Article 6 | |
Article 31(1) | Article 7 | |
Article 31(2) | Article 8 | |
Article 32(1) | Article 10(1) | |
Article 32(2) | Article 10(2) | |
Article 32(3) | Article 10(3) | |
Article 32(4) | Article 10(4) | |
Article 32(5) | Article 10(5) | |
Article 33 | Article 23 | |
Article 34(1) | Article 24(1) | |
Article 34(2) | Article 24(2) | |
Article 34(3) | Article 24(3) | |
Article 35(1) | Article 25(1) | |
Article 35(2) | Article 25(2) | |
Article 35(3) | Article 25(3) | |
Article 35(4) | Article 25(4) | |
Article 35(5) | Article 25(5) | |
Article 35(6) | Article 25(5) | |
Article 35(7) | Article 25(5) | |
Article 36(1) | Article 26(1) | |
Article 36(2) | Article 26(2) | |
Article 36(3) | Article 26(3) | |
Article 36(4) | Article 26(4) | |
Article 36(5) | Article 26(5) | |
Article 36(6) | Article 26(5) | |
Article 36(7) | Article 26(5) | |
Article 37 | Article 36 | |
Article 38 | Article 27 | |
Article 39(1) | Article 28(1) | |
Article 39(2) | Article 28(2) | |
Article 39(3) | Article 28(3) | |
Article 39(4) | Article 28(4) | |
Article 39(5) | Article 28(4) | |
Article 39(6) | Article 28(4) | |
Article 40, first paragraph | Article 29, first paragraph | |
Article 40, second paragraph | ||
Article 40, third paragraph | ||
Article 41(1) | Article 30(1) and (2) | |
Article 41(2) | ||
Article 42 | Article 32 | |
Article 43(1) | Article 33, first paragraph | |
Article 43(2) | ||
Article 43(3) | ||
Article 43(4) | ||
Article 43(5) | ||
Article 44 | Articles 31 and 34 | |
Article 45 | Article 35 | |
Article 46 | Article 37 | |
Article 47(1) | Article 38(1) | |
Article 47(2) | Article 38(2) | |
Article 47(3) | Article 38(3) | |
Article 48(1) | Article 39(1) | |
Article 48(2) | Article 39(2) | |
Article 48(3) | Article 39(3) | |
Article 48(4) | Article 39(4) | |
Article 49(1) | Article 40(1) | |
Article 49(2) | Article 40(2) | |
Article 49(3) | Article 41, third paragraph | |
Article 50(1) | Article 42, first paragraph | |
Article 50(2) | ||
Article 50(3) | ||
Article 50(4) | ||
Article 50(5) | Article 42, second paragraph | |
Article 50(6) | Article 42, third and sixth paragraphs | |
Article 50(7) | Article 42, fourth and seventh paragraph | |
Article 50(8) | Article 42, fifth paragraph | |
Article 51(1) | Article 42a(1) | |
Article 51(2) | Article 42a(2) | |
Article 51(3) | Article 42a(3) | |
Article 51(4) | Article 42a(3) | |
Article 51(5) | Article 42a(3) | |
Article 51(6) | ||
Article 52(1) | Article 43(1) | |
Article 52(2) | Article 43(2) | |
Article 52(3) | ||
Article 52(4) | ||
Article 53(1) | Article 44(1) | |
Article 53(2) | Article 44(2) | |
Article 53(3) | ||
Article 54 | Article 45 | |
Article 55 | Article 46 | |
Article 56 | Article 47 | |
Article 57(1) | Article 48(1), first subparagraph | |
Article 57(2) | Article 48(1), second subparagraph | |
Article 57(3) | Article 48(2), first and second subparagraph | |
Article 57(4) | Article 48(2), third subparagraph | |
Article 57(5) | Article 48(2), fifth subparagraph | |
Article 57(6) | Article 48(2), fourth subparagraph | |
Article 58 | Article 49, first paragraph | |
Article 58(2) | Article 49, second paragraph | |
Article 58(3) | Article 49, fourth paragraph | |
Article 58(4) | Article 49, fifth paragraph | |
Article 59(1) | Article 50 | |
Article 59(2) | ||
Article 60 | Article 51 | |
Article 61(1) | Article 52, first paragraph | |
Article 61(2) | Article 52, second paragraph | |
Article 62 | ||
Article 63(1) | Article 53(1) | |
Article 63(2) | Article 53(2) | |
Article 64 | ||
Article 65 | ||
Article 66 | ||
Article 67 | ||
Article 68 | ||
Article 69 | ||
Article 70 | ||
Article 71 | ||
Article 72 | Article 55 | |
Article 73 | Article 123 | |
