Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC
Modified by
- Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Councilof 13 July 2009concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC(Text with EEA relevance), 32009L0073, August 14, 2009
Corrected by
- Corrigendum to Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, 32003L0055R(02), January 23, 2004
(a) operate, maintain and develop under economic conditions secure, reliable and efficient transmission, storage and/or LNG facilities, with due regard to the environment; (b) refrain from discriminating between system users or classes of system users, particularly in favour of its related undertakings; (c) provide any other transmission system operator, any other storage system operator, any other LNG system operator and/or any distribution system operator, sufficient information to ensure that the transport and storage of natural gas may take place in a manner compatible with the secure and efficient operation of the interconnected system; (d) provide system users with the information they need for efficient access to the system.
(a) those persons responsible for the management of the transmission system operator may not participate in company structures of the integrated natural gas undertaking responsible, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of the production, distribution and supply of natural gas; (b) appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the professional interests of persons responsible for the management of the transmission system operator are taken into account in a manner that ensures that they are capable of acting independently; (c) the transmission system operator shall have effective decision-making rights, independent from the integrated gas undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. This should not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on assets regulated indirectly in accordance with Article 25(2) in a subsidiary are protected. In particular, this shall enable the parent company to approve the annual financial plan, or any equivalent instrument, of the transmission system operator and to set global limits on the levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It shall not permit the parent company to give instructions regarding day-to-day operations, nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission lines, that do not exceed the terms of the approved financial plan, or any equivalent instrument; (d) the transmission system operator shall establish a compliance programme, which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded, and ensure that observance of it is adequately monitored. The programme shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet this objective. An annual report, setting out the measures taken, shall be submitted by the person or body responsible for monitoring the compliance programme to the regulatory authority referred to in Article 25(1) and shall be published.
(a) those persons responsible for the management of the distribution system operator may not participate in company structures of the integrated natural gas undertaking responsible, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of the production, transmission and supply of natural gas; (b) appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the professional interests of persons responsible for the management of the distribution system operator are taken into account in a manner that ensures that they are capable of acting independently; (c) the distribution system operator shall have effective decision-making rights, independent from the integrated gas undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. This should not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on assets, regulated indirectly in accordance with Article 25(2), in a subsidiary are protected. In particular, this shall enable the parent company to approve the annual financial plan, or any equivalent instrument, of the distribution system operator and to set global limits on the levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It shall not permit the parent company to give instructions regarding day-to-day operations, nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of distribution lines, that do not exceed the terms of the approved financial plan, or any equivalent instrument; (d) the distribution system operator shall establish a compliance programme, which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded, and ensure that observance of it is adequately monitored. The programme shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet this objective. An annual report, setting out the measures taken, shall be submitted by the person or body responsible for monitoring the compliance programme to the regulatory authority referred to in Article 25(1) and shall be published.
(a) those persons responsible for the management of the combined system operator may not participate in company structures of the integrated natural gas undertaking responsible, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of the production and supply of natural gas; (b) appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the professional interests of persons responsible for the management of the combined system operator are taken into account in a manner that ensures that they are capable of acting independently; (c) the combined system operator shall have effective decision-making rights, independent from the integrated gas undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. This should not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on assets, regulated indirectly in accordance with Article 25(2) in a subsidiary are protected. In particular, this shall enable the parent company to approve the annual financial plan, or any equivalent instrument, of the combined system operator and to set global limits on the levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It shall not permit the parent company to give instructions regarding day-to-day operations, nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission and distribution lines, that do not exceed the terms of the approved financial plan, or any equivalent instrument; (d) the combined system operator shall establish a compliance programme, which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded, and ensure that observance of it is adequately monitored. The programme shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet this objective. An annual report, setting out the measures taken, shall be submitted by the person or body responsible for monitoring the compliance programme to the regulatory authority referred to in Article 25(1) and shall be published.