Article 74(1) | Article 22(1) | |
Article 74(2) | Article 22(2) | |
Article 74(3) | Article 22(6) | |
Article 74(4) | ||
Article 75(1) | Article 22(3) | |
Article 75(2) | Article 22(4) | |
Article 75(3) | Article 22(5) | |
Article 76(1) | Annex V, point 2 | |
Article 76(2) | ||
Article 76(3) | ||
Article 76(4) | ||
Article 76(5) | ||
Article 77 | ||
Article 78 | ||
Article 79 | Annex V, points 3, 4 and 5 | |
Article 80 | Annex V, point 6 | |
Article 81 | Annex V, point 7 | |
Article 82(1) | Annex V, point 8 | |
Article 82(2) | Annex V, point 9 | |
Article 83(1) | Annex V, point 10 | |
Article 83(2) | Annex IV, point 5 | |
Article 83(3) | Annex I, points 38 and 41 | |
Article 84 | Annex V, point 11 | |
Article 85(1) | Annex V, point 12 | |
Article 85(2) | Annex V, point 13 | |
Article 86(1) | Annex V, point 14 | |
Article 86(2) | Annex V, point 14a | |
Article 86(3) | ||
Article 86(4) | Annex V, point 15 | |
Article 86(5) | Annex V, point 16 | |
Article 86(6) | Annex V, point 17 | |
Article 86(7) | Annex V, point 18 | |
Article 86(8) | Annex V, point 19 | |
Article 86(9) | Annex V, point 20 | |
Article 86(10) | Annex V, point 21 | |
Article 86(11) | Annex V, point 22 | |
Article 87 | ||
Article 88(1) | Annex V, point 1 | |
Article 88 (2) | ||
Article 89 | ||
Article 90 | ||
Article 91 | ||
Article 92(1) | Annex V, point 23, second paragraph | |
Article 92(2), introductory sentence | Annex V, point 23, introductory sentence | |
Article 92(2)(a) | Annex V, point 23(a) | |
Article 92(2)(b) | Annex V, point 23(b) | |
Article 92(2)(c) | Annex V, point 23(c) | |
Article 92(2)(d) | Annex V, point 23(d) | |
Article 92(2)(e) | Annex V, point 23(e) | |
Article 92(2)(f) | Annex V, point 23(f) | |
Article 92(2)(g) | ||
Article 93 | Annex V, point 23(k) | |
Article 94(1)(a) | Annex V, point 23(g) | |
Article 94(1)(b) | Annex V, point 23(h) | |
Article 94(1)(c) | Annex V, point 23(i) | |
Article 94(1)(d) | ||
Article 94(1)(e) | Annex V, point 23(j) | |
Article 94(1)(f) | Annex V, point 23(l) | |
Article 94(1)(g) | ||
Article 94(1)(h) | Annex V, point 23(m) | |
Article 94(1)(i) | ||
Article 94(1)(j) | Annex V, point 23(n) | |
Article 94(1)(k) | Annex V, point 23(n) | |
Article 94(1)(l) | Annex V, point 23(o) | |
Article 94(1)(m) | Annex V, point 23(p) | |
Article 94(1)(n) | Annex V, point 23(q) | |
Article 94(1)(o) | Annex V, point 23(r) | |
Article 94(1)(p) | Annex V, point 23(s) | |
Article 94(1)(q) | Annex V, point 23(t) | |
Article 94(2) | Article 150(3)b | |
Article 95 | Annex V, point 24 | |
Article 96 | ||
Article 97(1) | Article 124(1) | |
Article 97(2) | Article 124(2) | |
Article 97(3) | Article 124(3) | |
Article 97(4) | Article 124(4) | |
Article 98(1) | Annex XI, point 1 | |
Article 98(2) | Annex XI, point 1a | |
Article 98(3) | Annex XI, point 2 | |
Article 98(4) | Annex XI, point 3 | |
Article 98(5) | Article 124(5) | |
Article 98(6) | ||
Article 98(7) | ||
Article 99 | ||
Article 100 | ||
Article 101 | ||
Article 102(1) | Article 136(1) | |
Article 102(2) | ||
Article 103 | ||
Article 104 | Article 136 | |
Article 105 | ||
Article 106(1) | Article 149 | |
Article 106(2) | ||
Article 107 | ||
Article 108(1), first subparagraph | Article 68(2) | |
Article 108(1), second subparagraph | Article 3 | |
Article 108(1), third subparagraph | ||
Article 108(2) | Article 71(1) | |
Article 108(3) | Article 71(2) | |
Article 108(4) | Article 73(2) | |
Article 109(1) | Article 68(1) | |
Article 109(2) | Article 73(3) | |
Article 109(3) | ||
Article 110(1) | Article 124(2) | |
Article 110(2) | Article 23 | |
Article 111(1) | Article 125(1) | Article 2 |
Article 111(2) | Article 125(2) | Article 2 |
Article 111(3) | Article 126(1) | |
Article 111(4) | Article 126(2) | |
Article 111(5) | Article 126(3) | |
Article 111(6) | Article 126(4) | |
Article 112(1) | Article 129(1), first subparagraph | |
Article 112(2) | Article 129(1), second subparagraph | |
Article 112(3) | Article 129(1), third subparagraph | |
Article 113(1)(a) | Article 129(3), first subparagraph | |
Article 113(1)(b) | ||
Article 113(2)(a), first subparagraph | Article 129(3), second subparagraph | |
Article 113(2)(b), first subparagraph | ||
Article 113(2), second subparagraph | Article 129(3), second subparagraph | |
Article 113(3), third subparagraph | Article 129(3), third subparagraph | |
Article 113(3) | Article 129(3), fourth to seventh subparagraph | |
Article 113(4) | Article 129(3), eighth and ninth subparagraph | |
Article 113(5) | Article 129(3), tenth and eleventh subparagraph | |
Article 114 | Article 130 | |
Article 115 | Article 131 | |
Article 116(1) | Article 131a(1), first, second and third subparagraph | |
Article 116(2) | Article 131a(1), fourth subparagraph | |
Article 116(3) | Article 131a(2), first subparagraph | |
Article 116(4) | Article 131a(2), second and third subparagraph | |
Article 116(5) | Article 131a(2), fourth and fifth subparagraph | |
Article 116(6) | Article 131a(2), sixth subparagraph | |
Article 116(7) | Article 131a(2), seventh subparagraph | |
Article 116(8) | Article 131a(2), eighth subparagraph | |
Article 116(9) | Article 131a(2), ninth subparagraph | |
Article 117(1) | Article 132(1), first to sixth subparagraph | |
Article 117(2) | Article 132(1), seventh and eighth subparagraph | |
Article 117(3) | Article 132(2) | |
Article 117(4) | Article 132(3) | |
Article 118 | Article 141 | |
Article 119(1) | Article 127(1) | |
Article 119(2) | Article 127(2) | |
Article 119(3) | Article 127(3) | |
Article 120 | Article 72a | |
Article 121 | Article 135 | |
Article 122 | Article 137 | |
Article 123 (1) | Article 138(1) | |
Article 123(2) | Article 138(2), first subparagraph | |
Article 124 | Article 139 | |
Article 125 | Article 140 | Article 2 |
Article 126 | Article 142 | |
Article 127 | Article 143 | |
Article 128 | ||
Article 129 | ||
Article 130 | ||
Article 131 | ||
Article 132 | ||
Article 133 | ||
Article 134 | ||
Article 135 | ||
Article 136 | ||
Article 137 | ||
Article 138 | ||
Article 139 | ||
Article 140 | ||
Article 141 | ||
Article 142 | ||
Article 143 | Article 144 | |
Article 144(1) | Article 122a(9) | |
Article 144(2) | Article 69(4) | |
Article 144(3) | Article 70(4) | |
Article 145 | Article 150(1) | |
Article 146 | Article 150(1a) | |
Article 147(1) | Article 151(1) | |
Article 147(2) | Article 151(2) | |
Article 148(1) | Article 151a(3) | |
Article 148(2) | Article 151a(1) | |
Article 148(3) | Article 151b | |
Article 148(4) | Article 151a(2) | |
Article 148(5) | Article 151c | |
Article 149 | ||
Article 150 | ||
Article 151 | ||
Article 152 | Article 29 | |
Article 153 | Article 30 | |
Article 154 | Article 33 | |
Article 155 | Article 40 | |
Article 156 | Article 41 | |
Article 157 | Article 42 | |
Article 158 | Article 42a | |
Article 159 | Article 43 | |
Article 160 | ||
Article 161(1) | Article 156, sixth paragraph | |
Article 161(2) | Article 156, fourth paragraph | |
Article 161(3) | ||
Article 161(4) | ||
Article 161(5) | ||
Article 161(6) | ||
Article 161(7) | ||
Article 161(8) | ||
Article 161(9) | ||
Article 162(1) | ||
Article 162(2) | ||
Article 162(3) | ||
Article 162(4) | Article 157(1), third subparagraph | |
Article 162(5) | ||
Article 162(6) | ||
Article 163 | Article 158 | |
Article 164 | Article 159 | |
Article 165 | Article 160 | |
Annex I | Annex I |