(a) the need to refuse access where there is an incompatibility of technical specifications which cannot be reasonably overcome; (b) the need to avoid difficulties which cannot be reasonably overcome and could prejudice the efficient, current and planned future production of hydrocarbons, including that from fields of marginal economic viability; (c) the need to respect the duly substantiated reasonable needs of the owner or operator of the upstream pipeline network for the transport and processing of gas and the interests of all other users of the upstream pipeline network or relevant processing or handling facilities who may be affected; and (d) the need to apply their laws and administrative procedures, in conformity with Community law, for the grant of authorisation for production or upstream development.
(a) the investment must enhance competition in gas supply and enhance security of supply; (b) the level of risk attached to the investment is such that the investment would not take place unless an exemption was granted; (c) the infrastructure must be owned by a natural or legal person which is separate at least in terms of its legal form from the system operators in whose systems that infrastructure will be built; (d) charges are levied on users of that infrastructure; (e) the exemption is not detrimental to competition or the effective functioning of the internal gas market, or the efficient functioning of the regulated system to which the infrastructure is connected.
(a) The regulatory authority referred to in Article 25 may, on a case by case basis, decide on the exemption referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. However, Member States may provide that the regulatory authorities shall submit, for formal decision, to the relevant body in the Member State its opinion on the request for an exemption. This opinion shall be published together with the decision. (b) (i) The exemption may cover all or parts of, respectively, the new infrastructure, the existing infrastructure with significantly increased capacity or the modification of the existing infrastructure. (ii) In deciding to grant an exemption consideration shall be given, on a case by case basis, to the need to impose conditions regarding the duration of the exemption and non-discriminatory access to the interconnector. (iii) When deciding on the conditions in this subparagraph account shall, in particular, be taken of the duration of contracts, additional capacity to be built or the modification of existing capacity, the time horizon of the project and national circumstances.
(c) When granting an exemption the relevant authority may decide upon the rules and mechanisms for management and allocation of capacity insofar as this does not prevent the implementation of long term contracts. (d) The exemption decision, including any conditions referred to in (b), shall be duly reasoned and published. (e) In the case of an interconnector any exemption decision shall be taken after consultation with the other Member States or regulatory authorities concerned.
(a) the detailed reasons on the basis of which the regulatory authority, or Member State, granted the exemption, including the financial information justifying the need for the exemption; (b) the analysis undertaken of the effect on competition and the effective functioning of the internal gas market resulting from the grant of the exemption; (c) the reasons for the time period and the share of the total capacity of the gas infrastructure in question for which the exemption is granted; (d) in case the exemption relates to an interconnector, the result of the consultation with the Member States concerned or regulatory authorities; (e) the contribution of the infrastructure to the diversification of gas supply.
(a) until 1 July 2004, the eligible customers as specified in Article 18 of Directive 98/30/EC. Member States shall publish by 31 January each year the criteria for the definition of these eligible customers; (b) from 1 July 2004, at the latest, all non-household customers; (c) from 1 July 2007, all customers.
(a) contracts for the supply with an eligible customer in the system of another Member State shall not be prohibited if the customer is eligible in both systems involved; (b) in cases where transactions as described in point (a) are refused because the customer is eligible in only one of the two systems, the Commission may, taking into account the situation in the market and the common interest, oblige the refusing party to execute the requested supply, at the request of one of the Member States of the two systems.
(a) natural gas undertakings established within their territory to supply the eligible customers through a direct line; (b) any such eligible customer within their territory to be supplied through a direct line by natural gas undertakings.
(a) the rules on the management and allocation of interconnection capacity, in conjunction with the regulatory authority or authorities of those Member States with which interconnection exists; (b) any mechanisms to deal with congested capacity within the national gas system; (c) the time taken by transmission and distribution system operators to make connections and repairs; (d) the publication of appropriate information by transmission and distribution system operators concerning interconnectors, grid usage and capacity allocation to interested parties, taking into account the need to treat non-aggregated information as commercially confidential; (e) the effective unbundling of accounts as referred to in Article 17, to ensure there are no cross subsidies between transmission, distribution, storage, LNG and supply activities; (f) the access conditions to storage, linepack and to other ancillary services as provided for in Article 19; (g) the extent to which transmission and distribution system operators fulfil their tasks in accordance with Articles 8 and 12; (h) the level of transparency and competition.
(a) connection and access to national networks, including transmission and distribution tariffs, and terms, conditions and tariffs for access to LNG facilities. These tariffs, or methodologies, shall allow the necessary investments in the networks and LNG facilities to be carried out in a manner allowing these investments to ensure the viability of the networks and LNG facilities; (b) the provision of balancing services.
(a) the objective of achieving a competitive gas market; (b) the need to fulfil public service obligations and to ensure security of supply; (c) the position of the natural gas undertaking in the gas market and the actual state of competition in this market; (d) the seriousness of the economic and financial difficulties encountered by natural gas undertakings and transmission undertakings or eligible customers; (e) the dates of signature and terms of the contract or contracts in question, including the extent to which they allow for market changes; (f) the efforts made to find a solution to the problem; (g) the extent to which, when accepting the take-or-pay commitments in question, the undertaking could reasonably have foreseen, having regard to the provisions of this Directive, that serious difficulties were likely to arise; (h) the level of connection of the system with other systems and the degree of interoperability of these systems; and (i) the effects the granting of a derogation would have on the correct application of this Directive as regards the smooth functioning of the internal natural gas market.
the need for infrastructure investments, which would not be economic to operate in a competitive market environment, the level and pay-back prospects of investments required, the size and maturity of the gas system in the area concerned, the prospects for the gas market concerned, the geographical size and characteristics of the area or region concerned, and socioeconomic and demographic factors.
(a) For gas infrastructure other than distribution infrastructure a derogation may be granted only if no gas infrastructure has been established in this area, or has been so established for less than 10 years. The temporary derogation may not exceed 10 years from the time gas is first supplied in the area. (b) For distribution infrastructure a derogation may be granted for a time period which may not exceed 20 years for the distribution infrastructure from the time gas is first supplied through the said system in the area.
(a) the experience gained and progress made in creating a complete and fully operational internal market in natural gas and the obstacles that remain in this respect including aspects of market dominance, concentration in the market, predatory or anti-competitive behaviour; (b) the derogations granted under this Directive, including implementation of the derogation provided for in Article 13(2) with a view to a possible revision of the threshold; (c) the extent to which the unbundling and tarification requirements contained in this Directive have been successful in ensuring fair and non-discriminatory access to the Community's gas system and equivalent levels of competition, as well as the economic, environmental and social consequences of the opening of the gas market for customers; (d) an examination of issues relating to system capacity levels and security of supply of natural gas in the Community, and in particular the existing and projected balance between demand and supply, taking into account the physical capacity for exchanges between areas and the development of storage (including the question of the proportionality of market regulation in this field); (e) special attention will be given to the measures taken in Member States to cover peak demand and to deal with shortfalls of one or more suppliers; (f) a general assessment of the progress achieved with regard to bilateral relations with third countries which produce and export or transport natural gas, including progress in market integration, trade and access to the networks of such third countries; (g) the need for possible harmonisation requirements which are not linked to the provisions of this Directive.
the existence of non-discriminatory network access; effective regulation; the development of interconnection infrastructure, the conditions of transit, and the security of supply situation in the Community; the extent to which the full benefits of the opening of the market are accruing to small enterprises and households, notably with respect to public service standards; the extent to which markets are in practice open to effective competition, including aspects of market dominance, market concentration and predatory or anti-competitive behaviour; the extent to which customers are actually switching suppliers and renegotiating tariffs; price developments, including supply prices, in relation to the degree of the opening of markets; whether effective and non-discriminatory third party access to gas storage exists when technically and/or economically necessary for providing efficient access to the system; the experience gained in the application of the Directive as far as the effective independence of system operators in vertically integrated undertakings is concerned and whether other measures in addition to functional independence and separation of accounts have been developed which have effects equivalent to legal unbundling.
(a) have a right to a contract with their gas service provider that specifies: the identity and address of the supplier; the services provided, the service quality levels offered, as well as the time for the initial connection; if offered, the types of maintenance service offered; the means by which up to date information on all applicable tariffs and maintenance charges may be obtained; the duration of the contract, the conditions for renewal and termination of services and of the contract, the existence of any right of withdrawal; any compensation and the refund arrangements which apply if contracted service quality levels are not met; and the method of initiating procedures for settlement of disputes in accordance with point (f).
Conditions shall be fair and well known in advance. In any case, this information should be provided prior to the conclusion or confirmation of the contract. Where contracts are concluded through intermediaries, the above information shall also be provided prior to the conclusion of the contract: (b) are given adequate notice of any intention to modify contractual conditions and are informed about their right of withdrawal when the notice is given. Service providers shall notify their subscribers directly of any increase in charges, at an appropriate time no later than one normal billing period after the increase comes into effect. Member States shall ensure that customers are free to withdraw from contracts if they do not accept the new conditions, notified to them by their gas service provider; (c) receive transparent information on applicable prices and tariffs and on standard terms and conditions, in respect of access to and use of gas services; (d) are offered a wide choice of payment methods. Any difference in terms and conditions shall reflect the costs to the supplier of the different payment systems. General terms and conditions shall be fair and transparent. They shall be given in clear and comprehensible language. Customers shall be protected against unfair or misleading selling methods; (e) shall not be charged for changing supplier; (f) benefit from transparent, simple and inexpensive procedures for dealing with their complaints. Such procedures shall enable disputes to be settled fairly and promptly with provision, where warranted, for a system of reimbursement and/or compensation. They should follow, wherever possible, the principles set out in Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC ;OJ L 115, 17.4.1998, p. 31 .(g) connected to the gas system are informed about their rights to be supplied, under the national legislation applicable, with natural gas of a specified quality at reasonable prices.
Directive 98/30/EC | This Directive | |
---|---|---|
Article 1 | Article 1 | Scope |
Article 2 | Article 2 | Definitions |
Article 3 | Article 3 | PSOs and Customer protection |
Article 4 | Article 4 | Authorisation procedure |
— | Article 5 | Monitoring of security of supply |
Article 5 | Article 6 | Technical rules |
Article 6 | Article 7 | Designation of TSOs |
Article 7 | Article 8 | Tasks of TSOs |
— | Article 9 | Unbundling of TSOs |
Article 8 | Article 10 | Confidentiality for TSOs |
Article 9(1) | Article 11 | Designation of DSOs |
Article 10 | Article 12 | Tasks of DSOs |
— | Article 13 | Unbundling of DSOs |
Article 11 | Article 14 | Confidentiality for DSOs |
— | Article 15 | Combined operator |
Article 12 | Article 16 | Right of access to accounts |
Article 13 | Article 17 | Unbundling of accounts |
Article 14-16 | Article 18 | Third Party Access |
— | Article 19 | Access to storage |
Article 23 | Article 20 | Access to upstream pipeline networks |
Article 17 | Article 21 | Refusal of access |
— | Article 22 | New infrastructure |
Article 18 and 19 | Article 23 | Market opening and reciprocity |
Article 20 | Article 24 | Direct lines |
Article 21(2)-(3) and 22 | Article 25 | Regulatory authorities |
Article 24 | Article 26 | Safeguard measures |
Article 25 | Article 27 | Derogations in relation to take-or-pay commitments |
Article 26 | Article 28 | Emergent and Isolated Markets |
— | Article 29 | Review procedure |
— | Article 30 | Committee |
Article 27 and 28 | Article 31 | Reporting |
— | Article 32 | Repeals |
Article 29 | Article 33 | Implementation |
Article 30 | Article 34 | Entry into force |
Article 31 | Article 35 | Addressees |
Annex A | Measures on consumer protection |